Politicians appear to overestimate how conservative public opinion is in the U.S. and other Western democracies. Whether this “conservative bias” extends to voters remains unclear but has important implications for belief formation and behavior. I examine this in the context of abortion access after the Dobbs decision. Despite the salience of the topic, original survey data collected post-Dobbs reveal consistent underestimation of public support for abortion access. Individuals identifying as “pro-life” drive most of this underestimation, suggesting the presence of egocentric biases in which “pro-life” Americans overestimate the commonality of their views. Conservative biases among voters may contribute to a skewed information environment for politicians, potentially providing leverage for further restrictions on abortion access.

The extent to which legislators pursue their privately held preferences in office has important implications for representative democracy and is exceedingly difficult to measure. Many models of legislative decision-making tacitly assume that members are willing and able to carry out the wishes of their constituents so as to maximize their reelection prospects and, in so doing, relegate their personal preferences. This project explores this assumption by examining the role that members’ place of birth plays in shaping legislative behavior, apart from other politically relevant factors like partisanship. We find that birthplace exerts an independent influence on members’ voting behavior. Using a variety of geographic measures, we find that members who are born in close proximity to one another tend to exhibit similar patterns in roll call voting, even when accounting for partisanship, constituency attributes, and a variety of other determinants of voting. We also demonstrate in a secondary analysis that the agricultural composition of members’ birthplace influences their support for agricultural protection. Our findings suggest that members’ personal history shapes the representational relationship they have with their constituents.

We analyze a formal model of social contact and discrimination in the context of policing. Officers decide how to interact with members of two social groups while working and while socializing. The officers do not fully distinguish between their experiences of crime across these two contexts (“coarse thinking”), so they end up with excessively positive views of groups they socialize with and excessively negative views of those they police. This creates dual feedback loops as officers choose to socialize more with groups they view favorably and over-police those they view as “more criminal.” Interventions that induce positive contact with an overpoliced group can mitigate the officer’s discriminatory policing. However, this beneficial effect only persists if the policy intervention creates sustained positive contact. Our results provide a novel theoretical microfoundation for the contact hypothesis and highlight why effects of many policy interventions aimed at increasing positive contact may be short-lived.

Do ideologically extreme candidates enjoy fundraising advantages over more moderate candidates? Extant work documents a relationship between candidates’ positions and campaign contributions subnationally and in donor surveys, yet identification challenges have hampered investigation in the congressional context. I employ a close primaries regression discontinuity design to examine how “as-if random” nominations of extreme versus moderate House candidates influence general election contributions from individual donors and corporate political action committees (PACs) from 1980 to 2020. Results at both the nominee and contributor levels demonstrate that corporate PACs financially penalize extremists, while individual donors respond similarly to extreme and moderate candidates. These findings contribute to ongoing debates regarding the extent and nature of campaign contributors’ role in congressional polarization.

Survey research in the Global South has traditionally required large budgets and lengthy fieldwork. The expansion of digital connectivity presents an opportunity for researchers to engage global subject pools and study settings where in-person contact is challenging. This paper evaluates Facebook advertisements as a tool to recruit diverse survey samples in the Global South. Using Facebook’s advertising platform, we quota-sample respondents in Mexico, Kenya, and Indonesia and assess how well these samples perform on a range of survey indicators, identify sources of bias, replicate a canonical experiment, and highlight trade-offs for researchers to consider. This method can quickly and cheaply recruit respondents, but these samples tend to be more educated than corresponding national populations. Weighting ameliorates sample imbalances. This method generates comparable data to a commercial online sample for a fraction of the cost. Our analysis demonstrates the potential of Facebook advertisements to cost-effectively conduct research in diverse settings.

The Cox duration model serves as the basis for more complex duration models like competing risks, repeated events, and multistate models. These models make a number of assumptions, many of which can be assessed empirically, sometimes for substantive ends. We use Monte Carlo simulations to show the order in which practitioners assess these assumptions can impact the model’s final specification, and ultimately, can produce misleading inferences. We focus on three assumptions regarding model specification decisions: proportional hazards (PH), stratified baseline hazards, and stratum-specific covariate effects. Our results suggest checking the PH assumption before checking for stratum-specific covariate effects tends to produce the correct final specification most frequently. We reexamine a recent study of the timing of GATT/WTO applications to illustrate our points.

In this article, I study the effect of endogenous challenger entry on electoral accountability in the presence of adverse selection. To this end, I analyze a two-period electoral agency model wherein a potential challenger freely chooses whether to run for office. The effect of endogenous challenger entry on policy decisions in this model is ambiguous: depending on model parameters, it can worsen or ease policy distortions. Analogously, marginally increasing the cost of running for office can deepen or reduce these distortions. This uncertainty regarding the effect of endogenous challenger entry on policymaking leads to equally ambiguous welfare implications. Nonetheless, I identify conditions under which endogenous challenger entry improves policymaking and voter welfare. This suggests that, in some circumstances, imposing higher barriers to entry in elections can improve policymaking and voter welfare.

How do the effects of climate regulation on businesses impact public attitudes toward climate policy? While emissions intensity is the primary frame for understanding the effects of climate policy on business, theoretical scholarship and public discourse often emphasize that large firms will adjust to climate regulations easily while smaller firms will struggle. Because small businesses are sympathetic and large firms are unpopular, individuals who view climate regulation’s effects in line with this firm size account should be less likely to support climate change mitigation. To test this theory, we conduct an original survey of climate policy beliefs and then a survey experiment. We find evidence that distaste for large corporations increases opposition to climate action among people exposed to the idea that big companies can more easily navigate climate regulations than small companies. This work contributes to the literature on moral political economy and on the enduring difficulty of enacting effective climate change regulation within the United States.

Classic arguments about federalist governance emphasize an informational or learning role for decentralizing policy authority, but in practice, ideological outcomes frequently motivate this choice. We examine the role of ideology in the allocation of policy-making power by modeling a two-period interaction between an elected central executive and two local governments. Decentralization reduces the executive’s ability to set policy and control externalities but potentially insures against future policy reversals. In this environment, partial decentralization is a common outcome. Complete decentralization arises when executives are unlikely to be re-elected, party polarization is high, and institutional hurdles to policy-making are significant. These results help to clarify existing cross-national empirical findings on the determinants of centralization.

Much work is concerned with the effects of mainstream parties accommodating the positions of populist radical right parties. Little is known about the role of political rhetoric in mainstream party responses to radical right challengers though. This is a significant gap given the evident shifts in mainstream party discourse across European democracies. Using a pre-registered survey experiment in Germany, I analyze how voters react when mainstream parties engage in populist rhetoric and adopt radical right issue positions. Theoretically, I propose that voters, particularly those with populist attitudes, may use populist rhetoric as a heuristic when evaluating parties. I find that, in line with spatial theories of voting, voters penalize or reward mainstream parties based on their adoption of radical right positions, but that the use of populist rhetoric does not significantly impact voter evaluations. These findings demonstrate the relevance of programmatic party strategies in mainstream-challenger competition and cast doubt on the effectiveness of populist rhetoric.

This article examines the relationship between foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) and the degree of personalism in dictatorships. We contend that aid leads to higher personalism since it is a windfall that accrues to the government and does not require cooperation from elites to obtain it. Contrarily, we posit that FDI is linked to lower levels of personalism because it reshapes elites’ incentives and influence as they may acquire new preferences, connections, and exit options, thus constraining dictators. Using data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and FDI, and a latent index of personalism in autocracies, we find no robust evidence that ODA or FDI are correlated with personalism, but have some effect on some of the index’s components.

Many recent applications of the “Unexpected Event during Survey Design” (UESD) analyze single cases of frequently occurring events. In this research note, I question the generalizability of research findings obtained this way and demonstrate the empirical benefits of the “Multiple Unexpected Events during Survey Design” (MUESD). I conduct 15 large-scale replications (total N = 101,940) of a new UESD analyzing the effects of Mediterranean shipwrecks on immigration attitudes. Previous research suggests that such events drastically reduce anti-immigration attitudes among the European public, presumably through an empathy-based mechanism. However, after 15 of the most lethal shipwrecks since 2013, anti-immigration attitudes were reduced in only one case of exceptionally high salience and to a much lesser degree than originally found.

What explains the geography and timing of contestation in civil war? We propose a theory of opportunistic rebel tactics, in which insurgent commanders react to temporary shifts in the local balance of power to attack the state. We argue that these opportunistic strikes are enabled by two jointly necessary factors: (1) negative fluctuations in local repressive state capacity and (2) the expectation of civilian compliance with rebel incursions. We evaluate this argument on data from the Colombian civil war. Leveraging exogenous variation in local state capacity caused by landslide-induced road closures, we find that short-term negative shocks to repressive capacity increase the likelihood of insurgent-state clashes. However, this effect does not hold when local communities harbor strongly anti-insurgent attitudes, suggesting that state capacity and civilian behavior jointly shape rebel strategy and that popular opposition can substitute for state strength.

Most research on political identities studies how individuals react to knowing others’ political allegiances. However, in most contexts, political views and identities are hidden and only inferred, so that projected beliefs and identities may matter as much as actual ones. We argue that individuals engage in motivated political projection: the identities people project onto target individuals are strongly conditional on the valence of that target. We test this theoretical proposition in two pre-registered experimental studies. In Study 1, we rely on a unique visual conjoint experiment in Britain and the USA that asks participants to assign partisanship and political ideology to heroes and villains from film and fiction. In Study 2, we present British voters with a vignette that manipulates a subject’s valence and solicits (false) recall information related to the subject’s political identity. We find strong support for motivated political projection in both studies, especially among strong identifiers. This is largely driven by negative out-group counter-projection rather than positive in-group projection. As political projection can lead to the solidification of antagonistic political identities, our findings are relevant for understanding dynamics in group-based animosity and affective polarization.

Do more restrictive voter identification (ID) laws decrease turnout? I argue that in the 2018 London Local elections this was the case. Bromley was the only London borough to pilot a more restrictive ID scheme. The scheme was assessed by the Electoral Commission and Cabinet Office but lacked a good estimate for the impact on turnout. Applying a synthetic difference-in-difference (DID) methodology, which has several benefits compared to traditional DID methods, to turnout data from 2002 to 2018 I show that turnout was between 4.0 and 5.0% points lower than otherwise would be expected. This indicates more restrictive ID laws can meaningfully limit turnout which has implications for future elections if governments chose to implement a more restrictive regime.

Panel surveys and phone-based data collection are essential for survey research and are often used together due to the practical advantages of conducting repeated interviews over the phone. These tools are particularly critical for research in dynamic or high-risk settings, as highlighted by researchers’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, preventing high attrition is a major challenge in panel surveys. Current solutions in political science focus on statistical fixes to address attrition ex-post but often overlook a preferable solution: minimizing attrition in the first place. Building on a review of political science panel studies and established best practices, we propose a framework to reduce attrition and introduce an online platform to facilitate the logistics of survey implementation. The web application semi-automates survey call scheduling and enumerator workflows, helping to reduce panel attrition, improve data quality, and minimize enumerator errors. Using this framework in a panel study of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, we maintained participant retention at 63 percent four and a half years after the baseline survey. We provide guidelines for researchers to report panel studies transparently and describe their designs in detail.

Mexico's war on drugs is increasingly characterized by small, local groups rather than large cartels. This research note introduces new data developed from a narcoblog—a citizen journalism website—on more than 450 criminal organizations operating in Mexico between 2009 and 2020. I use the data to test prominent theories of fragmentation, providing suggestive evidence that drug war policies contributed to a more complex conflict: kingpin removals were correlated with the emergence of smaller groups; profit opportunities (in this case, fuel theft) then attracted these organizations to new territories. This research contributes to our understanding of criminal control and informs debates over violence reduction policies.

The standard measure of authoritarianism asks respondents about desirable qualities in children. Although these questions are gender-neutral, respondents may differ in the gender of the child in their heads when answering. The items also may tap into gendered expectations about boys' and girls' behavior. We conducted three experiments that randomly assigned respondents to be asked about a child, a boy, or a girl in the items. We compare the means, measurement properties, and correlation between authoritarianism and other important variables across the conditions. Asking respondents about a girl creates significant differences in the level and measurement of authoritarianism, which is partially driven by the respondents' sexism. There are, fortunately, few other significant differences in the correlates of authoritarianism.

Can autocratic governments influence foreign media? This study finds that political pressures from autocrats can motivate the media in democracies to tone down their negativity. Exploiting China's sudden expulsion of American journalists in March 2020, I show that US news outlets targeted by the expulsion adopted a more positive tone toward China in their subsequent coverage, compared to outlets that were not targeted. Further analyses confirm that the observed pattern is not due to unexpelled outlets presenting more negative coverage of China, and that the expulsion has similar chilling effects on media outlets that could have been affected. The findings highlight the overt threats autocracies pose to media freedom, a fundamental pillar of democratic societies.

Do external threats increase American bipartisanship? We subject this question to an experimental test. Leveraging the Biden and Trump administrations’ similar characterization of the China threat, we exposed American respondents to real-world primes about security threats from China, while randomizing the messenger of such primes. We find that the threat primes—regardless of the partisan identity of their messenger—boosted Democrats’ and Republicans’ support for assertive foreign policy in a largely parallel manner, thereby failing to reduce preference polarization. Importantly, there were no measurable changes across multiple indicators of affective polarization. These findings clarify the limits of external threats in uniting Americans, while also challenging recent perspectives that external threats—often colored by elite rhetoric—will further polarize the American public.