In this review of articles in the Encyclopedia of Religion I have selected those concerning theoretical issues about the nature of religion and those describing the history and methods of the study of religion as an academic discipline. By any count this collection of papers (over 50) should be of central importance to an encyclopaedia of this nature. Method provides one of the most contentious and thorny sets of issues in contemporary academic debate in the study of religion. A reference work of this sort would perform an invaluable service if it offered a clear and comprehensive guide to these issues. Furthermore, there can be no more important questions for the student of religion than those concerning what kind of phenomenon religion is and how religion is related to human nature. If a reference work in the study of relgion cannot sum up the best of what is thought and known in contemporary scholarship in answer to these questions then, for all the detail it offers on particular manifestations of religion, it will be seriously deficient.

The place of Christianity in a work such as the Encyclopedia of Religion is an uncomfortable one. The work is, after all, largely the product of Western scholars operating in a culture now widely thought to have abandoned much of its Christian inheritance. How does one in such circumstances fulfil the editorial desire to be evenhanded, to treat all religious phenomena as far as possible ‘objectively’? By giving Fairies a longer entry than Cyril of Alexandria, for example? Or, to take a more serious example, by seeing to it that the Eastern church gains a fair proportion of space, thus giving Cyril I, patriarch, 1570/7–1638, more space than Cyril of Alexandria, theologian and bishop? Such points are an indication of the immense difficulty facing editors of a work such as this.

A comedy, unlike a tragedy which the experts maintain has to succeed greatly if it is to succeed at all, can be evaluated on a more or less basis. The former can likewise be great, but it can also be quite funny or only mildly amusing and remain a worthwhile comedy and it is this kind of relativist assessment that this writer believes is appropriate with regard to the sections of this encyclopaedia dealing with ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ religions. The former section, taken in the round, is impressive in terms of its range, the quality of the entries and the back-up or support material, the latter is somewhat less so in all of these areas but nonetheless worthwhile.

The religions of Indian origin occupy considerable space in the Encyclopedia. There are literally hundreds of articles, some quite extensive, that deal with the relevant material. Such a generous treatment need not come as a surprise. The editor in chief was the late Mircea Eliade, the author of a highly influential work on yoga; he himself honoured the Encyclopedia with the entry on the same subject. Moreover, in any global account of religion the Indian traditions ought to figure prominently, given their enormous influence all over Asia.

Philosphy is not necessary to religion, and philosophy in the modern West proceeds without much reference to religion. In so far as religion is taken to be a matter of reverence for the traditional gods of place and people, its rites and stories are as resistant to philosophical analysis as are the works of poets and dramatists. Yet insofar as a religion makes claims about the nature of the real world, claims based on some allegedly special mode of access proper to that religion, then it is bound to come under critical scrutiny. The Socratic method of seeking an analysis of meanings and an exposition of modes of knowledge can be readily applied to any religious believers who claim to understand what religious concepts mean and who further claim that they know some of their beliefs to be true. Although Plato has Socrates participate in sacrifices to the gods, he never considers the rites of ancient Greek religion to be worthy of serious philosophical comment. Instead, he invented his own austere, mathematical, cerebral religion, the contemplation of the Good, which provides knowledge of how to live justly in society. Ever since that time, philosophers in the West have tended to invent their own vastly unpopular religions of intellectual supremacy, and to leave the mass of popular religion to superstition and illusion. Theologians, however, conscious of the need to provide some intellecutal basis for their faith, have tended to adopt the philosophical positions of a few, or even of a few hundred, years ago, and baptize them, sometimes very roughly, into the Christian or some other faith.

In the Encyclopedia of Religion the articles on Islam and the religions of Iran prompt very different reactions. On the Islamic side a third are good, a third bad, and the rest either of indifferent quality or merely straightforward, as is natural in a work of reference. But not only are the bad articles extremely misleading: they are cast in a framework which cannot fail to produce a seriously distorted overall perspective. For the religions of Iran, however, we are given an admirable series of contributions by Gherardo Gnoli, and it is a great pleasure for a British reader to find, in English, a balanced summary of the results of recent Continental scholarship in this field.

The great increase of interest in the study of spirituality and mysticism is reflected in the large number of articles that the Encyclopedia of Religion devotes to various aspects of this topic. As one would expect, there are long entries for ‘Mysticism’ and ‘Christian Spirituality’ and ‘Religious Experience’. In addition to these broad categories, attention is given to more specific aspects of spirituality such as ‘Asceticism’, ‘Silence’, ‘Prayer’, ‘Meditation’, and so on. This is complemented by entries on many of the spiritual giants of the Christian tradition, both ancient and modern. I shall begin by discussing these articles on individuals, and go on to examine the more general articles later in the review. I shall suggest that, despite many merits, both sorts of entry display an editorial policy about which serious questions must be raised.

I have meditated regularly, following simple Buddhist procedures, for more than ten years, and that seems just about long enough for me to start to offer some preliminary account of it, despite the limitations of my progress and experience, and the difficulty of describing the more intimate and less explored reaches of the mind. I think I have learned enough to say that through prolonged spiritual practice one arrives at the springs of action and at root attitudes, and is in a position to be possessed of them in a purer, stronger form. It may seem difficult to see how the practice of philosophy can be reconciled with the practice of meditation, but I shall describe how I have tried to do so, and say how I think the one bears on the other. In fact all I can do in the present paper is to attempt a limited discussion of moral psychology, and its relation to the foundations of ethics, a discussion, I must concede now, in which I waver uncertainly in my expression of the key issues. But I think that I cannot delay indefinitely, and if I can sketch out the terrain even roughly, better work on it can come later. My references to mindfulness and to meditation will be elementary and not systematic, though adequate, I hope, to what I want to say about ethics. What I am writing in praise of is mindfulness, or awareness, which I take to be a virtue that is developed through the practice of meditation or some comparable contemplative activity. I am also concerned for the future direction of philosophy. It seems to me that our attaining to this virtue will transform its practice, so that it moves closer to traditional expectations, somewhat disappointed in recent years, though supposedly less so now. If I am not deluded, there is an interior route towards the great questions of metaphysics, and we shall be known for not having taken it. It is a task for a new generation of philosophers, and I for one still scan the horizon for their arrival.

In Evil and a Good God Bruce Reichenbach presents a theodicy for natural evil. According to Reichenbach, natural evil consists in suffering and pain and ‘states of affairs significantly disadvantageous to sentient beings’ which have either nonhuman causes or human causes for which no human being can be held morally responsible. He attempts to provide a morally sufficient reason why natural evil exists. In this paper I will evaluate this reason.