The overall aim of the seminar on “The Philosophical Roots of the Bill of Rights” was to gain a better understanding of the basic presuppositions and implications of our Constitutional commitments as expressed in the Bill of Rights, especially as viewed from the perspective of the original debates and compromises that led finally to the enactment of the Bill of Rights. That original perspective was, of course, riven by considerable controversy, above all between the Federalists who supported, and the Anti-Federalists who opposed, the ratification of the original Constitution. The latter were the primary instigators of the movement for a Bill of Rights amending the proposed Constitution, but at the end of the day it was the Federalist outlook, articulated above all by Congressman James Madison, that most fully determined the actual character of the rights that were given Constitutional recognition. Still, this very fact, that an eventual compromise was reached which was at least as satisfying to most leading Federalists as it was to the leading Anti-Federalists who had originally insisted on the amendments—points to the very large measure of agreement on fundamental principles that underlay the debates between Federalists and Anti-Federalists.

This agreement on basic moral and political principles becomes most apparent when one contrasts the republicanism of the Americans, the republicanism rooted in a commitment to individual rights, with earlier and alternative forms of republican political theory. This contrast was the theme of the first seminar. I asked the participants to read Plutarch's life of Lycurgus, not only because Plutarch is an author, and this particular short biography is a text, well-known to the American Founders, but even more because the life of Lycurgus contains a vivid and concrete statement of the classical republican ideal that brings out some of the most alien features of that ideal.

Approximately 65 applicants opted for acceptance in this seminar, from whom twenty were ultimately selected. All accepted. They came from seven colleges and thirteen universities, located in ten states; ranked from instructor through professor; ranged in age from 29 to 61; and included seventeen men and three women.

Wisely, the objectives of the four seminars conducted under the program constituted both substantive inquiry and teaching methodology. Consequently, my approach to the examination of “landmarks in the judicial interpretation of civil rights in America” was designed to stress the communicative responsibilities of teaching as well as content matter. All too frequently, the latter suffers because of insufficient attention to the former. I did not utilize video aids in the seminar, but I provided sundry types of exhibits that have proved helpful in my now more than four decades of teaching at the university level.

Although the thrust of the seminar's aims and context was self-evident, it seemed to me that to address the subject matter without an analysis of seminal components of the nature of the judicial process, in general, and the parameters of judicial power, in particular, would be both short-sighted and dysfunctional. Looking back to the seminar now, I am more persuaded than ever that that resolve was appropriate—for, perhaps quite naturally and understandably in view of the deeply felt components of the subject matter, pre-conceived personal, as well as professional commitments, were indubitably in evidence at the threshold. Consequently, the entire first day's attention to an examination of the lines and limits of the judicial role and the postures of individual jurists would serve as seminal background material for the gravamen of the seminar's remaining days.

The twenty participants in this seminar came from a variety of colleges and universities that ranged from major research institutions to small teaching colleges. The academic ranks and interests of those in attendance also were diverse. This heterogeneity of participants was intentional and designed to facilitate a meaningful exchange of ideas and perspectives on the topics to be discussed. Formal class sessions were held for three and one-half hours each morning. The instructor made herself available for individual discussions later each day. Seminar participants were urged to take advantage of the unique location of the seminar. It was held at the APSA convention site only a few blocks away from the Martin Luther King, Jr. birth site and the MLK Center for Nonviolent Social Change.

The focus of this seminar in the main was to explore the role that interest groups have played and are likely to continue to play in the judicial process. Our focus was on the federal level, particularly the United States Supreme Court. Given the varied backgrounds and interests of those attending this seminar, it was believed that such an approach would provide a broader and richer understanding of not only the development of law concerning civil rights but also of the judicial process itself.

After introductions the first morning, we immediately launched into a discussion of the readings for the day. They were designed to acquaint the participants with some of the literature on interest group litigation. Interestingly, however, the focus of our attention was immediately turned to the idea of “group” and what was meant by interest group or social movement. Several participants had been grappling with these questions in their own research, and others had had extensive experience in a diverse set of groups. A lengthy discourse from varied perspectives then ensued.

Most Americans take for granted the notion that the powers of government are circumscribed by individual rights. But this commonplace notion is, in fact, very complicated conceptually and poses difficult problems institutionally. This course explored both the conceptual and the institutional problems, from their origins to their contemporary manifestations. We began with the formation of the Constitution: the writing of the document in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, its ratification, the addition of the Bill of Rights in 1789, and the establishment of judicial review. As a starting point, I offered my own perspective through excerpts from my forthcoming book, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy. My central argument is that the Framers' concern with protecting the rights of property distorted both their understanding of constitutionalism and the institutions they designed to implement that understanding. The Framers wanted to design a republican form of government based on the notion of consent by the governed, and thus some form of democratic (as we would call it today) representation. But the Federalists, whose views dominated the convention, also wanted to ensure that civil rights would be secure in the new republic. Property became the focus of their efforts to make the political rights implicit in republican government compatible with the security of civil rights. Unfortunately, their focus on the protection of unequal property, the property of the minority as threatened by the (future) propertyless majority, distorted their vision of the basic problem of protecting individual rights in a democracy. Their fears of the propertyless bred a focus on containing the political power of the people.

In June of 1789, Representative James Madison fulfilled a campaign promise to his Virginia constituents by asking colleagues in the House of Representatives to consider a group of constitutional amendments designed to secure basic individual liberties. By December of 1791, ten of these were ratified by the necessary number of states, becoming the first amendments to the new Constitution—the U.S. Bill of Rights. Despite the bicentennial “burnout” which some individuals are experiencing, the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights—which we begin in earnest this spring—should be a most meaningful occasion for every American. The Declaration of Independence made the nation a possibility; the Constitution created the structure of public authority in the nation; but the Bill of Rights has done nothing less than define the very quality of public and private life in the United States. If the Constitution is a “living document,” then surely the Bill of Rights is about daily living and the freedom we have to experience life. This makes the Bill of Rights America's most important “founding” document.

The Bill of Rights has been variously described as “a shield to every American citizen,” “the one guarantee of freedom to the American people,” “fetters against doing evil which no honest government should decline,” and “the foundation of liberty against the encroachments of government.” However, even as we prepare to celebrate its bicentennial, ignorance, indifference, intolerance, ideology, and perhaps even modernity threaten the viability of its guarantees. Historian Michael Kammen (1986: 336-356) calls it a “subtle attack” while others see it as a direct frontal assault.

During the 1987 Iran/Contra hearings, Senator George J. Mitchell of Maine spoke eloquently about the importance of the rule of law in a culturally pluralistic nation like the United States:

The students we teach live in what is certainly one of the most culturally pluralistic cities, and nations, in the world. They are increasingly part of a society in which this pluralism affects them either as members of cultural minorities, or as members of the so-called dominant culture who interact with many different cultural groups. As a cultural anthropologist and a political scientist teaching in a college with a focus on law and justice, we felt it important to bring to our students a deeper understanding of the possibilities and problems of cultural pluralism in a democratic, constitutional society. While Senator Mitchell's words surely express a fundamental ideal in American society, how closely these words express the reality experienced in American society is a question that had long interested us.

In recent years, public officials in the United States and abroad have expressed increasing concern over the economic effects of defense spending. It has been alleged that defense spending is a major cause of the budget deficit and is at the root of America's economic “decline.” Even in the Soviet Union, questions are now being raised about the impact of military spending on the civilian economy.

As director of a research program at Harvard that focuses on economics and national security, I decided it was important to offer a course on the “political economy of national security.” While Harvard and other major universities in the Boston area offer courses in political economy on the one hand and national security on the other, students have few opportunities to examine national defense from an economic perspective. Given that national security is the largest single economic activity in the United States and many other countries, and given intense student interest in the topic, the time was ripe to devise such a course.

The course was first offered in the Harvard Summer School, which is open to undergraduate and graduate students from Harvard and other universities. The only prerequisite was an introductory course in economics. As it turns out, most of the students were more than adequately prepared; among those who attended were students from Harvard Business School, the Kennedy School of Government, some local defense industry executives, military officers, and a number of Ph.D. candidates. For those who might consider offering such a course, I would suggest that the required economics course not be waived in any circumstances; otherwise you will spend a lot of time explaining basic concepts.

Many political scientists find that they have difficulty generating enthusiasm (from both themselves and their students) when they teach the introductory course in American politics. The material can be very dry and basic, students are often required to take the course, and many believe they know the material from high school civics classes. In short, motivation can be a major problem, and the instructor must find a way to get students involved with the course. This is especially important, because this course often serves as the gateway to other offerings in American politics. If students are not excited about the Intro class, they may not go any farther in political science.

I believe the key to motivation in this class lies in getting students to actually participate in the interest group process. This allows them to test the theoretical constructs presented in the course in the laboratory of real world politics. Therefore, I have designed an introductory course in American politics that is centered around a small group project that requires students to try to get a government (local, state, or national) to do something substantial that the group proposes.

In many respects, my course is a fairly traditional introduction to American politics. We cover the Constitution, federalism, interest groups, civil rights, elections, theories of power,and the institutions. The reading is reduced a bit to allow time for students to work on the projects. After describing the project, I will explain how it fits into the framework of the course.