The seventeenth century can be viewed as an era of (closely related) innovation in the formal and natural sciences and of paradigmatic diversity in philosophy (due to the coexistence of at least the humanist, the late scholastic, and the early modern tradition). Within this environment, the present study focuses on scholastic logic and, in particular, syllogistic. In seventeenth-century scholastic logic two different approaches to logic can be identified, one represented by the Dominicans Báñez, Poinsot, and Comas del Brugar, the other represented by the Jesuits Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, and Compton. These two groups of authors can be contrasted in three prominent features. First, in the role of the theory of validity, which is either a common basis for all particular theories (in this case, sentential logic and syllogistic), or a set of observations regarding a particular theory (in this case, syllogistic). Second, in the view of syllogistic, which is either an implication of a general theory of validity and a semantics of terms, or an algebra of structured objects. Third, in the role of the scholastic analysis of language in terms of suppositio, which either is a semantic underpinning of syllogistic, or it is replaced by a semantics of propositions.

This article enlarges classical syllogistic logic with assertions having to do with comparisons between the sizes of sets. So it concerns a logical system whose sentences are of the following forms: All x are y and Some x are y, There are at least as many x as y, and There are more x than y. Here x and y range over subsets (not elements) of a given infinite set. Moreover, x and y may appear complemented (i.e., as $\bar{x}$ and $\bar{y}$), with the natural meaning. We formulate a logic for our language that is based on the classical syllogistic. The main result is a soundness/completeness theorem. There are efficient algorithms for proof search and model construction.

Charlotte Angas Scott (1858–1932) was an internationally renowned geometer, the first British woman to earn a doctorate in mathematics, and the chair of the Bryn Mawr mathematics department for forty years. There she helped shape the burgeoning mathematics community in the United States. Scott often motivated her research as providing a “geometric treatment” of results that had previously been derived algebraically. The adjective “geometric” likely entailed many things for Scott, from her careful illustration of diagrams to her choice of references and citations. This article will focus on Scott’s striking and consistent use of geometric to describe a reality of dynamic points, lines, planes, and spaces that could be manipulated analogously to physical objects. By providing geometric interpretations of algebraic derivations, Scott committed to an early-nineteenth-century aesthetic vision of a “whole” analytical geometry that she adapted to modern research areas.

We consider the propositional logic equipped with Chellas stit operators for a finite set of individual agents plus the historical necessity modality. We settle the question of whether such a logic enjoys restricted interpolation property, which requires the existence of an interpolant only in cases where the consequence contains no Chellas stit operators occurring in the premise. We show that if action operators count as logical symbols, then such a logic has restricted interpolation property iff the number of agents does not exceed three. On the other hand, if action operators are considered to be nonlogical symbols, then the restricted interpolation fails for any number of agents exceeding one. It follows that unrestricted Craig interpolation also fails for almost all versions of stit logic.

We present novel proof systems for various FDE-based modal logics. Among the systems considered are a number of Belnapian modal logics introduced in Odintsov & Wansing (2010) and Odintsov & Wansing (2017), as well as the modal logic KN4 with strong implication introduced in Goble (2006). In particular, we provide a Hilbert-style axiom system for the logic $BK^{\square - } $ and characterize the logic BK as an axiomatic extension of the system $BK^{FS} $. For KN4 we provide both an FDE-style axiom system and a decidable sequent calculus for which a contraction elimination and a cut elimination result are shown.

Mathematicians judge proofs to possess, or lack, a variety of different qualities, including, for example, explanatory power, depth, purity, beauty and fit. Philosophers of mathematical practice have begun to investigate the nature of such qualities. However, mathematicians frequently draw attention to another desirable proof quality: being motivated. Intuitively, motivated proofs contain no “puzzling” steps, but they have received little further analysis. In this article, I begin a philosophical investigation into motivated proofs. I suggest that a proof is motivated if and only if mathematicians can identify (i) the tasks each step is intended to perform; and (ii) where each step could have reasonably come from. I argue that motivated proofs promote understanding, convey new mathematical resources and stimulate new discoveries. They thus have significant epistemic benefits and directly contribute to the efficient dissemination and advancement of mathematical knowledge. Given their benefits, I also discuss the more practical matter of how we can produce motivated proofs. Finally I consider the relationship between motivated proofs and proofs which are explanatory, beautiful and fitting.

Positive logics are $\{ \wedge , \vee , \to \}$-fragments of intermediate logics. It is clear that the positive fragment of $Int$ is not structurally complete. We give a description of all hereditarily structurally complete positive logics, while the question whether there is a structurally complete positive logic which is not hereditarily structurally complete, remains open.

We will present a three-valued consequence relation for metainferences, called CM, defined through ST and TS, two well known substructural consequence relations for inferences. While ST recovers every classically valid inference, it invalidates some classically valid metainferences. While CM works as ST at the inferential level, it also recovers every classically valid metainference. Moreover, CM can be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. Nevertheless, CM cannot recapture every classically valid meta-metainference. We will afterwards develop a hierarchy of consequence relations CMn for metainferences of level n (for 1 ≤ n < ω). Each CMn recovers every metainference of level n or less, and can be nontrivially expanded with a transparent truth predicate, but cannot recapture every classically valid metainferences of higher levels. Finally, we will present a logic CMω, based on the hierarchy of logics CMn, that is fully classical, in the sense that every classically valid metainference of any level is valid in it. Moreover, CMω can be nontrivially expanded with a transparent truth predicate.

Sufficient conditions are given under which ratifiable acts exist.

In this article we study proofs of some general forms of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. These forms conform to the Feferman format, where the proof predicate is fixed and the representation of the set of axioms varies. We extend the Feferman framework in one important point: we allow the interpretation of number theory to vary.

In a wide range of fields, the word “modular” is used to describe complex systems that can be decomposed into smaller systems with limited interactions between them. This essay argues that mathematical knowledge can fruitfully be understood as having a modular structure and explores the ways in which modularity in mathematics is epistemically advantageous.

In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is realized as a weakened form of knowledge 35. Building on Stalnaker’s core insights, and using frameworks developed in 11 and 3, we employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the foundational axioms of Stalnaker’s system rely intuitively on both of these notions. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle equivocation between an “evidence-in-hand” conception of knowledge and a weaker “evidence-out-there” notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads to a trimodal logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in topological subset spaces in which belief is definable in terms of knowledge and knowability. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker logics that preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker’s postulates, yet do not allow for any reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these irreducible notions of belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the corresponding logics.

This article investigates Charles Peirce’s development of logical calculi for classical propositional logic in 1880–1896. Peirce’s 1880 work on the algebra of logic resulted in a successful calculus for Boolean algebra. This calculus, denoted by PC, is here presented as a sequent calculus and not as a natural deduction system. It is shown that Peirce’s aim was to present PC as a sequent calculus. The law of distributivity, which Peirce states in 1880, is proved using Peirce’s Rule, which is a residuation, in PC. The transitional systems of the algebra of the copula that Peirce develops since 1880 paved the way to the 1896 graphical system of the alpha graphs. It is shown how the rules of the alpha system reinterpret Boolean algebras, answering Peirce’s statement that logical graphs supply a new system of fundamental assumptions to logical algebra. A proof-theoretic analysis is given for the connection between PC and the alpha system.

The large-structure tools of cohomology including toposes and derived categories stay close to arithmetic in practice, yet published foundations for them go beyond ZFC in logical strength. We reduce the gap by founding all the theorems of Grothendieck’s SGA, plus derived categories, at the level of Finite-Order Arithmetic, far below ZFC. This is the weakest possible foundation for the large-structure tools because one elementary topos of sets with infinity is already this strong.

In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut involving semantic notions. In this article we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have nontrivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this article is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this article, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be nontrivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities.

We consider Hilbert-style non–well-founded derivations in the Gödel-Löb provability logic GL and establish that GL with the obtained derivability relation is globally complete for algebraic and neighbourhood semantics.

In recent work Philip Welch has proven the existence of ‘ineffable liars’ for Hartry Field’s theory of truth. These are offered as liar-like sentences that escape classification in Field’s transfinite hierarchy of determinateness operators. In this article I present a slightly more general characterization of the ineffability phenomenon, and discuss its philosophical significance. I show the ineffable sentences to be less ‘liar-like’ than they appear in Welch’s presentation. I also point to some open technical problems whose resolution would greatly clarify the philosophical issues raised by the ineffability phenomenon.

In the article [2] a hierarchy of modal logics has been defined to capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in that hierarchy were distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to the modal logics of Medvedev frames it has been shown that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable. However, the infinite case remained open. In this article we prove that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by standard Borel spaces (these cover probability spaces that occur in most of the applications) is also not finitely axiomatizable.

We study, in an abstract and general framework, formal representations of dependence and groundedness which occur in semantic theories of truth. Our goals are (a) to relate the different ways in which groundedness is defined according to the way dependence is represented and (b) to represent different notions of dependence as instances of a suitable generalisation of the mathematical notion of functional dependence.

This paper explores the relationship borne by the traditional paradoxes of set theory and semantics to formal incompleteness phenomena. A central tool is the application of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem to systems of second-order arithmetic and set theory in which various “paradoxical notions” for first-order languages can be formalized. I will first discuss the setting in which this result was originally presented by Hilbert & Bernays (1939) and also how it was later adapted by Kreisel (1950) and Wang (1955) in order to obtain formal undecidability results. A generalization of this method will then be presented whereby Russell’s paradox, a variant of Mirimanoff’s paradox, the Liar, and the Grelling–Nelson paradox may be uniformly transformed into incompleteness theorems. Some additional observations are then framed relating these results to the unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, the intensionality of arithmetization (in the sense of Feferman, 1960), and axiomatic theories of truth.