This paper responds to John Harris's vigorous analysis of the ethical principles involved in organ retention. The author contends that Harris overlooks the context in which revelations about organ retention came about in the UK. He pays insufficient regard to deeply held cultural and religious beliefs, and does not fully address the claims of the living to determine the fate of their body after death, or the interests of bereaved families in laying a beloved relative to rest. The paper argues that the fundamental principle governing removal and retention of body parts after death must rest on a strong presumption that such body parts should be removed only with the suficient consent of the deceased or his family.

This paper offers a critical perspective on how immigration control regulates the family lives of British residents and nationals of migrant descent. Family migration is problematic for a government determined to restrict long-term immigration to the skilled. The extended or ‘corporate’ family is particularly problematic because it also causes the reproduction of forms of family life that are regarded as oppressive and a barrier to cohesion. Policies have tended to minimise these forms of migration, and recent changes and proposals are consistent with that. The result is the increased marginalisation or exclusion of some migrants and pressure on migrant family life to conform more closely to majority norms.

In the Republic of Ireland nearly all primary schools are state-funded but the vast majority of these schools are owned and managed by religious bodies. There is no system of state-run schools. This paper discusses the protection of freedom of religion within this unique system of schooling. In particular, it examines the notion of ‘the integrated curriculum’ whereby all schools in receipt of state funding are legally obliged to ensure that a religious spirit informs and vivifies the whole work of the school. The paper identifies the international human rights standards relevant to the teaching of religion in schools. Through empirical evidence based on interviews with parents, teachers and pupils, an assessment is made of how far Irish law and practice respect these standards. The outcome of this evaluation of the use of religious bodies in non-state service provision is discussed.

This paper reconsiders images of the judge and, in particular, the position of the woman judge using fairy tale and myth. It begins by exploring the actuality of women's exclusion within the judiciary, traditional explanations for this and the impact of recent changes. It goes on to consider the image of the Herculean judge, arguing that whilst we may view him as an ideological construct, or even as a fairy tale, we routinely deny this to ourselves and to others. This both ensures the normative survival of Hercules and simultaneously constrains counter-images of judges, including that of the woman judge, who becomes almost a contradiction in terms, faced with the need to shed her difference and fit the fairy tale. Like the little mermaid, the woman judge must trade her voice for partial acceptance in the prince's world.

This image of silencing which Andersen's tale so vividly captures highlights a paradox in current discourses of adjudication. On the one hand, women judges are viewed as desirable in order to broaden the range of perspectives on the bench, thus making the judiciary more representative; on the other hand, judges are supposed to be without perspective, thus suggesting there is little need for a representative judiciary. Feminists and other commentators negotiate their way uncomfortably through this territory, acknowledging a gender dimension to adjudication, but failing fully to confront its implications. This paper seeks to ‘undress’ the judge, to flush out images of adjudication which deter or prevent women from joining the judiciary and constrain their potential within it. It highlights both the role of the imagination in existing conceptions of adjudication and the increasing necessity for a re-imagined Hercules – an alternative understanding of the judge which women and other groups currently underrepresented on the bench can comfortably and constructively occupy.

There is no agreed definition of socio-legal studies: some use the term broadly to cover the study of law in its social context, but I prefer to use it to refer to the study of the law and legal institutions from the perspectives of the social sciences (viz all the social sciences – not only sociology). The last decade has seen many developments in this enterprise. Many younger academic lawyers became dissatisfied with the traditional type of legal scholarship, which concentrated on the internal consistency of the law and the inter-relationship of different legal rules. They showed great interest in studying the realities of the law in action, the social effects of law and the relationship of law to wider questions of social structure, and naturally turned to the social sciences for assistance.

This paper argues that climate change litigation is an important component of the governance framework that has emerged to regulate how states respond to climate change at the global, regional and local levels. The paper examines climate change-related cases from selected jurisdictions, including Australia and the EU, and proposes a theoretical framework to shed light on the use of litigation as a regulatory response to climate change.

No legal integration project can circumvent the matter of language. Yet, lawyers advocating one form or other of Europeanisation of law, apparently basing themselves on the unexamined view that everything is adequately translatable, do not seem prepared to address linguistic issues. But a move beyond law's disciplinary barriers – in particular, a foray into translation studies (or ‘translatology’) – compels one to challenge the effectivity of the uniformisation agenda. First, it shows that the inherently local character of language resists the establishment of uniform law. Second, it demonstrates that no uniform law, irrespective of the language in which it is written, can account for local legal experience. Both claims suggest that language simply cannot be made subservient to the lawyer's agenda and that the assumption that it can be ignored is mistaken.

This paper explores understandings of harm in law through the application of a feminist perspective. Drawing on the idea of harm as a social construct, the paper considers the role of law in shaping perceptions of when a harm has occurred and whether it should be redressed. These themes are illustrated by means of a close legal and contextual analysis of the House of Lords decision in Waters v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, in which a woman was allegedly bullied at work for reporting she had been raped by a fellow officer. The paper raises questions about why this particular claimant had difficulty establishing that she had suffered harm, despite alleging 89 separate hostile acts by fellow officers, and even though the courts who heard her claim assumed for the purposes of legal argument that the facts alleged were true. It is argued that the narrowness of the approach adopted by most of the judges who heard Ms Waters' claim precluded recognition of the seriousness of the allegations and the social, political, and legal need to provide redress.

In the wake of the financial crisis, there has been much discussion about whether boards (particularly of banks) are sufficiently accountable. However, while a significant literature has grown up in relation to the study of accountability in various disciplines, particularly public administration and politics, in the field of corporate governance there has been little consideration of what accountability means or entails. This is problematic: without a clearer idea of the elusive concept of accountability, debates about board accountability may be at cross-purposes. It will be difficult to assess whether particular corporate governance mechanisms promote board accountability, and if not, why not. The lack of clarity can also mask accountability deficits. This paper addresses this gap, setting out why accountability is important and offering an account of what accountability means in the corporate governance context, focusing on board accountability, in order to provide a framework for future research.

This paper concerns the origination, development and emergence of what might be termed ‘Olympic law’. This has an impact across borders and with transnational effect. It examines the unique process of creation of these laws, laws created by a national legislature to satisfy the commercial demands of a private body, the International Olympic Committee (IOC). It begins by critically locating the IOC and Olympic law and examining Olympic law as a transnational force. Using two case studies, those of ambush marketing and ticket touting, it demonstrates how private entities can be the drivers of specific, self-interested legislation when operating as a transnational organisation from within the global administrative space and notes the potential dangers of such legal transplants.

Traditionally, European continental judiciaries have been organised along a bureaucratic, civil service model. Early recruitment was complemented by the strong hierarchical character of the judicial organisation. Therefore, in this type of judiciary guarantees of independence have been problematic because of the influence hierarchical superiors (or in some cases the government itself) had on promotions.

Since the Second World War the need for change has been increasingly felt. The main aims have been to increase external independence, especially vis-à-vis the executive, and to protect lower ranking judges from negative influence by the senior judiciary, often considered to be too responsive to governmental wishes.

Until recently claims for damages by patients against their doctors were rare in England. Patients who did pursue such claims often found scant sympathy from Her Majesty's judges. The clinical judgment of the medical practitioner was accorded something very like immunity from suit. Since 1980 the pace of medical litigation has quickened dramatically. Patients seem less and less willing to accept without complaint the results of unsuccessful or injurious treatment. They are more and more inclined to question their doctor's judgment. Medical litigation and scrutiny of medical decision making is highly newsworthy in 1987. The practice of medical litigation looks set to become profitable for lawyers. To the cynical oberver all this might look like good news for lawyers and bad news for doctors.

A fundamental aspect of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) is the statutory endorsement of a functional approach to capacity. In principle, this requires a separate assessment of capacity in respect of each decision to be made. Most capacity assessments take place at a non-judicial level, and, outside of day-to-day decisions, the most common assessors are likely to be healthcare professionals. This paper investigates the practical operation of the capacity assessment process at both judicial and non-judicial levels. It asks whether the process can deliver on the MCA's goal of preserving maximum decision-making freedom, while, at the same time, providing an appropriate degree of protection. It argues that assessors who are not legally trained encounter significant difficulties in carrying out the essentially legal task of assessing capacity. It also shows that assessors' values and biases, both professional and personal, are likely to impact on the conclusions reached. Having identified these difficulties, the paper considers their implications for the MCA's approach to capacity. It evaluates the attempts in the MCA itself to address assessors' limitations and argues that these will not have a substantial impact on the way in which capacity assessors operate. It considers other ways in which the quality of assessment could be improved and puts forward specific suggestions as to how greater assessor accountability can be delivered and increased rigour introduced to the capacity assessment process.

Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 has often been derided as a Cinderella provision, but during the last few years, this has started to change. This paper examines how Art 14 has developed and how it may live up to its potential as a powerful non-discrimination principle. The case-law developments in relation to the ‘ambit’ requirement in Art 14, the development of indirect discrimination case-law and the approval of positive action, all point to a more substantive conception of equality, which offers protection to disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.

This paper is concerned with the legal and regulatory control of electoral campaigning online, in particular ‘microtargeting’. There has been a longstanding consensus in the UK on how to control political advertising, yet the shift of expenditure to the online environment, together with innovations in digital campaigning tools, are exposing tensions and gaps in the current regime. One central harm associated with microtargeting is its potential to undermine meaningful democratic deliberation. The paper interrogates the issues through the lens of electoral law and regulation, and questions the extent to which a recalibration is necessary to deal with the challenges of digital campaigning.

Although the constitutional reform programme undertaken by the Blair administration is formally consistent with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, it is clear that the human rights and devolution legislation, in particular, significantly alter the political and constitutional environment within which Parliament's legislative powers are exercised. This paper considers whether it is meaningfiul, within this new constitutional setting, to adhere to the traditional notion of sovereignty. It is argued that the disparity between a Parliament whose powers are formally unlimited yet increasingly constrained, in political terms, by norms based on fundamental rights and devolved governance may be accommodated, in the short term, by means of constitutional conventions which trace the constitutionally acceptable limits of legislative action by Parliament. However, following examination of the nature of convention and its relationship with law and constitutional principle, it is argued that the possibility arises, in the long term, that conventional limits upon legislative freedom may ultimately evolve into legal limiis, thus ensuring that the fundamental values embraced by the legal order are acknowledged not merely in pragmatic or conventional terms, but as a matter of constitutional law.

This article argues that professional codes of conduct cannot perform the important task of ensuring that lawyers uphold high ethical standards. Instead, moral behaviour by lawyers requires the development of fixed behavioural attributes relevant to legal practice - what may be called a lawyer's professional moral character. At the same time, however, along with other factors, professional codes are important in that they can either contribute to or detract from the successful development of professional moral character. If so, it is argued that in order to have the best chance of assisting the character development of lawyers, codes should neither take the form of highly detailed or extremely vague, aspirational norms, but should instead guide ethical decision-making by requiring them to consider a wide range of contextual factors when resolving ethical dilemmas.

The judgment of the House of Lords in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority appeared to usher in an era ofjudicial respect for children's rights and the autonomy of the older child. Just a decade later the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Re R and Re W were perceived as signalling a reversion to judicial paternalism and dealing a near fatal blow to adolescent autonomy. The fundamental philosophy of the Children Act 1989 itself, in which the wishes of children and the ‘rights’ of the more mature minor play such a central part, came under attack in a continuing series of cases at first instance where judges overruled the judgments of older children in favour of the judgment of their doctors.

In Spring 2004 the French Parliament agreed to the passing of a Bill named ‘Application of the Principle of Secularity’. The new law was brought into effect on 2 September 2004, banning all ‘ostentatious’ religious symbols in state schools and the enactment denies Muslim schoolgirls the right to wear the ‘hijab’ (or the traditional Muslim headscarf) in French public schools. The new enactment has stirred controversy within the Islamic world where many have considered the law to be an example of ‘Islamophobia’ and the West's intolerance towards the religion of Islam. This article aims to understand the historical background and the rationale of the ban on religious symbols in French state schools and seeks to examine some of the main criticisms of the new law.