The ILA approach to the progressive structuring of international society, so typical of later 19th Century social optimism, has from the very first found a warm advocate in its oldest national branch, the NVIR. The idea to assemble legal luminaries and captains of industry into a single body might not be quite representative of the Dutch, rather compartmentalized, tradition of legal thinking, but even so, the NVIR, after a first abortive attempt in 1875, from its ‘re-launch’ in 1910 invariably met with a thoroughly welcoming intellectual climate in the Netherlands.

Over the past century, the Society's (board) members have not consistently proved themselves visionaries in their anticipation of, or reaction to, social change, be this in the domestic sphere or the international domain. Symptomatic of this were the fairly conservative views they held on such issues as Neutrality or the League of Nations in the 1920s; on the conflict with Indonesia, also regarding New Guinea, in the post-WWII years; on the Benelux experiment and the Schuman Plan in the 1950s; or on the decolonization process in the 1960s.

Even so, in the final analysis, the views represented by the NVIR have invariably been a welcome, indeed fairly refreshing contribution to the Dutch social debate. Also, and in spite of the progressive institutionalization and codification in the international arena auspicated by a wealth of intergovernmental bodies, ILA and the NVIR never did, nor will they presumably, fail in carving a very respectable niche of their own in aspiring to help the implementation of the Rule of Law in this world drawing nearer.

The adoption of the Declaration on the Progressive Development of Principles of Public International Law relating to a New International Economic Order (Seoul Declaration) by the 62nd Conference of the International Law Association (ILA) in 1986 set the seal on eight years of hard work by the ILA's Committee on Legal Aspects of a New International Economic Order (NIEO Committee). However, it certainly did not mark the end of the Committee's efforts.

García Amador, the first Special Rapporteur on the topic of state responsibility, was of the view that in international law, special circumstances denote situations of exemption from the secondary rule which attaches disadvantageous consequences to breach of obligation under any primary rule. By contrast, his successor, Roberto Ago, advanced the notion that the exceptional circumstances characterise situations of exemption from the obligations arising out of primary rules. In departure from both conceptions, James Crawford, the last Special Rapporteur on the law of state responsibility, submitted that it is only after having established that a certain course of behaviour is contrary to the terms of a prohibition that it becomes possible to enquire whether the actor had a justification for acting as he did. If affirmative, the conduct in question is to be regarded as conduct which neither conforms with the obligation nor constitutes a violation thereof. If negative, then the act amounts to an unjustified wrongdoing and accordingly forms the basis for the operation of the various disadvantageous consequences envisaged by the law of international responsibility. This contribution first examines the process of the development of the notion of exceptional circumstances in the edifice of the law of international responsibility ex delicto. It then shows that from the three competing conceptions, only that advanced by Ago proves capable of accurately accounting for the circumstances of consent, self-defence, and the legitimate application of a countermeasure.

In attempting to formulate the principles of law regulating transfrontier pollution, it is helpful to recall the experience of states in dealing with this kind of pollution. I propose, therefore, to say something about the Canadian and United States experience in this matter, concentrating on three problems relating to water resources, namely pollution of the Great Lakes, pollution of waters caused by acid rain, and the damage threatened in Canadian waters by the Garrison Diversion project in the United States.

The importance of a scholar like Hugo de Groot can be viewed in different ways. A systematic analysis of his works would clarify the coherence and depth, an historical approach would do the same for his sources and the extent of his originality. Other possibilities would be to trace the further development of his (legal and political) thinking or to ask what inspiration his works can still give towards the solution of problems today. Another approach has been adopted in the present contribution, viz., a discussion of Grotius' influence on a particular thinker of a later period, the Neapolitan lawyer and philosopher Giambattista Vico(1668–1744). Two aspects of his influence will be considered. In the first place, the question why Vico himself attributed such particular importance to Grotius. Vico even named Grotius as one of his “authors”. Vico employs the term “author” as a title of honour for his mentors in literature whom he considers especially important and in whose work he recognizes aspects of his pwn thinking which are of exceptional importance. However, Vico's attitude to Grotius does not consist solely of grateful admiration. In his principal work, the New Science, of which the first edition was published in 1725, and the last, totally rewritten, posthumous edition appeared in 1744, Vico's recognition of Grotius' merits is certainly still apparent, although his criticism has, by this stage, taken a dominant role. Vico's opposition to the predominant Cartesian rationalism, which he had already expressed in his De nostri temporis studiorum ratione of 1709 and in his De antiquissima italorum sapientia ex linguae latinae originibus eruenda, liber primus sive metaphysicus of 1710, also extends to the rationalist school of natural law of which he considers Grotius, Selden and Pufendorf to be the main representatives.

In September 1958 the Venezuelan Ministry of Justice created a Commission, comprising Professors Roberto Goldschmidt, Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren and Joaquín Sánchez-Covisa, assigning it the task of preparing a Draft on Private International Law. A preliminary document was drawn up after ten months of intensive work, but the Commission decided to reflect on the Draft and it was only in April 1963 when it was completed, with an ‘Explanatory Report’ annexed.

The various provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) envision import regulations being triggered because of features or characteristics of products seeking entry into a country's customs territory, not because of the processes utilized in producing or harvesting such products. The origins of this emphasis on products rather than processes dates from at least the GATT decision in the Belgian Family Allowances case, and was explicitly articulated in the well-known and controversial 1991 GATT panel decision in United States – Restriction on Imports of Tuna from Mexico. The precise language of the panel decision in that latter case provided that import measures must be designed to regulate the imported item because of its features or characteristics ‘as a product’, and not because of ‘harvesting’ techniques that may have been employed in gathering or collecting the item. Obviously, this product rather than process oriented approach makes it difficult for non-product based national environmental laws to pass muster under the GATT. By excluding such laws from the ambit of what the basic substantive provisions of the GATT permit in the form of import regulation, national governments are forced to seek the protection of the exceptions of GATT Article XX. These, however, have been very narrowly construed, with the impression given being that of unreceptivity to measures aimed at protecting the environment.

Whenever the use of comparative law is discussed, the question arises as to whether the phrase encompasses the use of foreign law. In this report comparative law will be taken in a broad sense, to include foreign law. For practical reasons subjects which are not confined to the boundaries of a single system – such as European law, international law and the law of international organisations – will not be covered in this report. For the same reasons no attention will be paid to those branches of legal science, which do not primarily deal with positive law, such as jurisprudence, legal methodology, sociology of the law and criminology.

International law as it applies to armed conflict necessarily treads a fine line between irrelevance to and complicity in its subject matter. The emergence of this body of law has been slow and painful, its foundational irony being that the treaty establishing the basis of modern international humanitarian law – the Nuremberg trials – was signed by the Allies on the same day that the United States dropped its second atomic bomb on Japan. This uncertain beginning, combined with the central role that nuclear weapons came to play in Cold War foreign policy, render it hardly surprising that the legal status of this most devastating class of weapons remained unclear for over half a century and is likely to remain so for some time to come.

Civil liability for environmental damage is currently very much the centre of attention. Many countries and international organizations have recently adopted rules in this field or are in the process of doing so. Almost without exception, these rules concentrate on creating a liability regime for damage caused by pollution that is the result of incidents which took place before their entry into force. The problem of damage that is the result of so-called historic pollution — primarily cases of soil contamination — was mostly left outside the range of these regulations. Until recently that is. Last year specific legislation on liability in cases of historic soil contamination was adopted in the Flemish region of Belgium and in the United Kingdom. Other countries like, for example, Denmark are studying the subject. The Netherlands has much greater experience with this type of legislation. It goes back to the Interim Soil Clean-up Act of 1983. The experiences with this act are reflected in a new legal regime for cleaning up contaminated land that came into force in 1994. The objective of this article is to reflect on these Dutch experiences.

The Asser Institute has asked me to speak in English, here in The Hague before a Dutch audience. Permit me to linger for a moment over this phenomenon.

The international economic order of the late fifties and early sixties was still fascinated by the so-called salt-water colonialism. This appears from international legal attempts at that time to offer more protection to foreign investors than was available to their host countries. The mid-sixties inaugurated a new era by reversing this trend. Legal aspects of the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States, such as stabilization clauses and the choice of both forum and applicable law, thus in the seventies became subordinate to the discretionary powers of host States, whether or not a party to a contract. A possible consensus regarding the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) was even abandoned because of this prevailing view. The real challenge in this period formed the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) moulded in a predominantly political blue-print for the development of States as the sole or main actors in international economic relations.

Of the more than 140 major cases of armed violence recorded since World War II, which have claimed more victims than that war itself, only relatively few have been ended through the mediation of the United Nations. Moreover, there is no single case in which the United Nations were absolutely instrumental in the prevention of an armed conflict, though in some cases aggression may have been averted in the face of international pressure. This is a disappointing state of affairs for an organisation whose task, according to the Preamble of its Charter, is to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’. But even if we disregard the lofty wording of the Preamble, the Charter itself in Article 1 places the maintenance of international peace and security first among the aims of the organisation.

The People's Republic of China (hereinafter: China) does not have a special statute on private international law. The relevant rules can be found mainly in China's Civil Procedural Law and the General Principles of the Civil Law. The rules of international jurisdiction are included in the former. In Part IV of the Civil Procedural Law entitled ‘Special Provisions for Civil Procedures Involving Foreign Parties’, there is a special chapter that is dedicated to the rules of international jurisdiction. This chapter has altogether four articles, all of which concern international jurisdiction over contract disputes.