The variety DMM of De Morgan monoids has just four minimal subvarieties. The join-irreducible covers of these atoms in the subvariety lattice of DMM are investigated. One of the two atoms consisting of idempotent algebras has no such cover; the other has just one. The remaining two atoms lack nontrivial idempotent members. They are generated, respectively, by 4-element De Morgan monoids C4 and D4, where C4 is the only nontrivial 0-generated algebra onto which finitely subdirectly irreducible De Morgan monoids may be mapped by noninjective homomorphisms. The homomorphic preimages of C4 within DMM (together with the trivial De Morgan monoids) constitute a proper quasivariety, which is shown to have a largest subvariety U. The covers of the variety (C4) within U are revealed here. There are just ten of them (all finitely generated). In exactly six of these ten varieties, all nontrivial members have C4 as a retract. In the varietal join of those six classes, every subquasivariety is a variety—in fact, every finite subdirectly irreducible algebra is projective. Beyond U, all covers of (C4) [or of (D4)] within DMM are discriminator varieties. Of these, we identify infinitely many that are finitely generated, and some that are not. We also prove that there are just 68 minimal quasivarieties of De Morgan monoids.

Greek antiquity saw the development of two distinct systems of logic: Aristotle’s theory of the categorical syllogism and the Stoic theory of the hypothetical syllogism. Some ancient logicians argued that hypothetical syllogistic is more fundamental than categorical syllogistic on the grounds that the latter relies on modes of propositional reasoning such as reductio ad absurdum. Peripatetic logicians, by contrast, sought to establish the priority of categorical over hypothetical syllogistic by reducing various modes of propositional reasoning to categorical form. In the 17th century, this Peripatetic program of reducing hypothetical to categorical logic was championed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. In an essay titled Specimina calculi rationalis, Leibniz develops a theory of propositional terms that allows him to derive the rule of reductio ad absurdum in a purely categorical calculus in which every proposition is of the form A is B. We reconstruct Leibniz’s categorical calculus and show that it is strong enough to establish not only the rule of reductio ad absurdum, but all the laws of classical propositional logic. Moreover, we show that the propositional logic generated by the nonmonotonic variant of Leibniz’s categorical calculus is a natural system of relevance logic known as RMI$_{{}_ \to ^\neg }$.

This article presents a new (multivalued) semantics for classical propositional logic. We begin by maximally extending the space of sequent proofs so as to admit proofs for any logical formula; then, we extract the new semantics by focusing on the axiomatic structure of proofs. In particular, the interpretation of a formula is given by the ratio between the number of identity axioms out of the total number of axioms occurring in any of its proofs. The outcome is an informational refinement of traditional Boolean semantics, obtained by breaking the symmetry between tautologies and contradictions.

This article builds on a recent paper coauthored by the present author, H. Hosni and F. Montagna. It is meant to contribute to the logical foundations of probability theory on many-valued events and, specifically, to a deeper understanding of the notion of strict coherence. In particular, we will make use of geometrical, measure-theoretical and logical methods to provide three characterizations of strict coherence on formulas of infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic.

We prove strong completeness results for some modal logics with the universal modality, with respect to their topological semantics over 0-dimensional dense-in-themselves metric spaces. We also use failure of compactness to show that, for some languages and spaces, no standard modal deductive system is strongly complete.

Principia Logico-Metaphysica contains a foundational logical theory for metaphysics, mathematics, and the sciences. It includes a canonical development of Abstract Object Theory [AOT], a metaphysical theory (inspired by ideas of Ernst Mally, formalized by Zalta) that distinguishes between ordinary and abstract objects.

This article reports on recent work in which AOT has been successfully represented and partly automated in the proof assistant system Isabelle/HOL. Initial experiments within this framework reveal a crucial but overlooked fact: a deeply-rooted and known paradox is reintroduced in AOT when the logic of complex terms is simply adjoined to AOT’s specially formulated comprehension principle for relations. This result constitutes a new and important paradox, given how much expressive and analytic power is contributed by having the two kinds of complex terms in the system. Its discovery is the highlight of our joint project and provides strong evidence for a new kind of scientific practice in philosophy, namely, computational metaphysics.

Our results were made technically possible by a suitable adaptation of Benzmüller’s metalogical approach to universal reasoning by semantically embedding theories in classical higher-order logic. This approach enables one to reuse state-of-the-art higher-order proof assistants, such as Isabelle/HOL, for mechanizing and experimentally exploring challenging logics and theories such as AOT. Our results also provide a fresh perspective on the question of whether relational type theory or functional type theory better serves as a foundation for logic and metaphysics.

Systems of illative logic are logical calculi formulated in the untyped λ-calculus supplemented with certain logical constants.1 In this short paper, I consider a paradox that arises in illative logic. I note two prima facie attractive ways of resolving the paradox. The first is well known to be consistent, and I briefly outline a now standard construction used by Scott and Aczel that establishes this. The second, however, has been thought to be inconsistent. I show that this isn’t so, by providing a nonempty class of models that establishes its consistency. I then provide an illative logic which is sound and complete for this class of models. I close by briefly noting some attractive features of the second resolution of this paradox.

We argue against Foreman’s proposal to settle the continuum hypothesis and other classical independent questions via the adoption of generic large cardinal axioms.

We present an embedding of the Lambek–Grishin calculus into an extension of the nonassociative Lambek calculus with negation. The embedding is based on the De Morgan interpretation of the dual Grishin connectives.

In a recent article, Barrett & Halvorson (2016) define a notion of equivalence for first-order theories, which they call “Morita equivalence.” To argue that Morita equivalence is a reasonable measure of “theoretical equivalence,” they make use of the claim that Morita extensions “say no more” than the theories they are extending. The goal of this article is to challenge this central claim by raising objections to their argument for it and by showing why there is good reason to think that the claim itself is false. In light of these criticisms, this article develops a natural way for the advocate of Morita equivalence to respond. I prove that this response makes her criterion a special case of bi-interpretability, an already well-established barometer of theoretical equivalence. I conclude by providing reasons why the advocate of Morita equivalence should opt for a notion of theoretical equivalence that is defined in terms of interpretability rather than Morita extensions.

In the literature, there have been several methods and definitions for working out whether two theories are “equivalent” (essentially the same) or not. In this article, we do something subtler. We provide a means to measure distances (and explore connections) between formal theories. We introduce two natural notions for such distances. The first one is that of axiomatic distance, but we argue that it might be of limited interest. The more interesting and widely applicable notion is that of conceptual distance which measures the minimum number of concepts that distinguish two theories. For instance, we use conceptual distance to show that relativistic and classical kinematics are distinguished by one concept only.

We shall be concerned with the modal logic BK—which is based on the Belnap–Dunn four-valued matrix, and can be viewed as being obtained from the least normal modal logic K by adding ‘strong negation’. Though all four values ‘truth’, ‘falsity’, ‘neither’ and ‘both’ are employed in its Kripke semantics, only the first two are expressible as terms. We show that expanding the original language of BK to include constants for ‘neither’ or/and ‘both’ leads to quite unexpected results. To be more precise, adding one of these constants has the effect of eliminating the respective value at the level of BK-extensions. In particular, if one adds both of these, then the corresponding lattice of extensions turns out to be isomorphic to that of ordinary normal modal logics.

This essay discusses rules and semantic clauses relating to Substitution—Leibniz’s law in the conjunctive-implicational form $s\dot{ = }t \wedge A\left( s \right) \to A\left( t \right)$—as these are put forward in Priest’s books In Contradiction and An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is. The stated rules and clauses are shown to be too weak in some cases and too strong in others. New ones are presented and shown to be correct. Justification for the various rules is probed and it is argued that Substitution ought to fail.

A correction is needed to our paper: to the definition contained within the statement of Lemma 1.5 and thus arguments around it in §3.

A series of nonrepresentable relation algebras is constructed from groups. We use them to prove that there are continuum many subvarieties between the variety of representable relation algebras and the variety of coset relation algebras. We present our main construction in terms of polygroupoids.

Although much technical and philosophical attention has been given to relevance logics, the notion of relevance itself is generally left at an intuitive level. It is difficult to find in the literature an explicit account of relevance in formal reasoning. In this article I offer a formal explication of the notion of relevance in deductive logic and argue that this notion has an interesting place in the study of classical logic. The main idea is that a premise is relevant to an argument when it contributes to the validity of that argument. I then argue that the sequents which best embody this ideal of relevance are the so-called perfect sequents—that is, sequents which are valid but have no proper subsequents that are valid. Church’s theorem entails that there is no recursively axiomatizable proof-system that proves all and only the perfect sequents, so the project that emerges from studying perfection in classical logic is not one of finding a perfect subsystem of classical logic, but is rather a comparative study of classifying subsystems of classical logic according to how well they approximate the ideal of perfection.