When discussions of scientific method shift from natural sciences to social sciences, we tend to feel that we are turning from strict sciences to subject matters which may have achieved some measure of intellectual competence but which lack the rigor, objectivity and principles of organization found in mature science. This sense of a difference between the natural sciences and the social sciences is connected with questions of the meaning and rôle of laws. To the extent to which social and historical events have not been reduced to laws or perhaps cannot be, the disciplines which study such events are considered immature or imperfect sciences. To the extent to which social sciences do not offer predictions, they are felt to have little application to the solution of actual and immediate problems. When a bridge has to be built over a chasm, the laws of the natural sciences can be brought to bear. But when a treaty is to be drawn, where, it is asked, are the social and historical laws which can be applied to the situation?

Once upon a time the well-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics (one might even say the “traditional” paradoxes of quantum mechanics!—I refer here to paradoxes such as the Schrödinger cat and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox) seemed especially difficult because of the rather bizarre behavior of the wave packet under the von Neumann theory of measurement, to which behavior these paradoxical situations seemed to draw especial attention. Quite recently quantum theoretical accounts of the measurement process have been appearing which sidestep direct reference to such things as “contraction” of the wave packet (see, for example, Krips and Jauch). With this development it has become increasingly popular to take a “cool” approach to these paradoxes, arguing that the new approach to measurement provides a consistent, nonbizarre account of the physical situations and that the paradoxicality was due largely to intuitive blunders—even plausible intuitive blunders—accentuated (but also disguised) by the unfortunate features of the von Neumann approach to measurement. Both Krips and Jauch, for example, adopt this approach.

In “Studies In The Logic Of Explanation” (Philosophy of Science, XV, 1948) Hempel and Oppenheim analyze the basic pattern of scientific explanation. One of the difficult problems which they acknowledge is “whether and how the analysis of explanation can be extended from the case where all general explanatory principles invoked are of a strictly universal or ‘deterministic’ form to the case where explanatory reference is made to statistical hypotheses.” It is hoped that the remarks which follow may contribute a little toward clarifying the issue.

We describe two anomalies in Bohm’s quantum theory that shed light on the notion of probability zero in quantum mechanics. In one anomaly the preferred reference frame may be discovered.

Thought experiments play an important epistemic, rhetorical, and didactic function in Galileo’s dialogues. In some cases, Salviati, Sagredo, and Simplicio agree about what would happen in an imaginary scenario and try to understand whether the predicted outcome is compatible with their respective theoretical assumptions. There are, however, also situations in which the predictions of the three interlocutors turn out to be theory laden. Salviati, Sagredo, and Simplicio not only disagree about what would happen, but they reject one another’s solutions as question begging and sometimes even dismiss one another’s thought experiments as misleading or nonsensical.

Von Mises defined a “physical” probability as a strict limit of the relative frequency of occurrence of an event in repeated trials. As a result of a number of criticisms of von Mises's approach, the more favored approach became the “propensity” interpretation. It is argued here that this interpretation is not compelling and that the only problem in von Mises's approach is the assumption that the relative frequency converges in a strict sense. This problem is then remedied by deducing the axioms of probability theory from the assumption that the relative frequency converges only in the sense of the weak law of large numbers.

In his (1988), Brian Baigrie criticizes my earlier discussion of the rationality of science (Siegel 1985). In this response, I argue that (1) Baigrie misses the point of my tripartite distinction between different questions one can ask about science's rationality, (2) Baigrie's argument that the history of the development of methodological principles is crucial to philosophical discussion of the rationality of science is flawed, and (3) Baigrie's charge that my view is “anemic” rests on a failure to appreciate the point of my tripartite distinction.

The object of the present discussion is to show that the analysis of indirect discourse obtained when the concept of assertion is construed as a relationship that obtains between the asserting person and the asserted proposition—along the familiar lines proposed by Church [3, 4]—is entirely adequate of itself to circumvent the semantical paradoxes in which indirect discourse is involved.

In response to the growing number of paradoxes relating to the hypothesis of universal predictability, Sellars has written:

This article defends the Negative View of natural selection explanation, according to which natural selection cannot explain of any given individual why it has the traits it does. Over the years, this view has been criticized on empirical, metaphysical, and explanatory grounds. I review the debate and offer additional reasons for rejecting the empirical and metaphysical objections. The explanatory objection, which holds that the Negative View is rooted in a flawed account of contrastive explanation, initially seems plausible. However, I argue that a closer consideration of the desiderata of contrastive explanation shows that this objection fails as well.

Another critical analysis of the intellectual antecedents or the logical structure of Thorstein Veblen's thought is hardly needed. Since his death—iconoclasm's reward is often posthumous—a goodly number of such studies has appeared. I do not intend to add to the pile, but rather to analyze Veblen's work as representative of the response of “intellectuals” to specific ideologies and to ideology in general. This is a subject that has not received the direct attention it deserves, and, to my knowledge, Veblen has never been studied in this connection.

By “ideology” I mean a system of beliefs that presents value-judgments as empirical truths in order to justify, with or without conscious intent, a particular socio-economic group's claim to material and prestigial rewards. The valuejudgments in an ideology fall into two categories: those which have to do with a hero-subject, individual or group, whom the ideologue believes worthy of the rewards, and those which concern a villain-subject, individual or group, whom the ideologue believes unworthy. To win general acceptance of these valuejudgments an ideology also contains a set of reality-statements. These, in purporting to tell the “truth” about the world—about men, nature, God—serve to objectify, and thus justify, the choice of the hero and villain-subjects.

By dialectical fundamentalism I mean the view that maintains the inerrancy of the orthodox classical scriptures of dialectical materialism; by flexible scientific naturalism I mean the view recognizing the past heuristic value of dialectical materialism, but also the realization for the need to develop and change it along lines suggested by complementary philosophies relevant to the scientific outlook.

In this essay I argue that there are strong reasons for preserving the concept of race in both medical and sociological contexts. While I argue that there are important reasons to conceive of race as picking out distinctions among populations that are both legitimate and important, the notion of race that I advocate in this essay differs in fundamental ways from traditional folk notions of race. As a result, I believe that the folk understanding of race needs to be either revised or eliminated altogether.

Theories of intentionality need to account for non-cognitive states like emotions as well as cognitive states like beliefs. When certain non-cognitive states are included, one can formulate a feasible physicalist account of intentionality that highlights its evolutionary roots. I argue that recent experimental data support just such a move.

This article discusses Kevin Kelly’s recent attempt to justify Ockham’s Razor in terms of truth-finding efficiency. It is argued that Kelly’s justification fails to warrant confidence in the empirical content of theories recommended by Ockham’s Razor. This is a significant problem if, as Kelly and many others believe, considerations of simplicity play a pervasive role in scientific reasoning, underlying even our best tested theories, for the proposal will fail to warrant the use of these theories in practical prediction.

The lucidity of Mr. Copilowish's argument makes the task of the reviewer very pleasant, even if he disagrees as completely as I do with the conclusion, which is the main thesis Mr. Copilowish attempts to prove. Only at one minor point does his exposition not quite suit my taste. He chose to preface his argument with a string of quotations supposedly supporting the position he wishes to defend. It seems to me that with the proper historical precautions these passages allow for a very different interpretation. Yet I shall not pursue this matter, partly because I believe that Mr. Copilowish merely followed a literary stereotype, but mainly because the issue ought to be discussed on its merits rather than through the clouds of witness one could adduce on either side.

Randomized controlled trials are currently the gold standard within evidence-based medicine. Usually they are monitored for early signs of effectiveness or harm. However, evidence from trials stopped early is often charged with bias toward implausibly large effects. To our mind, this skeptical attitude is unfounded and caused by the failure to perform appropriate conditioning in the statistical analysis of the evidence. We contend that conditional hypothesis tests give a superior appreciation of the obtained evidence and significantly improve the practice of sequential medical trials, while staying firmly rooted in frequentist methodology.