As we meet in 2018, it is nearly thirty years since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; seventeen years have passed since the terrorist attacks in the United States of September 11, 2001; and it is nearly fifteen years since the United Nations promulgated its definition of rule of law in 2004.

The discussion on humanitarian access is, unfortunately, an essential one to have right now. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that about 141 million people across thirty-seven countries are in need of humanitarian assistance. Of that, about 13.1 million people in Syria—that is twice the size of the population of the DC metro area—and 22.2 million in Yemen, just to name two countries in conflict. The operational and legal challenges to try to get even a small amount of assistance to people in need are tremendous.

Access to the victims of armed conflicts for humanitarian relief operations is vital for the survival of those victims, especially for the most vulnerable ones. What can international law do to facilitate and secure such access? These remarks shall pinpoint some basic principles and problems.

Of the diverse array of contemporary challenges around humanitarian access in armed conflict, a particular set of issues concerns the so-called “criminalization” of humanitarian action under counterterrorism frameworks. This presentation raises some key elements of that set of issues.

The Trump administration has made no secret about its frustration with the World Trade Organization (WTO). Campaign rhetoric is being channeled into policy. The United States is single-handedly strangling the Appellate Body by blocking appointment of new members and complaining about those who are holding over past their terms. The latest WTO ministerial resulted in no deals. An administration that touts enforcement has largely eschewed filing WTO complaints. The president's imposition of duties pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Section 232) is a manifestation of deeper concerns with the asymmetry that was built into the global trading system—asymmetry the United States encouraged at the time. That asymmetry contributed to the U.S. status as the market of last resort: the destination of choice for excess production, with adverse consequences for domestic producers of similar goods.

The rules international organizations (IOs) make deviate considerably from the traditional sources of international law in Article 38 of the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) Statute and the ways those are understood: as generated, enforced, and interpreted by states based on their consent. As this panel demonstrates, IO “rules” take various forms—e.g., guidelines, recommendations, and standards—and are promulgated by not only traditional interstate organizations but public/private hybrids, transnational networks involving agencies inside states, private associations of industry or other experts, or subsidiary committees of the parties (COPs) or meetings of the parties (MOPs). These rules enjoy varying degrees of authoritativeness, often purport to have some impact on state and non-state actors, and depart, sometimes quite openly, from reliance on state consent. And even when IOs turn to the traditional sources—treaties, custom, general principles—these take untraditional forms that blur distinctions between binding and non-binding law. Whether these governance efforts are described as systems of “global administrative law,” “global constitutionalism,” or “transnational legal orders” or as new forms of “international public law,” they are certainly different from your grandmother's public international law. Like “soft” law before it, these governance efforts have drawn the ire of legal positivists who ask, with some justice, what is meant by “law” if everyone (public, private, and in-between) is a potential “lawmaker” and no one can be certain about whether their efforts entail legal responsibility and, if so, for whom.

Throughout its one hundred years of existence, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has taken a dynamic approach to the implementation of its mandate to achieve social justice through the adoption of international labor standards. This approach is exemplified in three ILO declarations: the Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the International Labour Organization, 1944 (Declaration of Philadelphia); the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998 (the 1998 Declaration) and the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2008 (the 2008 Declaration). These declarations contain expressions of renewed commitment by the ILO's tripartite membership toward the universal relevance of the Organization's constitutional mandate and its means of action (standards, development cooperation, and research), and by the ILO to support its members. These declarations have in addition adapted the vision of the ILO mission to contemporary circumstances for a better impact. As noted by Professors Alvarez and Burci, the ILO is a good example of a long-standing international public organization reinventing itself with very few amendments to its founding charter.

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is an independent, non-governmental, not-for-profit organization that develops and publishes fully consensus-based International Standards. ISO members are national standards bodies (NSBs), which may be government, private, or public-private entities. 163 NSBs are members of ISO. The ISO standards portfolio numbers more than 20,000 standards. ISO also has a large network of liaison organizations—which can participate in the ISO process but do not vote. These include many treaty organizations, including the World Health Organization, Codex, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and so on; as well as numerous other international organizations.

The conclusion of the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982 (Convention), highlighted by the emergence of a new maritime zone and the extension of the breadth of territorial sea from three to twelve nautical miles, has required Indonesia to adjust its maritime boundaries. As any other coastal state, Indonesia is entitled to all maritime zones as provided by the Convention and therefore needs to draw the boundaries for the respective zone in accordance with its provisions. Geographically, Indonesia is bordered by ten neighboring states where the maritime zones overlap. As prescribed by the Convention, Indonesia shall enter into negotiation with its neighbors to reach an agreement. This Article will explain how Indonesia addresses the issue.

The chair of the panel, Professor Alina Miron, asked Professor Oxman to address the following: Undoubtedly the first use of the mechanism of compulsory conciliation under Annex V of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea by Timor-Leste was a tremendous success, though not devoid of obstacles. What are the lessons that can be learned from this first experience? How different from the judicial mechanisms were the Commission's functions and procedures?

Thank you, Lucinda, for that kind introduction. Congratulations to Sean Murphy on your election as the new ASIL president and on the success of the initiative for a crimes against humanity convention. And thanks so much to Mark Agrast for this great program.

In recent years, individuals have increasingly travelled from their respective countries to join the ranks of armed opposition groups and terrorist networks, oftentimes in zones of ongoing armed conflict. One must look no further than recent newspaper headlines to realize that the “foreign fighters” phenomenon is as pervasive across borders as it is challenging, both from policy and legal standpoints. While the prospect of individuals travelling abroad to join ongoing hostilities is far from novel, the number of such foreign fighters lending support to terrorist organizations has been unprecedented in recent years, posing considerable threats to domestic, regional, and international peace and security. Hence, domestic, regional, transnational, and international actors have adopted measures to counteract terrorism, more broadly, and have begun to address the problem of foreign (terrorist) fighters. The contributions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are particularly noteworthy and, indeed, there has been growing interest in that organ's “quasi-legislative” activities.

Thanks, Vincent-Joel, for the introduction and to Kimberley Trapp for inviting me to speak.

There seems to be a natural connection between armed conflict and terrorism: both involve acts of violence by nonstate armed actors. The acts of armed groups during armed conflicts are frequently labeled as acts of terrorism. Similarly, both international humanitarian law (IHL) and the international legal regime governing terrorism address acts of violence committed by nonstate armed actors. Yet, these superficial similarities obscure the significant conceptual differences between acts of violence in armed conflicts and those outside armed conflicts as well as the differences in the legal regimes governing them. Before turning to an analysis of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2178 (2014), it is necessary to briefly explain how IHL addresses acts of terrorism, followed by a brief description of the international treaty regime governing terrorism, including how this regime regulates its relationship with IHL.

I am going to consider the UN Foreign (Terrorist) Fighter FTF regime from a different perspective, by exploring how the regime interacts with both the international law relating to terrorism and international criminal law. I will to do this by looking first at the definition of terrorism and then at how the UK Supreme Court approached the issue of terrorism and armed conflict. In addition, I am going to apply a little prosecutorial pragmatism to these difficult legal issues, and suggest that we focus on the crime.

With the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, major changes were made to the dispute settlement system that had previously governed international trade disputes. Prior to the WTO, the dispute settlement system that had evolved under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was widely believed to suffer from certain structural weaknesses. One perceived weakness was that the establishment of a dispute settlement panel or the adoption of a panel's report required a positive consensus of all the GATT contracting parties, effectively allowing respondents to block losing outcomes against themselves. Thus, one major change that resulted from the Uruguay Round of negotiations (which led to the creation of the WTO) was the replacement of the positive consensus rule with a negative consensus rule such that to block establishment of a panel or adoption of a panel report, all WTO members have to agree not to establish or not to adopt the report.

The Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing a crisis. Appointment of AB members requires a consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body (comprised of all WTO members), and the United States has been blocking a consensus on further appointments since Donald J. Trump became the president. Without new appointments, the ranks of the AB have been diminishing as AB members’ terms have been expiring. If this continues (and many expect the United States to continue blocking a consensus on appointments), then in December 2019, through attrition, the number of AB members will fall below the threshold necessary to render decisions, at which point the AB will cease to function.

The United States for at least sixteen years has had serious concerns with whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system was operating according to the terms upon which WTO Members had agreed. While the United States has been a major supporter of the WTO system and the dispute settlement system generally, concerns about sovereignty and the proper functioning of the system have been important since at least 2002, reflected in U.S. legislation and actions by three administrations. Concerns have existed on (1) whether panels and the Appellate Body have honored the limitations contained in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) not to create rights or obligations; (2) the issuance of advisory opinions on issues not raised or not necessary to the resolution of the dispute; (3) actions of the Appellate Body that permit deviation from the DSU without affirmative authorization by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB); and, former Appellate Body members continuing to be involved in cases after their term has expired (failure to complete appeals in the DSU required maximum time of ninety days). These are all issues that have concerned the United States for years but also have been raised by other members.

Welcome to the Business and Human Rights in Action panel, sponsored by the ASIL Human Rights Interest Group. Business and Human Rights is an evolving field that has gone through many changes in recent years, with new legislative developments and private initiatives designed to improve corporate social responsibility practices and respect for human rights. Meanwhile, the Alien Torts Claims Act has been limited by the U.S. Supreme Court, and stakeholders have faced challenges involving corporations in transitional justice initiatives.

The 2018 ASIL panel on the question of corporate responsibility and human rights, and in particular, my remarks on corporate responsibility and transitional justice, preceded a long-awaited United States Supreme Court decision on the question of whether foreign corporate responsibility for human rights abuses belonged in United States courts ending in a closely decided vote—dividing sharply along political lines, with the Court conservatives in splintered opinions deciding against such liability. A forceful dissent by the four liberals on the Court would have allowed the Alien Tort Claims Act (ACTA) claim to go forward.