Following the end of the Cold War, Italy took on greater responsibilities in dealing with the increased challenges to international security, especially in its neighbourhood. The aim of this special issue of the journal Modern Italy is to understand to what extent Italy has been successful in developing a third circle in its foreign policy beyond the two traditional lodestars, Atlanticism and Europeanism; or whether Italy's competence in the Mediterranean has been strategically used to improve its relationship with the United States or its position within the European Union.

After outlining the trends of Italian Mediterranean politics, this article examines the relationship between Italy and the Maghreb region. As a result of its central geographic position, acting as a natural bridge between Europe and Africa, Italy is undoubtedly more exposed and vulnerable than other countries to any critical developments in the political and economic situation of this area, so it is understandable that it occupies an increasingly important position in Italian foreign policy. Italy has especially considered it in its national interest to make it a specific, high priority to contribute to stabilising this region through multilateral and bilateral initiatives aimed at reinforcing political dialogue and economic cooperation with the coastal countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. The aim has been to create a safety net around Italian maritime borders against the risks posed by an uncontrolled increase in migration (to which Italy is more exposed than other countries), the instability of North African energy resources and Islamist terrorists infiltrating Italian territory. Apart from examining the concerns regarding the Maghreb region that have become crucially important for Italian national interests (security, immigration, development, energy), the article analyses the salient elements of bilateral relations between Italy and the Maghreb countries, particularly Libya.

Focusing on Italy's Middle East policies under the second Berlusconi (2001–2006) and the second Prodi (2006–2008) governments, this article assesses the manner and extent to which the observed foreign policy shifts between the two governments can be explained in terms of the rebalancing between a ‘Europeanist’ and a transatlantic orientation. Arguing that Rome's policy towards the Middle East hinges less on Italy's specific interests and objectives in the region and more on whether the preference of the government in power is to foster closer ties to the United States or concentrate on the European Union, the analysis highlights how these swings of the pendulum along the EU–US axis are inextricably linked to a number of underlying structural weaknesses of Rome's foreign policy. In particular, the oscillations can be explained by the prevalence of short-term political (and domestic) considerations and the absence of long-term, substantive political strategies, or, in short, by the phenomenon of ‘politics without policy’ that often characterises Italy's foreign policy.

This article reviews Italy's role in the various phases of the European Union's policy towards the Mediterranean: the ad hoc policy of the 1950s and 1960s, the Global Mediterranean Policy developed in the 1970s, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership agreed in Barcelona in 1995, the European Neighbourhood Policy signed in 2003, the proposal launched by French president Nicolas Sarkozy in 2006 for a Mediterranean Union. The overall argument is that the various Italian governments have carried out an ambivalent and often reactive policy: on the one hand, they have consistently tried to promote a Mediterranean dimension in the European Union, though without upsetting the United States; on the other hand, they have limited the extension of trade privileges to exports from North Africa. While the end of the Cold War provided a new opportunity for Italy to play a more assertive role in the international arena, the two coalitions that have alternated in power have substantially failed to move the Mediterranean to the centre of Italy's and the European Union's external policy. A partial change of attitude – yet a reactive policy – emerged under the second Prodi Government, when Italy and Spain became close allies in an attempt to counter-balance the new activist policy of Sarkozy.

Since the early 1990s Italy has been engaged in promoting peace and stability in the Balkans with a growing amount of political, economic and military resources. At the beginning of the process of Yugoslav dissolution, the Italian polity was torn apart by a set of political and financial scandals that prevented the development of an assertive foreign policy. Over time, however, Italy was able to play a more relevant and constructive role. This article traces Italy's policy towards the Balkans from its modest beginnings to the present day, focusing on four key political/economic events: the war in Bosnia, the Telekom Serbia affair, the war in Kosovo and the support given to the nascent Albanian democracy. Generally speaking, Italy has provided a positive, although modest, contribution to bringing peace and stability to the region.

This article explores the attitudes of Italy's ruling and opposition parties towards the European Union (EU) enlargement process in Central and Eastern Europe. It shows that during both left (1996–2001) and right (2001–2006) governments there was a convergence between conservative and constructivist political platforms. In the first case, support for the Balkan countries (i.e., Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia) and Turkey was based on their economic (penetration of Italian firms) and political (stabilisation of a difficult area) potential. In the second case, support was justified for both economic (i.e., redistributive policy towards Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia) and cultural (i.e., pursuing a ‘plural’ Europe by including Turkey) reasons. Some liberal criticism based on Turkey's partial compliance with the political requirements for accession were raised by individual politicians of moderate right and left parties, and cultural biases against Islamic Turkey were stressed by the Lega Nord. Neither view, however, had a significant impact on the decision-making process.