In a commercial society we see gains from trade. Entrepreneurship involves alertness to opportunities for gains from trade along with a willingness to bear risks that go with being on a frontier of innovation. Social entrepreneurship, whatever else it may be, is first of all a form of entrepreneurship.

Duties of beneficence are general, impersonal obligations to promote the welfare and meet the needs of strangers. Many laypeople and philosophers presume that duties of beneficence are primarily met through volunteering or donating to various causes. More recently, some business ethicists and activists in the effective altruist camp have argued that social enterprise can be a way to exercise beneficence. This essay argues that most of us exercise beneficence, and discharge many or perhaps all of our duties of beneficence, by holding normal jobs and doing normal productive work.

As corporations increasingly embrace ethical commitments and prioritize corporate social responsibility (CSR), commentators have begun to speak of a shift toward “moral capitalism.” This shift has revived debates about the compatibility of CSR with economic efficiency and the role of markets in promoting social change. We find the economic concern misplaced: moral capitalism efficiently responds to a growing demand for CSR from all stakeholders, including shareholders. Yet the same market mechanisms that make modern CSR profitable raise political objections worth considering. Major shareholders can now leverage their disproportionate economic power to use corporations as vehicles for forcing unilateral resolutions of societal issues, bypassing and undermining formal democratic processes. Beyond this, there is a broader risk to social cohesion: when markets become arenas for adjudicating rather than sidestepping moral and political disagreements, they reinforce exchanges among “friends” (those with shared preferences) while deepening divisions with “foes.” This may import polarization into market life, with spillover effects on society at large. Taken together, these concerns raise the question of whether moral capitalism may threaten the very democratic moral sensibility it claims to uphold.

Corporate activism—companies taking public stances on contested sociopolitical issues—has become increasingly prevalent in American life. Against such activism, this essay raises two normative complaints. First, corporate activism undermines democracy by violating political equality and distorting public deliberation. Second, corporate activism adds to the undesirable overpoliticization of everyday life. Corporations, the essay concludes, should generally avoid activism.

In recent years, there has been increased interest in a variety of ways that private actors, especially actors in the business world, broadly understood, can contribute to addressing important social problems and persistent injustices. In this essay, I aim to articulate and begin to answer what seem to me to be some of the most important and challenging normative questions arising with regard to social entrepreneurship as a mode of economic activity aimed at addressing social problems or promoting justice. I focus on questions about the relationship between the pursuit of social entrepreneurial activity, the satisfaction of obligations to promote justice, and claims to income and wealth produced by successful social entrepreneurial ventures. I argue that there are reasons to think that social entrepreneurial activity can be a way that individuals (attempt to) satisfy at least some of their obligations of justice, but note that there are moral risks involved in attempting to satisfy these obligations in this way. And I suggest that there are at least some reasons, including recognition of the grounds on which we might sometimes prefer that people in a position to take these risks do so, to think that only those who accept broader moral views that are very demanding can consistently deny that social entrepreneurs who successfully generate substantial profits are morally entitled to retain them.

Social entrepreneurship is presented by its supporters as an alternative to traditional charity, viewing those who would be beneficiaries on a charitable model as customers instead. In this essay, I explore the idea of social entrepreneurship as an alternative model for service-provision by thinking about the specific service of women’s refuges. I ask whether it would be possible to shift women’s refuges out of the government or charitable sectors and into the market. I also consider two speculative proposals for market-based provision.

Institutional actors should aim to increase the long-term market value of their firms. This claim implies that firms should adopt a profit-maximizing mission. Business ethicists have been too quick to dismiss moral defenses of profit maximization. Even though there are limits to the moral benefits of profit maximization, a profit-maximizing approach is still morally better than alternative approaches to defining an institutional mission.

We are never more high-minded about what matters in life than when we are at commencement ceremonies. As new graduates prepare to head into the real world, speakers tell them that to live meaningful lives they need to get out there and make their mark: change the world, upset the status quo, solve the biggest problems, and shape the revolutions of our time. But is this good life advice? Not really. Commencement Speech Morality encourages young people to become moralizers and busybodies. We should be wary of preaching it.

Social entrepreneurs face a dilemma. When making decisions about corporate giving, should they prioritize groups with whom they share some historical, national, or emotional tie or should they maximize the overall effectiveness of their contributions? According to a thesis I call “associationist priority,” the moral reasons to favor stakeholders with whom the entrepreneur shares an associative relationship trump the reasons to promote the impartial good. An important component of the argument for associationist priority is the premise that some nonvoluntary associations, including those between corporations and members of their communities, create special moral obligations. This essay argues against associationist priority by way of denying nonvoluntary associative obligations generally. This expands the moral discretion corporate social entrepreneurs enjoy both in how they give and to whom they give.

It is sometimes morally permissible not to help others even when doing so is overall better for you. For example, you are not morally required to take a career in medicine over a career in music, even if the former is both better for others and better for you. I argue that the permissibility of not helping in a range of cases of “compensated altruism” is explained by the existence of autonomy-based considerations. I sketch a view according to which you can have autonomy-based permissions to choose between alternatives when these alternatives differ in terms of the valuable features they instantiate. Along the way, I argue that considerations of moral autonomy do not support rejecting the plausible view that we each constantly face reasons with morally requiring strength to help (distant) strangers.

Some critics contend that effective altruism is objectionably anti-political; they claim that by prioritizing individual action, effective altruism ignores the moral significance of political institutions. I argue that the prevailing versions of the political or institutional critique of effective altruism are mistaken. I begin by addressing the objection that effective altruism neglects the root causes of suffering. I then turn to a broadly rule-consequentialist argument from Brian Leiter alleging that an individual effective altruist ought to pursue institutional reform rather than private giving because more good would be done if all effective altruists pursued institutional reform instead of private giving. Next, I take up Julia Maskivker’s claim that engaging in private altruism is not enough to honor our duty to help others, because we also have a Samaritan duty to vote well. Lastly, I consider an objection from Alexander Dietz, namely, that a focus on doing the most good they can as individuals will cause effective altruists to fail to coordinate on collective philanthropic projects that would produce more good than their uncoordinated individual philanthropic projects would. I argue that none of these objections succeed and close by exploring what sorts of institutional reforms effective altruists should consider pursuing.