Italian party coalitions (from both the centre-left and the centre-right) have enacted an average of 57% of the pledges included in their common manifestos. In relative terms, Italian political parties keep their electoral promises much less than parties governing in single-party government, but slightly outperform those that form post-electoral coalitions. Although this finding contradicts the widespread pessimism about Italy's performance, it also illustrates that there is no significant advantage to bipolarism and the existence of a common programme as opposed to situations where coalitions are formed after the elections. This might explain Italians’ dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their country.

Between 1994 and 2006 Berlusconi has been the dominant figure of Italian politics. Following his electoral defeat in the April 2006 elections, it is possible to begin an initial evaluation of the many roles he has played as well as to assess his overall accomplishments in politics. This article focuses on five roles—party builder, coalition maker, institution builder, Prime Minister, and opinion leader. The article briefly explores Berlusconi's achievements and inadequacies and attempts to explain the reasons for his failures. Because Berlusconi has been unable fundamentally to institutionalize his politics and to reform Italian institutions, the article comes to the conclusion that his legacy will be of limited duration. All this notwithstanding, Berlusconi's political trajectory may not yet have reached its conclusion.

Recent cultural and political debate in contemporary Italy, which has often been focused on Fascism and the Resistance, has seen an attempt to reconsider the importance of the constitutive moment of the Republic, namely the Liberazione from Nazism–Fascism, and to equate the memories of Fascism and anti-Fascism. The direct consequence of these confused revisionist approaches is either to rehabilitate many aspects of the Duce's regime, or on the contrary to assign this shady page of history to oblivion. The effect of this would be to marginalize anti-Fascism, and even to depict Fascism as relatively ‘harmless’ or ‘apolitical’. The danger is that this trend may construct an artificial and distorted history and thus a ‘manipulated’ public memory for Italian society. The purpose of this article is not to defend anti-Fascism but to restore the reality of ‘Fascism in action’, and to challenge distorted revisionist perceptions of the past.

To the Italian historian the Battle of Adwa in March 1896 has offered a field of interpretation which has been heavily marked by the events that occurred between (and within) the two countries—Ethiopia and Italy—before and after the battle. Adwa has been variously depicted by Italian historiography of the liberal period as a major military defeat, a political mistake by Crispi's expansionist government and the result of deep contrasts within the newly born state over the ‘colonial burden'. Fascist historiography painted Adwa as proof of liberal decay and political inefficiency. Adwa's name could be avenged only in the battlefield, which was done during Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935-36. From the Ethiopian point of view, Adwa's image changes no less. Until recently, the Battle of Adwa was painted as the landmark for Ethiopian unification and independence during the colonial era. Menelik's momentous victory at Adwa crowned his bid for power in the national arena, while his successful ability to stave off external colonial pressure appeared to cancel, or rather conceal, the internal policy of expansion and consolidation of his country's rule in the region. Today's insistence on Adwa as an African victory appears to be the dominant historiographical representation. The different interpretations all contain elements of truth, yet all, if frozen into historiographical truths, become embarrassing to the historian who needs documents, rather than monuments, as tools of analysis. To many historians both in Italy and Ethiopia, Adwa's respective symbolism of victory/defeat has been transformed into an icon, an historiographical monument, unassailable and immovable. The centenary of Adwa allows us to reconsider historical events of a shared past as critical documents and biased representations reflecting their own culture and time. This article attempts to deconstruct the historiographical monument of Adwa in Italian society so as to transmit such a heavily coded event to the critical examination of future historians in both Italy and Ethiopia.

The birth of the ‘Second Republic’ was at least partially due to the changes in international relations in Europe and the rest of the world. The instablity in the Balkans forced Italy to face security issues close to home, while instability in the Middle East meant that Italy had to reconsider its energy security policy as well as military security in the region. The change in the form of government in Italy under both the centre-right and centre-left has involved the Prime Minister taking on a much more important role in foreign policy. The two traditional pillars of Italian foreign policy—Atlanticism and an attachment to the European institutions—have remained largely unchanged, but their relative importance and emphasis have altered markedly with the alternation of administrations. During the course of the Second Republic we can therefore conclude that Italy has moved from being a ‘consumer of security’ to being a ‘producer of security’ due to a combination of external necessities and internal reforms.

This article provides a review and an assessment of the foreign policy of the second Berlusconi government. The first section summarizes the changes Italian foreign policy underwent at the end of the Cold War. The second focuses on the question of continuity and change regarding the two traditional pillars of Italian foreign policy, the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, during the second Berlusconi government's time in office. The article concludes that if the current government has brought changes to Italian foreign policy, they concern its tone and style more than its substance, and that the claim that Italy has embarked on a new foreign policy course is a political exaggeration.

In recent years two populist regionalist parties have emerged in the alpine region, the Lega dei Ticinesi (LDT) in Switzerland and the Lega Nord (LN) in Italy. However, while typical populist themes such as the constant attacks against professional politicians and appeals to the ‘people’ resonate in the rhetoric of both movements, what differentiates them is the style of their propaganda, as the LDT's paper, Il Mattino della Domenica, constantly strives to shock its readers in ways that are alien to the Italian leghisti. Following a discussion of the strength, organisation and rhetoric of the two parties, this articles addresses the reasons why they have adopted different strategies of communication by considering the parties’ constituencies, the nature of their media and the personalities of their leaders.

As a consequence of Italy's integration in the EMU in 1998, the Lega Nord shifted from a pro-European to a Eurosceptic position. The Lega's Eurosceptic vision combines a strong identification with Europe with a hostile attitude towards the institutions of the EU. Identification with Europe expresses in the first place the party's geopolitical view of Padania as a European and hence modern and entrepreneurial region. Its critique of the EU incorporates numerous, sometimes contradicting influences such as the neo-liberal vision of a free-trade based Europe with minimal rules and regulations, and a protectionist defence of northern Italian economic interests. It is in particular the party's institutional vision that attributes centrality to the right of Padania to autonomy and self-government which leads to its rejection of the centralism and dirigism of the European Union.

This article provides an overview of the geography and economic sociology of recent immigration to Italy. Its main purpose is to offer a contextual framework for the mainly place- and nationality-specific studies which follow and make up the main contributions to this special issue of the journal. Throughout our account, stress is laid on the regional diversity of the immigrant experience within Italy, and on the diversity of migratory types and nationalities which have entered the country over the last twenty-thirty years. In the final part of the article we make a brief analysis of the Italian political response to the country's relatively new status as a receiver of large-scale immigration.

The Italian linguistic situation is characterised by a remarkable number of language varieties, although the development of Italian in the past 150 years has been the cause of a language shift from local languages to Italian. The degree of endangerment suffered by so-called ‘Italian dialects’ is shown using the Major Evaluative Factors of Language Vitality drawn up by a UNESCO ad hoc expert group in 2003, and the data offered by the 2006 ISTAT survey on language use. The debate in Italy on the vitality of ‘dialects’ and their future has done little to activate mechanisms and strategies to reverse the worrying language shift that both minority languages and ‘dialects’ are undergoing.

This article examines how Italy has dealt with the physical remains of the Fascist regime, as a window onto Italian attitudes to the past. The ventennio left indelible marks on Italy’s cities in the form of urban projects, individual buildings, monuments, plaques and street names. In effect, the survival of physical traces contrasts with the hazy memories of Fascism that exist within the Italian collective consciousness. Conspicuous, yet mostly ignored, Italy’s Fascist heritage is hidden in plain sight. However, from the 1990s, buildings associated with the regime have sparked a number of debates regarding the public memory of Fascism. Although these debates present an opportunity to re-examine history, they may also be symptomatic of a crisis in the Italian polity and of attempts to rehabilitate Fascism through historical revisionism.

This article analyses, adopting the well-known approach of Katz and Mair, the issue of organizational change within Italian political parties since 1990. In addition to an account of trends in membership, local units, finances, staff, and of changes in party statutes, the article aims at testing the widespread view in the literature that organizational resources–hence power–are becoming more and more concentrated in the hands of party and/or parliamentary leaders, and correspondingly that the territorial presence of parties is declining. The analysis of the change over time of Katz and Mair's party organisational ‘faces’ leads to the confirmation, to a large extent, of the overall hypothesis of a decline of the party at ground level, and a concentration of party resources in the central office, and above all in the party in public office.

The central theme of this article is the notion that migrants ‘shop’ for opportunities of work, income and social advantages in different countries. Taking the case of Cape Verdean women migrants, the research is based on 25 in-depth interviews carried out with domestic workers in Rome and Rotterdam. I explore ways in which these women have negotiated mobility, employment and family and household responsibilities within the context of a largely independent female migration which is well established from Cape Verde. Italy has a nodal role in channelling mobility from Cape Verde to various destinations in the global Cape Verdean diaspora. But while opportunities for stable employment as domestic workers in Italy have been a constant factor encouraging Cape Verdean women to migrate to Italy, difficulties over pay, working conditions, welfare and family reunion have led to much onward movement to the Netherlands and elsewhere.

The aim of this article is to describe the evolution of the Italian regional party systems 25 years after the establishment of 15 Ordinary Statute regions and five years after the implementation of a major Constitutional reform increasing the powers of the regions and the visibility of regional political actors. The theoretical point of departure of the article is the second order election model originally applied to European elections to highlight their dependence on the national political level. The article begins by showing that this model has been applicable for regional elections only since the mid-1990s, a finding that goes against the conventional wisdom. The article then explains the structure of regional political competition through the analysis of two phenomena, fragmentation and differentiation, and the way they are correlated, stressing the changing pattern of competition before and after the breakdown of the First Republic.

The Italian centre-right was ‘constructed’ by Silvio Berlusconi in the run-up to the 1994 general election, which marked the beginning of the Second Republic. It includes Forza Italia, the National Alliance, the Northern League and the Union of Christian Democrats (UDC), parties which are all very different in terms of their political identities, histories, geographies and social composition. The centre-right thus looks like a complex mosaic, whose pieces stay together only thanks to the role of the leader and his ‘personal party’, Forza Italia, and to the use of the media and political marketing to communicate with the electorate. These are the twin pillars of ‘the Berlusconi model’. This article contends that Berlusconi represents both a resource and a limit for the centre-right, as it is difficult for such a heterogeneous coalition to define a common identity and pursue coherent political projects and policies while relying so heavily on the role of the leader. This explains the cyclical alternation within the coalition of phases of integration and rapprochement with others of tension and open conflict. Since the coalition's election victory in 2001, it has found it difficult to meet the contrasting demands of its diverse electorate for neo-liberalism, devolution, major public works, infrastructure creation and tax cuts. This task has been made more problematic by the international instability and economic stagnation of recent years. This article puts forward the hypothesis that ‘the Berlusconi model’, which gave life to the centre-right, now appears to be worn out and will prove difficult to revive.

London today hosts more than 200,000 Italian people. A traditional point of arrival for Italian migrants since the nineteenth century, London is a setting characterised by the presence of the ‘old’ classic economic migration – of those who left Italy mainly in the 1950s and 1960s, and the ‘new’ migration, made up mainly of highly-educated people in the professional, academic and arts sectors. These two groups differ as regards their time of arrival, socio-economic characteristics and educational background, and they rarely have the chance or find the need to interact. This paper is based on interviews with representatives of Italian institutions and associations, and with ‘old’ and ‘new’ Italian migrants; participant observation of Italian events happening in London; and some elements of discourse analysis. By means of this empirical material, I aim to show that, besides their well-known differences, the ‘old’ and ‘new’ communities present striking similarities in their migration narratives.

For the century following Unification, malaria was the principal Italian public health problem. This article seeks to explain this high incidence and explores its impact both on the sufferer and on society. An eradication campaign began after Unification; gathered momentum at the turn of the century; and achieved victory following the Second World War. Important themes are the growing understanding of malaria; the search for weapons to combat it; and the contrasting approaches of the Liberal and Fascist regimes. Italy was the classic country to eradicate malaria by a national campaign and it is important to relate its success to the ongoing global debate surrounding malaria control and eradication.

In 2003, a presidential decree enacted legislation guaranteeing Italian voters overseas the right to postal voting as well as parliamentary representation within their respective electoral constituency. The electoral weight of the overseas-based constituent had a remarkable effect on the 2006 election results. In the tightest vote in the Republic's history, the vote of overseas Italians, which was one of the decisive features of the election, helped provide the winning centre-left coalition with a slender majority in the Senate. Election results notwithstanding, the question of whether to grant the vote to Italians overseas has faced challenges of a procedural, normative and political nature. What may have been initially seen as a democratic right may well be cast aside as it poses challenges to overseas electoral relationships with the Italian national polity, Italian citizenship and multinational allegiances, diasporic identity, electoral participation and political representation in homeland political institutions. The overseas vote for Italians may be contested further in the near future, which could translate into a radical rethink of its validity and democratic global extension.

The history of the Italian Republic's territorial structure has always been intertwined with party competition. Partisan logics have notably played a relevant role in the ways regions have been moulded, set up and run. This article illustrates the discourse of Italy's political parties on the ‘ordinary’ statute regions throughout the successive phases of regionalisation. After the consensus reached in the Constituent Assembly, a paralysis due to party contrasts followed. The Centre-left governments in the 1960s re-started the process, which culminated in the 1970s–also thanks to the Communists’ support–in the establishment of the 15 ordinary-statute regions. The 1990s inaugurated a period of further devolution, which reached constitutional status in the early years of the millennium. Once again, partisan motivations were of primary importance, notably because of the electoral threat posed to mainstream parties by the Northern League. In recent years, party positions have differentiated consistently according to inter-coalition competitive dynamics.

Studies of colonialism and imperial cultures have increasingly recognized the roles of geographical knowledges in European efforts to construct the colonial world materially and imaginatively. Simultaneously, the discipline of geography has undergone a thorough self-critique of its part in the constitution of colonial space. This article discusses the imbrication of geographical knowledges and colonialism in Italy, and especially how the production and circulation of geographical knowledges about Libya worked hand in hand with its territorial occupation and control. In particular, the article discusses the expeditions directed and co-ordinated by the Italian Geographical Society that were despatched into the Saharan interior in the early 1930s to produce ‘scientific’ representations of the region. The article examines the roles of geographical sciences in the construction of Italian Libya, but particularly how this performance of ‘colonial science’ surveyed Libya's populations and contributed to their classification as ‘primitive’ and ‘Other'. These conclusions supported Italian authority in the region, but also reinforced the development of a ‘colonial consciousness’ among Italians as African space and peoples were rendered legible by European epistemologies.