The need to decarbonise the economy in order to slow the pace of climate change is now recognised as one of the most pressing international policy challenges. While the UK cannot by itself materially affect global climate change, it has an opportunity to play an influential role, both by persuading others of the need for action but also by reshaping its domestic economy to benefit from a low-carbon transition.

Far from hampering competitiveness, adoption of a coordinated policy approach to climate change today would generate positive benefits for the UK economy, especially if it addresses the multiple market failures that promote pollution and places decarbonisation at the heart of structural economic policy.

Desirable strategies would include public support for research, development, and deployment of new technologies, and measures to foster an environment where innovation can rapidly shift the economy from dirty to clean production systems. Focusing UK industrial strategy on securing strong domestic supply chains for green products and services, for example, could help create an early mover advantage in rapidly growing global market sectors. Interventions could include the establishment of a National Infrastructure Bank to support decarbonisation in crucial sectors such as energy and transport, and would also need to encompass measures to assist structural adjustment in affected industries and their workforces.

We analyse the costs of Brexit. The results show that by 2030 a hard Brexit would reduce cumulative GDP growth by 18 percentage points compared to a situation where the UK continued its EU membership. The economic damage in our FTA and soft Brexit scenarios is less severe than in our hard Brexit scenario, although it will still cost the UK economy roughly 12.5 percentage points and 10 percentage points of cumulative GDP growth by 2030, respectively. We find much larger negative effects than most existing studies that use macroeconometric modelling to assess the effects of Brexit. This is due to two reasons. First, we use an improved tariff version of the macroeconometric model NiGEM, which enables us better to assess the negative impact of cost-push inflation resulting from imposed trade barriers. Second, we estimate a new productivity model for the UK, which allows us to gauge adequately the negative UK-specific effects on productivity caused by Brexit.

The past 25 years have been characterised by a surge in international trade as economies have become increasingly inter-linked. In many advanced economies this surge has been associated with increased import competition from low-wage economies. This paper explores the effects of such competition on manufacturing jobs in the UK. We consider two developments that influenced the nature of international trade: the ascendency of China as an important player in global markets and the accession to the European Union of a number of Eastern European economies in 2004. Both of these changes were associated with a shift in trade regimes and led to a sharp rise in import competition in particular UK manufacturing sectors. We find that these changes are likely to have hastened the decline of UK manufacturing.

The past few months have seen a growing debate on the question of migration. There is little doubt that there has recently been a sharp inflow of migrants into the United Kingdom, raising a range of both economic and social issues. In this commentary we consider the structure of recent immigration and assess some of its economic consequences.

There was a wide measure of agreement that unemployment in Britain during the 1920s was aggravated by lack of international competitiveness. This was the basic issue underlying the debate over the return to the gold standard. The experience of the restored gold standard did much to confirm the arguments of those like Keynes who had claimed that sterling was overvalued at $4.86. This view of the problems of adjustment to an overvalued exchange rate has been endorsed by both Johnson (1975) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963). A major element in competitiveness was the level of real wages. Britain's difficulties in the inter-war period were made more acute by the increase in the cost of labour between 1913 and 1924. This reflected the sharp rise in wages in the First World War and the post-war boom of 1919-20, which was only partly corrected in the recession of 1921-2. The reduction in working hours in 1919, when normal weekly hours were reduced from 53 hours to 47, also raised the cost of employing labour. As a result hourly real wages in 1924 were 28 per cent higher than in 1913 and real wages measured in terms of own product were increased by 20 per cent, while output per head had risen by only 5 per cent over the same period. The increased cost of employing labour was particularly noted and emphasised by Clay (1929).

This article describes the current versions of six major macroeconometric models, and analyses their overall properties as revealed in standard simulation experiments. Particular attention is given to a policy issue of long-standing importance, namely the control of the size of the government budget deficit. Analysis of the impact on the government budget deficit of a range of policy instruments under a number of deficit-funding regimes shows that there is considerable disagreement between the models on the size and time-profile of these effects. Modelling of the exchange rate remains a key issue in assessing differences in model behaviour.

The whole of Europe has embarked on a major programme of economic change. The former CMEA countries are trying to move rapidly from state planning to market economies. In the west, not only is the European Community well down the road to removing a large number of non-tariff barriers between the member states through the Single Market programme—extended to EFTA through the European Economic Area agreement but it has also agreed, through the Maastricht Treaty, to try to converge to an economic and monetary union with low inflation, low public sector deficits and controlled public debt, before the end of the century. Negotiations are beginning over extending this, through full membership of the Community, to Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden.

No one can deny the outstanding success of the East Asian economies in the last two decades of rapid economic growth backed by surging capital inflows. Key questions posed by the current crisis are: what went wrong, and why? how to fix it? and, how to prevent a recurrence? To answer them, the article begins with a brief overview of recent developments in the miracle economies of East Asia, focusing mainly on Korea, Indonesia and Thailand. We focus too on some of the shadows that came to darken the glittering success story—on declining competitiveness and growing financial vulnerability; and on regulatory failures in banking. Then we take a leaf from Charles Kindleberger's book (1996) on Panics, Manias and Crashes and discuss—with historical precedents—various types of financial crisis: speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates, asset bubbles, stock market crashes and bank runs. Based on the distinction between illiquidity, due to a shortage of cash, and insolvency arising from a failure of economic prospects, we go on to outline three main views of the current crisis.

First that it was simply due to reversal of capital flows, to a failure of collective action on the part of creditors which could and should have been solved by supplying extra liquidity—or by forcing creditors to roll over their loans. Second the view that the miracle had grown into a bubble that had finally had to burst: so the problem was essentially one of insolvency. Finally the view that we prefer, that the panic was not wholly groundless (and rescue efforts were bound to be difficult) mainly because weak regulation combined with implicit deposit guarantees had left local bankers free to gamble with the money that global capital markets had poured into their parlours. Panic set in when foreign depositors realised that there were not enough dollar reserves left for the guarantee to be credible. This account (championed most notably by Paul Krugman of MIT) involves both illiquidity and insolvency and helps to explain why the IMF was unwilling simply to throw money at the problem.

Why did the crisis spread like wildfire around the region? Was it because a bank run due to shaky fundamentals in one country was imitated elsewhere, as investors joined the herd heading for the exit? This and other accounts of contagion are discussed before turning to ideas for crisis prevention and management, and a brief account of future prospects for the region. The article concludes by outlining immediate steps to resolve the current financial crisis and by proposing international monetary reforms to prevent a recurrence.

This article describes a variety of simulations carried out with the three major macroeconomic quarterly forecastingmodels of the UK currently in operation—those of the Treasury, the London Business School and the National Institute. The simulations cover both fixed and floating exchange rate regimes.

This article sets the broad facts of the industrial performance of the UK in the post-war period within a European context. Using purchasing power parity rates the relative levels of labour productivity between countries are compared, for GDP, manufacturing and six sub-sectors of manufacturing. By 1973 the UK had the lowest level amongst the countries studied. Growth rates of output, employment and labour productivity are estimated for four periods since 1955 and the relatively slow growth rates in the UK are analysed.

This paper reports on the availability of regional capital stock data,1 in the form of new/updated regional (NUTS2 level) capital stock estimates,2 building on an approach (Perpetual Inventory Method) which had been previously developed for the European Commission. The particular focus here is on the UK and how these data are used to shed light on regional labour productivity disparities. Using a NUTS2 level dataset constructed for the period 2000–16, we use a dynamic spatial panel approach from Baltagi et al. (2019) to estimate a model relating productivity to output (growth or levels) and augmented by explicit incorporation of capital stock plus various other covariates such as human capital. We find that regional variations in capital stocks per worker make a significant contribution to regional variations in labour productivity, but the geography of human capital is also highly relevant. Moreover, we give evidence to show that as human capital rises, notably as we move from the regions to London, the impact of capital stock per worker is less. The effect of capital stock depends on the level of human capital.

The Covid-19 pandemic has put forecasting under the spotlight, pitting epidemiological models against extrapolative time-series devices. We have been producing real-time short-term forecasts of confirmed cases and deaths using robust statistical models since 20 March 2020. The forecasts are adaptive to abrupt structural change, a major feature of the pandemic data due to data measurement errors, definitional and testing changes, policy interventions, technological advances and rapidly changing trends. The pandemic has also led to abrupt structural change in macroeconomic outcomes. Using the same methods, we forecast aggregate UK unemployment over the pandemic. The forecasts rapidly adapt to the employment policies implemented when the UK entered the first lockdown. The difference between our statistical and theory based forecasts provides a measure of the effect of furlough policies on stabilising unemployment, establishing useful scenarios had furlough policies not been implemented.

Building societies play an important part in the collection of savings in the personal sector and dominate lending for private house purchase. Quite apart from its intrinsic interest as a description of the operation of a major group of financial intermediaries, an account of building society behaviour should therefore be of some interest to those concerned with forecasting private dwelling investment or the allocation of the personal sector's flow of funds.

This paper examines differences in inequality between regions and between sectors of the economy. The growth in overall inequality since the mid-1990s is found to have been driven primarily by that in London (with a smaller difference for the South East and East Anglia) and by that in the financial sector (with a smaller difference for the business activities sector). While these differences for London and the financial sector overlap to some extent, they also have significant separate influences once each other is controlled for. The changes in inequality in the rest of Britain and in the other sectors of the economy are numerically small and statistically insignificant.

‘And coming home, did go on board Sir W. Petty's Experiment—which is a brave roomy vessel—and I hope may do well. So went on shore to a Dutch house to drink some Rum, and there light upon some Dutchmen, with whom we had a good discourse touching Stoveing and making of cables. But to see how despicably they speak of us for our using so many hands more to do anything then they do, they closing a cable with 20 that we use 60 men upon’ (Samuel Pepys' diary for 13 February 1665)

This article compares the output per person-hour in 16 branches constituting the total manufacturing sector of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The comparatively poor productivity performance of British industry, as documented in previous studies comparing Britain with Germany and the USA, is confirmed in this new comparison with a much smaller economy in the 1980s. The article examines differences in the industrial composition in the manufacturing sectors of the two countries. Part of the productivity gap is accounted for by the stronger concentration of Dutch manufacturing in capital-intensive industries and in the production of semimanufactured goods. However, a bigger slice of the gap must be attributed to factors such as differences in the pace of introducing new technologies in some of the branches, the quality of the labour force and the utilisation of the capital stock. The article also explores the relation between the average size of manufacturing units and the degree of vertical integration.

Banking and finance are inherently pro-cyclical, a condition exacerbated by a combination of Basel II and mark-to-market accounting. But these latter measures have many advantages, so the need is to devise other counter-cyclical macro-prudential policies. This fragility was further enhanced by a decline in bank liquidity (reliance on wholesale funding) and a shift in govenance from partnerships to limited liability public companies. Some commentators have seen the solution to such pro-cyclicality in the guise of direct constraints on bank activity, such as the promotion of ‘narrow banking’ or limits on bank size. While there are arguments for toughening regulation as systemic risk increases, direct constraints are simplistic; more sensible ideas involve the adoption of better designed macro-prudential regulation, perhaps with some version of banking self-insurance. Quite what the future holds for bank regulation remains, however, to be decided.

We set out a framework for measuring the adequacy of saving in the United Kingdom by assessing the absolute level of savings based on individual preferences of different ages. We examine this relationship between age and savings using data from the Expenditure and Food Survey 2004–5. We show that, while the level of national saving is about 8.4 percentage points of net national income lower than is required if one assumes that each cohort pays its own way, wealth holdings are considerably higher than are required on the same basis. Looking at household, rather than national saving, the current pattern of benefits on public sector pensions removes the need to save for old age. While perhaps £4000m of household wealth holding can be accounted for by bequest and other transfer motives, our results suggest excess wealth holding of around £1600m in 2004.

This paper considers methods to measure output and productivity in the delivery of health services, with an application to NHS hospital sector. It first develops a theoretical framework for measuring quality adjusted outputs and then considers how this might be implemented given available data. Measures of input use are discussed and productivity growth estimates are presented for the period 1998/9-2003/4. The paper concludes that available data are unlikely fully to capture quality improvements.

Evidence is presented on the extent to which the possibility for the exchange rate to vary has been useful or unhelpful for UK monetary policy over the last two decades. ‘Large’ exchange rate changes and ‘large’ misalignments are identified, and the thinking and actions of the monetary authorities in response to the level of and changes in the exchange rate in successive monetary regimes are examined. It is argued that the exchange rate has not generally functioned as a useful automatic equilibrating mechanism or as a useful policy instrument; and that in nearly every phase there were movements of the exchange rate, or pressures on it, which for the authorities were unexpected and unwelcome. Thus the exchange rate has typically been a source of extraneous shocks.

The article examines whether ethnic minority employees report poorer treatment at work than white employees, and evaluates the impact of three key features — gender differences, formal equal opportunities policies and trade union recognition. The analysis reveals that ethnic minority men and women receive poorer treatment than their white counterparts. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that ethnic minority women receive poorer treatment than ethnic minority men. Equal opportunities policies are effective in ensuring equal treatment, but the presence of a recognised trade union is not. White men and women in unionised workplaces enjoy better treatment than their white counterparts in non-union workplaces, but the same is not true for ethnic minorities. By contrast, there is very little evidence of unequal treatment in non-union workplaces.