The fine-tuning argument for the existence of God requires that the probability that the universe is life-permitting if God exists is not nearly as low as the probability that the universe is life-permitting if God does not exist. Recently, some proponents of the fine-tuning argument have reasoned as follows. ‘Stipulate that the probability that there exists a life-permitting universe if God exists is one in a billion. Only the most hardened sceptic would refuse odds like that, right? So one in a billion is more than just fair to those sceptical of the fine-tuning argument. It is generous. Even on that generous assumption, the fine-tuning argument is very strong.’ This article explains why the assumption is not, in fact, generous.

Two competing metatheologies – approaches that propose a certain starting point for generating a proper account of the nature of God – are Perfect Being Theology (PBT), the approach to theology originating with Anselm in his efforts to find a way of demonstrating that such a perfect being exists, and Creator Theology (CT). This article argues that CT has significant advantages over PBT. The adversities that afflict PBT, to which CT is immune, are these: the first concerns parsimony in the ontology of divinity, and the second concerns the explanation of contingency itself. CT generates a simpler defence of monotheism and an account of contingency, whereas PBT struggles to defend monotheism and has no resources for generating an account of contingency, an account needed in order to defend the central claims of the ontological argument.

Michael Tooley has developed a sophisticated evidential version of the argument from evil that aims to circumvent sceptical theist responses. Evidential arguments from evil depend on the plausibility of inductive inferences from premises about our inability to see morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils to conclusions about there being no morally sufficient reasons for God to permit evils. Tooley's defence of this inductive step depends on the idea that the existence of unknown rightmaking properties is no more likely, a priori, than the existence of unknown wrongmaking properties. I argue that Tooley's argument begs the question against the theist, and, in doing so, commits an analogue of the base rate fallacy. I conclude with some reflections on what a successful argument from evil would have to establish.

What are the demands of religious inquiry? It can be tempting to think of these demands in strictly epistemic terms, e.g. as a function of the inquirer's background beliefs, cognitive faculties, natural cognitive ability, intellectual skills, and intellectual character. In this article, I extrapolate an alternative model of religious inquiry from three stories by the Southern Gothic writer Flannery O'Connor (1925–1964). According to the model, a person's fitness for religious inquiry also depends on whether she possesses a certain moral posture. In particular, I argue that something like moral humility functions as an epistemic virtue in the theistic domain.

In this article, I use the extended mind literature to elucidate religious phenomena that are normally left well outside the purview of analytic philosophy of religion. I show that the extended mind literature casts light on how the potential relationships of the ordinary believer to extra-natural power dictate cross-culturally re-occurring ways of structuring religious praxis. This application of the extended mind illuminates a diverse but subtly interconnected set of religious phenomena, from the cross-cultural appeal of magic as a negative category to the role of other-worldliness in the major world religions.

Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a way of furthering epistemic aims. Religious communities, by contrast, tend to regard it as a potential threat to their beliefs. But I argue that religious disagreement can help achieve religious epistemic aims. I do not argue this by comparing science and religion, however. For scientific hypotheses are ideally held with a scholarly neutrality, and my aim is to persuade those who are committed to religious beliefs that religious disagreement can be epistemically beneficial for them too.

Traditional Christology maintains that Christ was a single divine person with two natures (human and divine). According to kenotic Christology, certain divine properties such as omniscience and omnipotence were divested in order for Christ to acquire essential human properties. However, such a view appears to conflict with perfect-being theology, which takes omniscience and omnipotence to be essential properties for being divine. I propose a view that adopts a Thomistic theory of essences in order to show that there need be no conflict, and hence Christ can give up the property of being omniscient while still being essentially omniscient.

This article provides a new defence against the logical problem of evil, based on the naturalistic functional/teleological theory of mind (NFT). I argue that if the NFT is self-consistent then it is consistent with theism. Further, the NFT entails that it is not possible for created minds to exist in the absence of evil. It follows that if the NFT is self-consistent then the existence of God is consistent with the existence of evil.

In an article in this issue, Kenneth Pearce suggests a novel solution to the ‘logical problem of evil’. That is, he defends the consistency of the obtaining of evil with the existence of an omnipotent and good creator. The basic idea of Pearce's solution to the logical problem of evil is that according to the teleological theory of intentionality, which is self-consistent and consistent with the claim that God exists, some evil is necessary for the existence of created minds, and this evil is outweighed by the good that is involved in the existence of created minds. The present article argues that this suggestion fails to solve the problem.

In her 2016 article in Religious Studies, Anastasia Scrutton attempts to undermine Stephen Law's Evil-god challenge by arguing that belief in a good god is more justified than belief in an evil god, despite the alethic similarity of the two hypotheses. Drawing on the epistemological theory of pragmatic encroachment, Scrutton claims that is it more reasonable to believe in a benevolent deity than a malevolent one because belief in the latter (i) is detrimental to one's well-being and (ii) has worse moral consequences, whereas belief in the former (i) is good for one's well-being and (ii) has better moral consequences. In this article, I critically respond to Scrutton's argument by proposing that even if belief in a good god results in better consequences than belief in an evil god does, pragmatic encroachment does not undermine the Evil-god challenge. I further argue that pragmatic encroachment potentially undermines itself in this instance.