How much influence does the UK have in Europe? How has this changed? We argue that the UK has tended to view its relationship with the EU in transactional terms, and that this has led to a dominant understanding framed in terms of ‘costs’ and ‘benefits.’ However, thinking more broadly gives a more nuanced picture of British influence. Thus, we approach this question from two directions: examining the historical record of the UK's role in the development of the EU and the single market; and looking at the ways in which British politicians and officials exert influence in the current political structure. We argue that although the UK has generally had a good track record of success, this has often been threatened by domestic political difficulties – as the current referendum debate shows.

Immigration and free movement are central issues in the UK's referendum on EU membership. Although free movement was a founding principle of the EU, it only became of central economic and political importance after the expansion of the EU eastward in 2004. For the UK, the economic impacts of recent EU migration appear to have been relatively benign, even for the low paid and low skilled. The UK's recent ‘renegotiation’, which focused on the largely irrelevant issue of ‘benefit tourism’, will make little difference. A vote to Leave, however, will potentially take us into new territory for UK immigration policy,

For many people the key question in the referendum is whether a vote to leave will enable the UK to take back control of its borders. So for them the focus is primarily on Article 45 on the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which allows free movement of workers. But for individuals much movement to other EU Member States is covered by Article 56 TFEU on the free movement of services. This article will argue that empirical research shows that there is in fact an interesting link between temporary migration under Article 56 TFEU and ultimately permanent migration under Article 45 TFEU. Brexit has the potential profoundly to affect both.

This paper examines whether EU membership enhances or diminishes the UK's financial sector stability, and therefore its prominence in global finance. The UK is host to the largest share of financial services in the EU, despite being outside of the Eurozone. An important reason is that, as a member of the EU, the UK has direct access to the Eurozone's financial infrastructure. If the UK leaves the EU (and EEA) banks and other financial services firms may continue to have access to the Single Market, but they are unlikely to have direct access to the Eurozone's infrastructure. Banks in the UK will no longer be direct members the Eurozone's payments system. The swap arrangement between the European Central Bank and Bank of England would have no legal enforcement mechanism. Resolution of cross-border banks would be more challenging with less incentive for a cooperative outcome. While some may welcome the reduced size of the financial system, not without reason, this could be achieved more effectively with domestic regulation than by leaving the EU. Given the uncertainty that would follow a vote to leave, there is a risk of capital flight.

The European Union budget is small and fulfils only a limited range of functions, yet it provokes regular disputes among the Member States and institutions of the Union. This paper describes the structure of the budget and shows that standard theories, such as fiscal federalism, are not well-suited to analysing how the EU budget operates or the political economy behind it. The paper then looks at how much the UK contributes towards the EU budget and explains why some of the claims made about it in the public discourse are inaccurate.

• The world economy is expected to grow by 3.0 per cent in 2016, down from the 3.2 per cent predicted in the February Review. Growth this year is therefore forecast to be the slowest since the 2009 recession, before picking up to 3.5 per cent in 2017.

• The growth downgrade is mainly due to disappointing performances in the United States and Japan. Among the emerging market economies, growth has been also been revised down for Brazil and Russia.

• A moderate strengthening of growth is forecast for 2017 and beyond, supported by accommodative monetary policies, lower oil prices and the gradual normalisation of conditions in stressed emerging market economies.

• The UK economy is expected to grow by 2.0 per cent in 2016, down from the 2.3 per cent predicted in the February Review. Growth will pick up to 2.7 per cent in 2017.

• We expect the Bank of England to start raising interest rates in November. Rates will then continue rising throughout 2017, ending the year at 1.5 per cent.

• Although broadly unaffected in 2016, GDP is projected to be 1 per cent lower than our baseline forecast in 2017 if the UK votes to leave the European Union in next month's referendum. In the longer run, GDP is expected to be between 1.5 and 3.7 per cent lower than our baseline forecast.

The production of this forecast is supported by the Institute's Corporate Members: Bank of England, HM Treasury, Mizuho Research Institute Ltd, Office for National Statistics, Santander (UK) plc and by the members of the NiGEM users group.