Ceremonies, such as weddings, funerals, graduations, coronations, presidential inaugurations, and many other celebratory occasions play a central role in human life and society. But while their importance is emphasised in sociology and anthropology, as well as in Chinese, African and other philosophical traditions, ceremonies have received far less attention in Western philosophy, and when discussed are often, though not universally, dismissed as over-elaborate, or expressions of superstition. In this paper I will consider the nature and value of ceremonies, exploring both the positive and negative roles of ceremonies in human life, as well as considering how ceremonies can help us think about individual and group values.

In this paper I argue for a specific and highly challenging form of empathy involved in caring for young children – empathy that is an active and normally temporally extended exploration of the target subject’s complex and dynamic emotional life, guided by an epistemic aim of psychological understanding. I further argue that engagement in this empathetic work is liable to disable the caregiver’s normal emotional functioning in a way that can give rise to a sense of self-alienation. I end the paper by identifying three ways in which engagement in this special form of empathetic activity can also serve to enrich the caregiver’s life, or contribute to her flourishing.

The relationship between political philosophy and real-life politics is one that is heavily contested. On the one hand, it has been argued that political affiliation is a biasing force that stands in the way of our ability as political philosophers to maintain an objective perspective (Van der Vossen, 2015; 2020). On the other hand, it has been argued that political philosophers run the risk of bias whether they are politically active or not (Jones, 2020). In this paper, I nuance the debate at hand: I specify what kind of activism we should be concerned with as a biasing force, elaborate on what biases we should aim to mitigate as political philosophers, as well as what tools we have at our disposal in combatting biases within the discipline. This allows me to argue that participation in certain forms of political activism can be a powerful method for avoiding the most pernicious and pervasive biases we are prone to, namely biases against marginalised groups, and in favour of the political status quo. This has the implication that we must avoid a blanket ban on political activism within political philosophy, and instead recognise the epistemic merits of political activism where it is due.

Stephen Yablo suggested that the relation of mental properties to physical properties is the same as that between red and scarlet: one of determinable property to determinate property. So just as being scarlet is a specific way of being red, on Yablo’s proposal a subject’s having a certain neurological property (c-fibres firing, say) is a specific way of a subject’s having a certain mental property (pain, in this case). I explain the virtues of this theory, in particular as defended and developed by Jessica Wilson, but raise some problems for it. I then describe a novel theory of the mental/physical relationship, which inverts the Yablo-Wilson proposal. On this theory mental properties, notably phenomenal properties – or, as I will say, qualia – are determinates of determinable physical properties. I explain the virtues of this view, and argue that they at least match, and plausibly exceed, those of the Yablo-Wilson theory. In particular, this new theory is able to account for certain prominent perplexities of the mind/body problem that tend to go unexplained. I distinguish the view from nearby theories, in particular the increasingly popular ‘Russellian monism’. I end by likening it to a recent interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind due to David Charles.

In the entirety of his corpus, Spinoza uses the phrase ‘simplest bodies’ [corporibus simplicissimis] exactly twice and never offers an explanation of what it means. That said, it appears to play a fundamental role in his thought. This paper evaluates two twentieth-century readings of Spinoza in order to present a new original theory of simplest bodies. Ultimately, I present a reading of Spinoza which accepts a nuanced amalgamation of these accounts. I argue that the right understanding of Spinozistic simplest bodies is something like the following: simplest bodies are portions of extension featuring motive homogeneity among their necessarily infinite parts. For Spinoza, simplest bodies thus feature no mereological simplicity at all, but rather only motive simplicity, in that they are properly characterized by a single ratio of motion and rest.

The publication of Inoue Tetsujirō’s (1855–1944) The Philosophy of the Japanese Yangming School (1900) marked the birth of ‘Japanese philosophy’. In the early exploration of Japanese philosophy, the existence of a ‘twofold other’ – the ‘others’ of ‘philosophy’ and of kanji and kango components of Chinese origin in the Japanese script and language – became an unavoidable problem. In modernizing traditional scholarship to adapt it to the Western paradigm of ‘philosophy’, the first problem was the ‘other’ of ‘philosophy’. Discussions of the kokugo reform and the nationalization of the Japanese language originated precisely from kanji and kango representing the ‘other’. Inoue actively advocated abolishing kanji and creating a ‘new national script’ (shin kokuji). Nevertheless, he took the kanbun texts of early modern Confucianism as his object, and wrote his three ‘Japanese philosophy’ books, the so-called Trilogy of Tokugawa Confucianism. We argue that Inoue overcame the inconsistency in his positions on language politics and philosophy and paved the way to construct ‘Japanese philosophy’ through his ‘pan-philosophical’ outlook while advocating the creation of a new national script only for linguistic convenience. Thus, he was able to avoid the problem of twofold ‘otherness’ and cohere his theoretical position. However, Inoue’s path was soon abandoned.

According to J. S. Mill’s liberty principle, the only legitimate justification for restricting the freedom of competent adults is to prevent harm to others. However, this is ambiguous between two interpretations. The harm causation version (Brown, 1972) has it that only conduct that is itself harmful is liable to interference. In contrast, the general prevention of harm version (Lyons, 1979) allows interference with conduct that does not itself cause harm, such as refusals to assist others, so long as this interference prevents harm from occurring.

Mark Tunick (2024) has recently offered new arguments for the harm causation interpretation, suggesting that only this can explain Mill’s resistance to legal interference with prostitutes. This paper challenges Tunick’s arguments. First, I show that Mill does not clearly restrict interference to the proximate causes of harm. While he prefers interference to focus on the clients, rather than singling out the prostitutes, he is prepared to countenance interference with the prostitutes as well. Further, his preference for focusing on the clients is explicable, even if not required by the liberty principle.