The paradox that appears under Burali–Forti’s name in many textbooks of set theory is a clever piece of reasoning leading to an unproblematic theorem. The theorem asserts that the ordinals do not form a set. For such a set would be–absurdly–an ordinal greater than any ordinal in the set of all ordinals. In this article, we argue that the paradox of Burali–Forti is first and foremost a problem about concept formation by abstraction, not about sets. We contend, furthermore, that some hundred years after its discovery the paradox is still without any fully satisfactory resolution. A survey of the current literature reveals one key assumption of the paradox that has gone unquestioned, namely the assumption that ordinals are objects. Taking the lead from Russell’s no class theory, we interpret talk of ordinals as an efficient way of conveying higher-order logical truths. The resulting theory of ordinals is formally adequate to standard intuitions about ordinals, expresses a conception of ordinal number capable of resolving Burali–Forti’s paradox, and offers a novel contribution to the longstanding program of reducing mathematics to higher-order logic.

This paper explores a new language of neighbourhood structures where existential information can be given about what kind of worlds occur in a neighbourhood of a current world. The resulting system of ‘instantial neighbourhood logic’ INL has a nontrivial mix of features from relational semantics and from neighbourhood semantics. We explore some basic model-theoretic behavior, including a matching notion of bisimulation, and give a complete axiom system for which we prove completeness by a new normal form technique. In addition, we relate INL to other modal logics by means of translations, and determine its precise SAT complexity. Finally, we discuss proof-theoretic fine-structure of INL in terms of semantic tableaux and some expressive fine-structure in terms of fragments, while discussing concrete illustrations of the instantial neighborhood language in topological spaces, in games with powers for players construed in a new way, as well as in dynamic logics of acquiring or deleting evidence. We conclude with some coalgebraic perspectives on what is achieved in this paper. Many of these final themes suggest follow-up work of independent interest.

This paper presents an extended version of the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc). Quarc is a logic comparable to the first-order predicate calculus. It employs several nonstandard syntactic and semantic devices, which bring it closer to natural language in several respects. Most notably, quantifiers in this logic are attached to one-place predicates; the resulting quantified constructions are then allowed to occupy the argument places of predicates. The version presented here is capable of straightforwardly translating natural-language sentences involving defining clauses. A three-valued, model-theoretic semantics for Quarc is presented. Interpretations in this semantics are not equipped with domains of quantification: they are just interpretation functions. This reflects the analysis of natural-language quantification on which Quarc is based. A proof system is presented, and a completeness result is obtained. The logic presented here is capable of straightforward translation of the classical first-order predicate calculus, the translation preserving truth values as well as entailment. The first-order predicate calculus and its devices of quantification can be seen as resulting from Quarc on certain semantic and syntactic restrictions, akin to simplifying assumptions. An analogous, straightforward translation of Quarc into the first-order predicate calculus is impossible.

One way to study and understand the notion of truth is to examine principles that we are willing to associate with truth, often because they conform to a pre-theoretical or to a semi-formal characterization of this concept. In comparing different collections of such principles, one requires formally precise notions of inter-theoretic reduction that are also adequate to compare these conceptual aspects. In this work I study possible ways to make precise the relation of conceptual equivalence between notions of truth associated with collections of principles of truth. In doing so, I will consider refinements and strengthenings of the notion of relative truth-definability proposed by Fujimoto (2010): in particular I employ suitable variants of notions of equivalence of theories considered in Visser (2006) and Friedman & Visser (2014) to show that there are better candidates than mutual truth-definability for the role of sufficient condition for conceptual equivalence between the semantic notions associated with the theories. In the concluding part of the paper, I extend the techniques introduced in the first and show that there is a precise sense in which ramified truth (either disquotational or compositional) does not correspond to iterations of comprehension.

This paper presents a systematic study of the prehistory of the traditional subsystems of second-order arithmetic that feature prominently in the reverse mathematics program promoted by Friedman and Simpson. We look in particular at: (i) the long arc from Poincaré to Feferman as concerns arithmetic definability and provability, (ii) the interplay between finitism and the formalization of analysis in the lecture notes and publications of Hilbert and Bernays, (iii) the uncertainty as to the constructive status of principles equivalent to Weak König’s Lemma, and (iv) the large-scale intellectual backdrop to arithmetical transfinite recursion in descriptive set theory and its effectivization by Borel, Lusin, Addison, and others.

We investigate the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where “general Bayesian learning” means inferring a state from another that is regarded as evidence, and where the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a reference probability measure representing the background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent performing the inference. States are linear functionals that encode probability measures by assigning expectation values to random variables via integrating them with respect to the probability measure. If a state can be learned from another this way, then it is said to be Bayes accessible from the evidence. It is shown that the Bayes accessibility relation is reflexive, antisymmetric, and nontransitive. If every state is Bayes accessible from some other defined on the same set of random variables, then the set of states is called weakly Bayes connected. It is shown that the set of states is not weakly Bayes connected if the probability space is standard. The set of states is called weakly Bayes connectable if, given any state, the probability space can be extended in such a way that the given state becomes Bayes accessible from some other state in the extended space. It is shown that probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable. Since conditioning using the theory of conditional expectations includes both Bayes’ rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases, the results presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization.

A skeleton of the category with finite coproducts${\cal D}$ freely generated by a single object has a subcategory isomorphic to a skeleton of the category with finite products ${\cal C}$ freely generated by a countable set of objects. As a consequence, we obtain that ${\cal D}$ has a subcategory equivalent with ${\cal C}$. From a proof-theoretical point of view, this means that up to some identifications of formulae the deductions of pure conjunctive logic with a countable set of propositional letters can be represented by deductions in pure disjunctive logic with just one propositional letter. By taking opposite categories, one can replace coproduct by product, i.e., disjunction by conjunction, and the other way round, to obtain the dual results.

Ibn Sīnā (11th century, greater Persia) proposed an analysis of arguments by reductio ad absurdum. His analysis contains, perhaps for the first time, a workable method for handling the making and discharging of assumptions in a formal proof. We translate the relevant text of Ibn Sīnā and put his analysis into the context of his general approach to logic.

B. Kooi and A. Tamminga present a correspondence analysis for extensions of G. Priest’s logic of paradox. Each unary or binary extension is characterizable by a special operator and analyzable via a sound and complete natural deduction system. The present paper develops a sound and complete proof searching technique for the binary extensions of the logic of paradox.

The aim of this article is to investigate the roles of commutative diagrams (CDs) in a specific mathematical domain, and to unveil the reasons underlying their effectiveness as a mathematical notation; this will be done through a case study. It will be shown that CDs do not depict spatial relations, but represent mathematical structures. CDs will be interpreted as a hybrid notation that goes beyond the traditional bipartition of mathematical representations into diagrammatic and linguistic. It will be argued that one of the reasons why CDs form a good notation is that they are highly mathematically tractable: experts can obtain valid results by ‘calculating’ with CDs. These calculations, take the form of ‘diagram chases’. In order to draw inferences, experts move algebraic elements around the diagrams. It will be argued that these diagrams are dynamic. It is thanks to their dynamicity that CDs can externalize the relevant reasoning and allow experts to draw conclusions directly by manipulating them. Lastly, it will be shown that CDs play essential roles in the context of proof as well as in other phases of the mathematical enterprise, such as discovery and conjecture formation.

In 1981, Takeuti introduced quantum set theory by constructing a model of set theory based on quantum logic represented by the lattice of closed linear subspaces of a Hilbert space in a manner analogous to Boolean-valued models of set theory, and showed that appropriate counterparts of the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC) hold in the model. In this paper, we aim at unifying Takeuti’s model with Boolean-valued models by constructing models based on general complete orthomodular lattices, and generalizing the transfer principle in Boolean-valued models, which asserts that every theorem in ZFC set theory holds in the models, to a general form holding in every orthomodular-valued model. One of the central problems in this program is the well-known arbitrariness in choosing a binary operation for implication. To clarify what properties are required to obtain the generalized transfer principle, we introduce a class of binary operations extending the implication on Boolean logic, called generalized implications, including even nonpolynomially definable operations. We study the properties of those operations in detail and show that all of them admit the generalized transfer principle. Moreover, we determine all the polynomially definable operations for which the generalized transfer principle holds. This result allows us to abandon the Sasaki arrow originally assumed for Takeuti’s model and leads to a much more flexible approach to quantum set theory.

We show that a typed compositional theory of positive truth with internal induction for total formulae (denoted by PTtot) is not semantically conservative over Peano arithmetic. In addition, we observe that the class of models of PA expandable to models of PTtot contains every recursively saturated model of arithmetic. Our results point to a gap in the philosophical project of describing the use of the truth predicate in model-theoretic contexts.