A time-varying-parameter VAR for real output growth and inflation is estimated with annual U.S. series dating back to 1870. Volatility for both variables rises quickly with World War I and its aftermath, stays high until the end of World War II, and drops rapidly until the 1960s. This Postwar Moderation yields the largest decline in volatilities, surpassing the Great Moderation. Conditional on temporary shocks, inflation and output growth are positively correlated. Our model implies that aggregate demand played a key role in inflation volatility fluctuations. Conversely, the two variables are negatively correlated conditional on permanent shocks. Our model suggests that aggregate supply played an important role in output volatility fluctuations. Most impulse responses support an aggregate supply interpretation for permanent shocks. However, before World War I, a permanent increase in output raised the price level at longer horizons, and these responses are frequently statistically significant. This evidence supports the hypothesis that aggregate demand had a long-run positive effect on output during the pre–World War I period.

Although a number of economists have tried to revive the idea of nominal GDP targeting since the financial crisis of 2008, very little has been said about how this objective might be achieved in practice. This paper adopts and extends a strategy first outlined by Holbrook Working and later employed in the P-Star model. It presents a series of theoretical and empirical results to argue that Divisia monetary aggregates can be controlled by the Federal Reserve and that the trend velocities of these aggregates exhibit the stability required to make long-run targeting of a nominal objective feasible.

In one-sector neoclassical growth models, consumption externalities lead to an inefficient allocation in a steady state and indeterminate equilibrium toward a steady state only if there is a labor–leisure trade-off. This paper shows that in a two-sector neoclassical growth model, even without a labor–leisure trade-off, consumption spillovers easily lead to an inefficient allocation in a steady state and indeterminate equilibrium toward a steady state. Negative consumption spillovers that yield ove-accumulation of capital in a one-sector model may lead to underaccumulation or overaccumulation of capital in two-sector models, depending on the relative capital intensity between sectors. Moreover, a two-sector model economy with consumption externalities is less stabilized than an otherwise identical one-sector model economy.

I develop a dynamic political economy model with an informal sector and two political parties alternating in office. In equilibrium, if the incumbent political party faces a higher probability of staying in office, it sets a higher tax rate on the formal economy to invest more in productive public capital, while spending less for current office rent. Moreover, I argue that public capital is mainly utilized by the formal sector, and this implies that countries in which incumbent parties are more likely to stay in power have a higher tax burden but a smaller informal sector. I also present some empirical evidence that supports the main results of the model.

This paper analyzes the dynamics of an endogenous growth model with external habit formation and elastic labor supply. We first derive the conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and saddlepath stability of a feasible steady state with positive long-run growth. The global dynamics of the economy are characterized by phase-diagram analysis. Then we characterize the comparative static effects of shocks in preferences and production parameters analytically. The comparative dynamic effects of the shocks are characterized by phase-diagram analysis.

This paper presents a theory of the labor market matching process in terms of incentive-based, two-sided search among heterogeneous agents. The matching process is decomposed into its two component stages: the contact stage, in which job searchers make contact with employers, and the selection stage, in which they decide whether to match. We construct a theoretical model explaining two-sided selection through microeconomic incentives. Firms face adjustment costs in responding to heterogeneous variations in the characteristics of workers and jobs. Matches and separations are described through firms' job offer and firing decisions and workers' job acceptance and quit decisions. Our calibrated model for the United States can account for important empirical regularities, such as the large volatilities of labor market variables, that the conventional matching model cannot.

We study optimal monetary stabilization policy in a DSGE model with microfounded money demand. A search externality creates “congestion,” which causes aggregate output to be inefficient. Because of the informational frictions that give rise to money, households are unable to insure themselves perfectly against aggregate shocks. This gives rise to a welfare-improving role for monetary policy that works by adjusting the nominal interest rate in response to these shocks. Optimal policy is determined by choosing a set of state-contingent nominal interest rates to maximize the expected lifetime utility of the agents subject to the constraints of being an equilibrium.

This paper directly shows the equivalence between the existence of stationary monetary equilibrium and the conditional Pareto suboptimality of the initial endowment in a stochastic overlapping generations model. Especially, it gives short and constructive proofs for existence and uniqueness.

This paper reconsiders the monetary policy implications of a model from which a distinction between CPI inflation and PPI inflation arises. More specifically, this paper addresses the policy conclusion by K. Huang and Z. Liu [2005, Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to target, Journal of Monetary Economics 52, 1435–1462], which states that central banks should use an optimal inflation index that gives substantial weight to stabilizing both CPI and PPI. This paper argues that these authors' findings rely on the assumption that producer prices are as sticky as consumer prices and shows that once empirically relevant frequencies of price adjustment are used to calibrate the model, CPI inflation receives substantial weight in the optimal inflation index. Moreover, this rule is remarkably robust to uncertainty regarding the model parameters.