To many in the West, the League of Nations was to establish political peace between nations. To the Cuban sugar-producing elite of the 1920s and 1930s, however, the League was an important socioeconomic institution used to augment many of Cuba's first modern state institutions. This article explores how and why Cuban delegates were the principals behind the 1937 International Sugar Agreement – one of the League's few operational economic treaties. This treaty sheds light onto how actors from the so-called industrial core and agricultural periphery used international law, institutions, and practice to negotiate and renegotiate their relationship with each other.

On 28 and 29 October 2011, a conference was held in The Hague on International Criminal Law (ICL) as a cultural and legal hybrid. The aim of the conference convenors was to facilitate an exchange of thoughts between legal scholars, practitioners, and social scientists on the nature of ICL and to discuss the role (legal) culture plays in international criminal justice. The recent discussion is dominated by the adversarial (common law)–inquisitorial (civil law) dichotomy and centres on the hybrid nature of the procedure in international criminal law. The debate focuses on how a fair and efficient trial can be safeguarded by observing the rights of the accused and other participants through an operational criminal procedure. Sometimes, this clash of legal systems has become an end in itself, resulting in a debate on which system is superior. At least in theory, however, modern international criminal procedural law seems to have overcome the adversarial–inquisitorial dichotomy, since it combines features of both common- and civil-law systems. This unique compromise structure poses a challenge to the practitioners who – although trained in and influenced by their respective national systems – have to apply the procedural norms at the international level and, in doing so, find an appropriate balance between adversarial and inquisitorial features. This is even more challenging since the single elements of the different legal traditions do not fit together seamlessly, leading to myriad, heated disagreements over how to combine them into a single, coherent, workable legal system.

Paragraph 80 of the Kosovo AO reflects a very traditional conception of international law. By insisting on the inter-state character of the principle of territorial integrity, the Court refused to challenge the classical argument of the ‘neutrality’ of international law in regard to secession. The Court also refused any reinterpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. As already stated in the Wall Advisory Opinion, the prohibition of the use of force is only applicable between states. It does not apply between states and non-state actors, whether secessionist or not. Similarly, the Court refused the argument of ‘remedial secession’, at least as far as it would imply a right to violate the principle of territorial integrity of a state by a secessionist group. Indeed, if the latter principle is not applicable in such situations, it logically cannot be violated and there is therefore no right to infringe it. Finally, the Court refused to consider Kosovo as a ‘special case’ or a sui generis situation. According to the Court, this situation must be governed by the traditional rules of general international law. This implies that Kosovo did not violate international law by proclaiming independence. But this also implies that a declaration of independence by a secessionist group inside Kosovo would not be contrary to international law. Moreover, it can be pointed out that if Kosovo is not a state (a hypothesis perfectly compatible with the advisory opinion), then general international law would not preclude Serbia from invoking the argument of ‘legal neutrality’ to support such a secessionist group.

This paper finds that the ICJ's Kosovo Advisory Opinion reached the right result, but in a methodologically not fully satisfactory way. It examines five aspects that underpin the opinion: the temporal (purely ex post) perspective; the Court's equation of legal conformity and non-prohibition and the idea of a deliberate silence of international law; the applicability of the Lotus principle that was evoked by numerous states in the proceedings; the structural analogies between international law and private, criminal, or public law; and the oscillation between legal positivist and jusnaturalist paradigms. Finally, the paper argues in favour of procedural requirements for the international lawfulness of secession, and claims that this approach is compatible with the findings of the Advisory Opinion.

On 21 January 2011, the pre-trial judge of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (hereinafter ‘STL’) posed several questions to the Appeals Chamber (‘Chamber’)1 pursuant to Rule 68(G) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.2 Three of these questions dealt with the crime of terrorism.3 (i) Should the Tribunal take into account international notions on terrorism even though Article 2 of the Statute only refers to the Lebanese Criminal Code (‘LCC’)? (ii) If so, is there an international definition of ‘terrorism’ and how should it be applied? (iii) If not, how is the Lebanese definition of ‘terrorism’ to be interpreted by the Chamber? Both the prosecution and defence submitted extensive briefs dealing, inter alia, with these questions.4 Additionally, two amicus curiae briefs were submitted.5 On 16 February 2011, the Chamber issued its (interlocutory) decision pursuant to Rule 176 bis (A).6 The Chamber argues, in a nutshell, that terrorism has become a crime under international law and that the respective international definition influences the (applicable) Lebanese law. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that the Chamber's considerations, albeit innovative and creative, are essentially obiter, since the applicable terrorism definition can be found, without further ado, in the Lebanese law. There is no need to internationalize or reinterpret this law; it should be applied before the STL as understood in Lebanese practice. As to the Chamber's affirmation that there is a crime of terrorism under international law, I will argue, in the second part of the paper, that the available sources indicate, at best, that terrorism is a particularly serious transnational, treaty-based crime that comes close to a ‘true’ international crime but has not yet reached this status. Notwithstanding, the general elements of this crime can be inferred from the relevant sources of international law.

International criminal justice is based to a large extent on extrapolations from criminal-law research on domestic systems. The difficult exercise of arriving at a common denominator is exacerbated by the systemic dichotomy of the so-called common-law and civil-law models, which, in turn, have now been joined by a third contender: public international law. Each of these has its own methods of approaching the task of solving legal problems. This paper queries the inter-model conversation that is happening so far and asks the question as to whether it is necessary to hold this discussion at a much more fundamental level than it would seem has been the case so far. It does so at the example of the relationship between German and English and Welsh law, but its concerns and conclusions merit consideration for the entire debate between the systems.

Written from an outsider's perspective, this paper tries to capture the ethos, or, if you prefer, the Sittlichkeit, of international criminal law. It argues that international criminal law can profitably be seen as an ethos, rather than a body of law. In this telling, international criminal law, despite its name, emerges as an ethical–administrative enterprise rather than a legal one. If placed alongside global administrative law, for instance, international criminal law appears as alegal rather than illegal, so that to criticize international criminal law for violating, say, the ‘principle of legality’ would be like faulting apples for not producing orange juice, and oranges for not making apple pie.

This article focuses on the reasoning employed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion rendered on 22 July 2010 with respect to the most formidable legal impasse of the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence: the lex specialis that applied at the critical date, and which the Court affirmed continues to apply to Kosovo, as established by the United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 1244 (1999). The Court's analysis of the applicable lex specialis is questionable. Its analysis was coloured by the narrow approach it took to answering the question it was asked to address. It queried an unambiguous factual qualification made by the General Assembly, and it disregarded factual qualifications made by the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and indeed all relevant actors. It failed to uphold the legally binding provisions of Security Council Resolution 1244, and it did not qualify as unlawful or invalid an act of a subsidiary body of the Security Council that was undertaken in excess of authority and contrary to the fundamental provisions of that Resolution. The resolute conclusion of the majority of the Court that the unilateral declaration of independence did not violate international law seems to read as a declaration of ‘independence from international law’.

Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been mostly hailed as a victory, Islamic states still regard its application of international criminal-law norms with scepticism. The Rome Statute instructs the Court to apply general principles of law derived from national laws of legal systems of the world including the national laws of states that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime but, so far, the Court has relied purely upon Western inspiration and may fail to acquire the legitimacy to establish a universal system. Among the legal systems that are unjustifiably neglected by the ICC is the Islamic legal tradition. This paper argues that the principles of Islamic law are, for the most part, consistent with internationally recognized norms and standards, particularly those enshrined in the Rome Statute, and are on an equal footing with the common and Continental legal systems that are currently employed by the Court in the search for general principles of law.

The article presents an anthropological analysis of witness testimony about ritual murder, cannibalism, and secret societies in the trial against Charles Taylor in The Hague. In the first part, a comprehensive in-depth analysis of the testimony of one prosecution witness serves as a case study to illustrate the difficulties of assessing the veracity of witness statements on alleged atrocities linked to African religious and spiritual beliefs. The second part contextualizes the testimony heard in the trial against Charles Taylor by drawing on historical sources and the academic literature on West Africa. The analysis reveals striking parallels between the prosecution narrative and colonial representations of Africa as a mysterious and savage place.

In 2011, the Appeals Chamber of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon purported to identify a customary international crime of transnational terrorism and applied it in interpreting domestic terrorism offences under Lebanese law. This article argues that the Tribunal's decision was incorrect because all the sources of custom relied upon by the Appeals Chamber – national legislation, judicial decisions, regional and international treaties, and UN resolutions – were misinterpreted, exaggerated, or erroneously applied. The Tribunal's laissez-faire attitude towards custom formation jeopardizes the freedom from retrospective criminal punishment, subjugating the human rights of potential defendants to the Tribunal's own moralizing conception of what the law ought to be. The decision is not good for international law or public confidence in its institutions and processes.

On 10 May 2001, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey pronouncing on the legal consequences of Turkey's invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus since 1974. The Court found Turkey responsible for continuing violations of the right to the home and property of Greek-Cypriots. Invoking the Namibia principle, the Court found that remedies in the occupied part of Cyprus may be regarded as domestic remedies of Turkey and that the question of their effectiveness was to be considered in the specific circumstances in which it arises. On 1 March 2010, the Court decided that a Commission in the occupied area was a remedy that should be exhausted by the complainants for the above violations. Significant legal questions were determined relating to the effectiveness of this remedy with far-reaching consequences concerning the right to home and property as well as other aspects of human rights and international law.

The Kosovo Advisory Opinion reaches its conclusions in what is admittedly a very condensed and swift way of reasoning. The Court did not expand upon the question that was put to it. However, it is unfair to criticize the Court for failing to address the very issues the drafters of the question carefully and deliberately did not ask. Moreover, the Court did in fact clarify a number of important points that go beyond the narrow question of the lawfulness of Kosovo's declaration of independence. In particular, the Court confirmed that a state is a matter of fact in the first instance. It can come into being in consequence of unilateral secession when attempts to negotiate a separation have been frustrated by the central government. The doctrine of territorial integrity operates among states and furnishes no legal bar in such instances that applies to the seceding entity. Moreover, a decision on independence by such an entity cannot be evaluated according to the domestic legal order of the state from which it secedes. In this instance, Kosovo's secession was in any event not quite as unilateral as it may have seemed. Its declaration of independence and new constitution fully incorporate the entire package of measures proposed by the UN mediators in the final status talks. Hence, Kosovo has implemented what was in fact developed and proposed under the UN mandate for final status talks contained in Resolution 1244. Rather than overturning that resolution, it has acted in accordance with its terms.

Goldstone's recent retraction can leave the reader of the report that bears his name somewhat perplexed. Indeed, if the deliberate intent to target civilians could be discussed in some specific attacks listed, such a report nevertheless describes a pattern of behaviour that cannot be swept aside without disregarding the order of priorities set by the Israeli legal system itself. Through analysis of the new Israeli military code of ethics as well as the Israeli Supreme Court case law, this paper examines how civilians in Gaza were deliberately put at risk by a specific interpretation breaking down the flat rule of civilian immunity into a more complex construction opposing the Israeli soldiers’ right to life to the rights of an ‘enemy population’.

Focusing on some undertheorized aspects of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the present article aims to reassess critically the anti-fragmentation function generally assigned to this provision. The high hopes associated with the harmonizing potential of Article 31(3)(c) are usually based on a reading of this provision as requiring the interpreter to take into account not only rules applicable between all of the parties to the treaty, but also those applicable only between some of the parties. However, this reading does not seem to be confirmed by the interpretive approach suggested in this article. On the other hand, the use of Article 31(3)(c) in judicial settings raises a structural problem inherent in the international judiciary. The analysis undertaken along these lines suggests that the optimism that Article 31(3)(c) has recently provoked should be qualified in some important respects.

This article examines private sector complicity in governmental corruption that violates economic and social rights. Although banks and multinational corporations typically play critical roles in facilitating the diversion of public revenues away from the provision of social services, the link between the private sector, corruption, and human rights violations remains underexplored. This article therefore examines this relationship and explores the viability of a standard for assessing the complicity of the private sector in such violations of economic and social rights. Ultimately, the state-centred nature of the international human rights system limits the utility of any complicity standard for non-state actors.

This article deals with the fundamental evolution that the process of state recognition has gone through during the past few decades. Whereas the recognition of new states used to be subject to a relatively concise and clear-cut normative framework consisting of factual criteria, the dissolution of Yugoslavia marked the introduction of a new set of moral norms used to determine whether or not an entity should be recognized as a state. This evolution gave rise to a high level of uncertainty, among both authors and the state community, as was painfully shown by the international discord during the crises in Kosovo and South Ossetia/Abkhazia. A renewed normative framework for recognition that integrates both factual and moral criteria is needed if the international community wants to prevent each claim to statehood becoming a threat to international stability.

This piece provides critical analysis of some of the broader consequences of what is potentially suggested by certain findings in the 2010 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on ‘Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo’. The focus is on consequences for disputes generally, and disputes relating to self-determination and secession in particular, in either case including disputes that have been made subject to a Security Council-imposed settlement process. In the first place, the piece considers the relatively specific suggestion that sub-state groups are free to unilaterally terminate a Security Council-imposed process aimed at enabling the resolution of a dispute concerning their aspirations to external self-determination, without this termination having to comply with the principles of justice and international law. In the second place, the piece considers the relatively broad suggestion that the act of any sub-state group of declaring independence and seceding from the state within which it is located, without the consent of that state or any other international legal sanction, is likewise not regulated by international law.

According to the agency paradigm enshrined by the 2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, private conducts are attributed to a state when they are carried out on the state's behalf or under its tight control. On closer look, this legal framework proves to be unable to deal with state involvement in human-rights violations perpetrated by powerful non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or transnational corporations. These wrongs, indeed, are often put in place with the fundamental contribution of – but not on behalf of (or under the control of) – a state, with the consequence that, under the traditional paradigm, they could not be attributed to the latter. Against this backdrop, the present paper argues that a new secondary norm has been developing that provides that private wrongs are to be imputed to a state if the latter knowingly facilitated (or otherwise co-operated in) their commission. Although international practice will be duly taken into account, the analysis will be focused mainly on US case law concerning corporate liability for international human-rights violations.