This article analyzes and demonstrates the declining social selectivity of migration distance in Europe’s long nineteenth century and argues that this drove a radically new process of democratization of long-distance migration. It uses innovative spatial and quantitative analysis of nominal data on more than 5,000 international migrants who moved to the booming port city of Antwerp in present-day Belgium between 1850 and 1910. Examining the changes in migrants’ origins and trajectories on the one hand, and in their profiles in terms of gender and occupations on the other hand, it argues that the main evolutions observed represent an overall loosening of the ancien régime link between migration distance on the one hand and social selectivity on the other hand. By focusing on gender and social class as markers of social selectivity and by mapping the impressive expansion of the trajectories of Antwerp’s growing number of long-distance migrants, it lays bare the spatial, gender, and social dimensions that contributed to a general process of democratization of long-distance migration. As such, it sheds new light on the dynamics of Europe’s so-called “mobility transition” in the long nineteenth century.

Modern colonialism from the eighteenth century onward encompassed most of the world’s surface. Today, the world is different. In theory at least, nation-states rather than empires and colonies are the global norm. The sorts of colonial conquests that mark earlier centuries appear to have ended. But does this mean colonialism in the past is not relevant for the present? Scholarly and popular discussions allude to the idea that past colonialism impacts the present, using a variety of terms like “legacies,” “imprints,” “vestiges,” “ruins,” or “afterlives.” Yet existing scholarship has yet to fully clarify and catalog the specific processes and mechanisms that connect colonial history with its putative legacies. This essay, based upon the 2022 Presidential Address to the Social Science History Association, identifies and discusses four such processes and mechanisms or “modes of reverberation”: (1) continued colonialism through simple reproduction, (2) the persistence of power through formal and informal institutionalization, (3) path dependent historical trajectories (or “colonial institutionalism”), and (4) colonialism’s archive of meaning.

In the early 1900s, Washington, D.C. contained many alleys in the interior of blocks inhabited by impoverished Black residents. Elite reformers engaged in an aggressive campaign to eliminate alleys, on the grounds of their purported unsanitary environment and high disease prevalence. In this paper, I combine quantitative, qualitative, and spatial sources to explore new perspectives on segregation, public health, and the racialized efforts of housing reformers during this period. I find that reformers overstated the horrors of conditions in alleys and their effects on residents’ health: poorer health among alley residents was in large part due to Black residents’ marginalization wherever they might live. Alleys’ status as racialized space, coupled with progressive paternalistic racism, facilitated the discursive construction of alleys as pathological “breeding grounds of disease.” Further, my findings shed new light on micro-configurations of segregation within racially mixed neighborhoods, as well as the social experience and meaning of such configurations. Far from indicating harmonious coexistence, the proximity of such alleys to white homes and institutions spurred elite Washingtonians’ self-interested fear of disease spreading beyond the alleys. Thus, this pattern of segregation helps explain the zeal of the campaign to eradicate alleys: as a means of achieving separation from undesired Black neighbors whom white reformers associated with contagion.

Historical research on urban epidemics has focused on the interaction of diseases with social and spatial gradients, such as class, ethnicity, or neighborhood. Even sophisticated historical studies usually lack data on health-related behavior or health-related perceptions, which modern analysts tend to emphasize. With detailed source material from the Finnish city of Tampere during a typhoid epidemic in 1916, we are able to combine both dimensions and look at how material and social constraints interacted with behavior and knowledge to produce unequal outcomes. We use data on socioeconomic status, location, and physical habitat as well as the self-reported behavior and expressed understandings of transmission mechanisms of the infected people to identify the determinants of some falling ill earlier or later than others. Applying survival analysis to approximately 2,500 cases, we show that disease avoidance behavior was deficient and constrained by physical habitat, regardless of considerable public health campaigning. Behavioral guidelines issued by authorities were sub-optimally communicated, unrealistic, and inadequately followed. Boiling water was hampered by shared kitchens, and access to laundry houses for additional hygiene was uneven. Centralized chemical water purification finally leveled the playing field by socializing the cost of prevention and eliminating key sources of unequal risk.

Wheat market integration between the US and the UK before the “first era of globalization” (in the second half of the nineteenth century) was frequently interrupted by policy and “exogenous” events such as wars. This paper adds Canada to this story by looking at trade and price data, as well as contemporary debates. This allows us to triangulate the role of policy and wars, since Canada as a small open economy was part of the British Empire. We find that, despite its privileged access to British markets, Canada faced similar barriers to the US, suggesting that membership of the British Empire provided only a modest benefit to trade. We also describe the limitations she faced accessing the US market, in particular after American independence.

The question of deradicalization looms large in the historiography of western European socialism. But in this contested field, the contributions of the New Left historian, Ralph Miliband, have been curiously neglected. Through his work on the British Labour Party, Miliband developed a distinctive account of deradicalization that foregrounds the fact that when parties enter government, party elites find themselves transplanted into new, alien institutions. Over time, he argued, they then come to internalize the worldviews of those institutions and reshape their parties accordingly. This essay presents the first quantitative and cross-national test of this “experience of governing hypothesis,” using Comparative Manifesto Project data from western European socialist parties between 1945 and 2021 and a novel matching technique for panel data. Miliband’s theory is strongly supported by this analysis, which also demonstrates the value of taking a multi-dimensional approach to deradicalization.

This article focuses on the most relevant far right parties since the restoration of democracy in Spain, namely, Fuerza Nueva and VOX. These two parties show divergent electoral trajectories. While the former had some ephemeral prominence during the democratic process of transition, the latter emerged in 2018 and, for the time being, seems to have become established in several political arenas. Through an in-depth qualitative examination, this research explores the role of the organizational institutionalization process in the divergent electoral sustainability of both parties. The results show that it is possible to identify a temporal link, as well as certain mechanisms, between the way in which the parties develop organizationally and their electoral sustainability. In other words, a solid organizational institutionalization process has a positive effect on electoral sustainability. Overall, these findings suggest the need to further strengthen the so-called “internalist perspective” in the agenda of the far right, which entails a more systematic view of the characteristics of the parties themselves to explain their performance.

Throughout the nineteenth century, powerful railway unions in the USA and the UK cultivated an expansive system of voluntary sickness, death, unemployment, and superannuation benefits. By the early twentieth century, the movements had diverged: while the British Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants relinquished its commitment to voluntarism in favor of state healthcare and pensions, the American Railway Brotherhoods persisted along voluntarist lines, resisting social insurance in favor of exclusive schemes for their white male membership. What accounts for these diverging orientations? I highlight the importance of organizational forms as a lens for understanding comparative trade union strategy, emphasizing the role of law in designating legitimate forms of working-class association. I demonstrate that governing elites in both countries promoted voluntarism as a benign form of working-class organization throughout much of the nineteenth century. Consequently, I argue, early American and British trade unions adopted benefits in part because they enabled them to mimic the far more respected and legitimate friendly and fraternal mutual benefit societies. Toward the end of the century, the context had changed: while alternative organizational avenues were opened for trade unions in the UK, benefits presented an ongoing organizational lifeline for American unions. In defining and redefining the boundaries of legitimate forms of workers’ associations, legal decisions in both countries shaped not only trade union organizing strategies in the short run but also their positioning in broader social struggles.

The U.S. federal government adopted aggressive policies to control animal diseases decades before it made significant attempts to improve human health. Progressive-era reformers crafted a powerful argument that the male-dominated, rural-oriented political system valued the lives of hogs more than the well-being of babies. The invidious hog-baby comparison became a pervasive theme in debates over the Children’s Bureau, a National Department of Health, and the Sheppard-Towner Act, and it has been reproduced uncritically in recent years. This article investigates the important historical relationships between U.S. animal and human health policies. Human health champions would have been better served by embracing a One Health approach when possible, drawing more on the lessons learned in combating animal diseases.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, leisure was reserved for the few. By the end of the twentieth century, however, most workers had a regulated normal working time of 40 or fewer hours per week, annual paid leave, and overtime compensation. In this paper, I investigate which political parties brought forth these changes – which party constellations supported or opposed working-time reforms and argue that sector and class differences drive party preferences. Lower-class and urban middle-class workers demanded regulation as demand for leisure increased with income. In contrast, employers and farmers opposed such reforms. Accordingly, the study argues that socialist and social-liberal parties were inclined to support leisure-securing working-time reforms, whereas conservative and farmer parties opposed them. Due to their linkages with workers and farmers, liberal parties may be divided into a rural constituency that tends to oppose working-time reforms and an urban constituency that supports them. I test these expectations using parliamentary data: 65 roll-call votes from Norway between 1880 and 1940, combined with analysis of major reforms and legislative appeals. Finally, I undertake a generalization test using country-level reform data from 33 democracies between 1880 and 2010. Results generally fall in line with expectations, and the pattern is stable over time.

Comparative historical analyses have emphasized the role played by conservative parties in the consolidation of democratic regimes in Europe. They have also identified the main factors shaping the political and electoral strength of the right in democratization processes. On the basis of these analyses, the Spanish Second Republic (1931–36) has been characterized as a very inauspicious ground for the development of a strong conservative party. However, the right managed to build a successful electoral force in a short period of time. This paper explores the factors affecting the electoral strength of the Spanish right by conducting ecological statistical analyses in the three republican legislative elections. Empirical results show that the right managed to build strong links with national voters on the basis of sociopolitical cleavages and underlying social and institutional characteristics. In particular, they reveal the key importance of the religious cleavage in the party system of the 1930s and the crucial role played by Catholic lay organizations in the success of the right. Ultimately, this finding shows that, contrary to previous theoretical expectations, initial organizational precariousness was not an unsurmountable obstacle for the electoral success of the Spanish right.

What happens at the point of interchange between scholarly communities? We examine this question by investigating the case of growing ties between historical sociology and ethnography, two social scientific methods that once seemed to have little in common. Drawing on methodological writings by ethnographers and original interviews with practicing historical sociologists, we argue that these ties have been shaped by structural and methodological homologies between the two disciplines. Structurally, ethnography and historical sociology are similarly positioned in sociology more broadly, as enterprises with sometimes-tense relationships with dominant assumptions of the social sciences. Methodologically, both ethnographers and historical sociologists face the challenges of bounding the research process, navigating access to data, analyzing and retaining data while “in the field,” and overcoming cultural distance between themselves and the worlds they are studying. Taken together, these findings extend work in the sociology of science and knowledge and suggest some key conditions for intellectual efflorescence.

This paper discusses the implications of organizational control on the race for technological leadership in merchant empires. I provide an illustrative framework in which poor organizations have reduced incentives to invest, which in turn stifle technology improvements making leaders lag new entrants. In the late sixteenth century, Portugal’s large ships carried more merchandise and were more fitting of the monarch’s grandiose preferences, but they also were more prone to disaster. The merchant-controlled Dutch East India Company however, invested in smaller but more seaworthy vessels conducting more voyages at a much lower loss rate. The surviving historical evidence shows Portugal relying on large ships well into the seventeenth century suggesting her technological edge was gone by the time the Dutch dominated the Indian Ocean.

We combine unsupervised machine learning and econometric methods to study England’s print culture in the pivotal sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Machine learning synthesizes the content of 57,863 texts comprising 83 million words into 110 topics. Topics include the expected, such as Natural Philosophy, and the unexpected, such as Baconian Theology. Timelines suggest that religious and political discourse gradually became less antagonistic and economic topics more prominent. The epistemology associated with Bacon was present in theological debates already before Bacon’s epistemological contributions. Vector autoregression estimates provide insight into the coevolution of ideas on religion, science, and institutions. Innovations in religious ideas stimulated focus on science, especially at times when Puritanism was prominent in religious discourse. Neither science nor institutional thought evidence secularization. The Glorious Revolution and the Civil War did not spur debates on institutions nor did the founding of the Royal Society markedly elevate attention to science.

Housing figures prominently during economic crises, a notable example being the Great Depression. Because housing is immobile, its market is very localized. In each city, the main agents are closely interconnected. Lenders depend on mortgaged homeowners and landlords to maintain payments; landlords rely on tenants; municipalities need all property owners to pay taxes. The Depression experiences of tenants, homeowners, and federal housing programs are well-appreciated; those of landlords and private lenders much less so. Considering the role of all agents, this case study of Hamilton, Ontario, focuses on owners and private lenders and asks who lost property, to whom, and how. Drawing on land registry and property tax records, city directories, and newspaper accounts, it documents the pattern and trajectory of defaults experienced by homeowners, landlords, and private lenders. Contemporaries and historians have used foreclosures as a measure of distress, but many borrowers defaulted voluntarily. The experience of Hamilton’s homeowners was similar to those in U.S. cities. Local landlords experienced higher rates of defaults than homeowners; private lenders foreclosed less often than lending institutions. Along with municipalities, both learned to be flexible in demanding payments. The high incidence of private mortgages, the stability of lending institutions, and the marginal role of the federal government were distinctively Canadian, but in general Hamilton’s experience is more broadly indicative.

This article undertakes an examination of the origins and evolution of a discourse of alterity against the Vascones –the alleged forefathers of the Basques – and other Western Pyrenean peoples from Antiquity to the Middle Ages. The methodology employed involves the study of literary references made to these peoples, which are then compared to recent scholarly and archeological evidence. Through this analysis, it becomes possible to evaluate the accuracy of these mentions and interpret them within their specific historical context. The results of this research indicate that mentions of the Vascones during this timeframe were mainly polemic in nature and lacked substantial grounding in empirical reality. Instead, it seems that the underlying objective of these narratives of alterity was twofold: to enhance the social and political standing of their authors and to support their claims to political control over the Western Pyrenees. The abandonment of these interpretative repertoires during the tenth century, coinciding with the emergence of the kingdom of Pamplona and the county-duchy of Wasconia, further emphasizes the connection between the display of these tropes and imbalances in political power between the region and its neighbors. The conclusions of this article directly challenge the underpinnings of discourses that depict the ancient Vascones as entirely alien to the political and religious paradigms derived from the Roman and Christian traditions. In so doing, it thus confront narratives about these “ancient Basques” that are prevalent in contemporary Basque cultural production.

This article seeks to extend the theoretical discussion of interstitial emergence to an authoritarian context. An interstitial space is a space whose relations with the dominant power structure are not yet institutionalized. In analyzing interstitial emergence in an authoritarian context, it is necessary to examine the interaction between interstitial space and the state as an institutionalizing force and recognize that 1) institutionalization is an ongoing process that spans over a period and 2) a state’s intervention may induce unintended consequences. The rise and fall of labor NGO activism in China between 1996 and 2020 are used as a case to illustrate the theoretical discussion. Labor NGOs emerged out of the interstices of state control since the 1990s. Although the state started to regulate these organizations since the late 2000s, its intervention lacked consistency. Before the state finally gained the capacity to enforce rules, which was around 2015, labor NGOs had already launched a series of advocacy activism and cultivated a group of activists who identified with the value of social movement. Hence, although the activism was eventually incorporated, it had successfully thematized labor issues and produced enduring impact on the culture of public discussion.

Richard Nixon was the first president who examined the possibility of introducing a value-added tax (VAT) at the federal level in the late twentieth century. By 1970, his administration had considered recommending it alongside other domestic programs to overcome the criticism against the VAT’s regressivity, potential conflict in the federal–state tax authority, and the fragmented decision-making authority between the executive and legislative branches of the government. However, in 1971, the Nixon administration shifted their policy priority toward gaining the middle-class political support by linking local property tax relief to a federal VAT. Although they combined the two measures with a rebate to obtain consent to and confidence in them from the “opponents” among the “internalists” of policymaking and societal actors, their attempt failed to accomplish it. As a result, Nixon abandoned the federal VAT. This abandonment was a missed opportunity to introduce a federal VAT, leading the United States to become a fiscal outlier among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries: it has not yet implemented a national/federal VAT. Furthermore, this outcome marked the origin of certain historical characteristics of the American fiscal state: the use of tax expenditures, “fend-for-yourself federalism,” weak extractive capacity, and fiscal inflexibility.

While a value-added tax (VAT), which supports a welfare state, was officially introduced in Japan in 1989, earlier attempts to implement this tax system failed. This study looks in-depth at why Japan was slower than other countries to implement a VAT. The tax authorities’ debates during the 1960s and 1970s are reviewed to understand why other attempts to introduce a VAT failed. Implementing the VAT would require a shift from the ideology centering on a direct tax to acceptance of indirect taxes and justification for a general consumption tax’s superiority over specific consumption taxes. Four influential factors are identified. First, in 1960, the ideology centering on a direct tax made a VAT inherently inferior. Second, in the 1968, “Break Fiscal Rigidification Campaign” created a revenue-neutral path for indirect tax increases but favored specific consumption taxes. Third, the Fundamental Issues Subcommittee conceptualized “high benefit/high cost” in the early 1970s and established the VAT’s superiority over specific consumption taxes based on a study of overseas travel to European Commission countries. However, the VAT was abandoned due to external shocks. Fourth, the attempts to link the VAT with fiscal reconstruction in the late 1970s faced strong opposition from consumers, small businesses, and the ruling party. Failure to introduce the VAT in the 1970s eliminated the possibility of using it to raise taxes in the early 1980s. The findings reveal that Japan’s failure to introduce the VAT closed a door to a “high benefit/high cost” type of Western-style welfare state.

Scholarship demonstrated the major role of inheritance and kinship for elite’s power reproduction, particularly among noble families. In the absence of monarchic and court structures, ruling classes that enjoyed privileges and engaged in social closure could become the functional equivalent of a nobility. In this paper, we examine the evolution of the power of Swiss patrician families in the three major Swiss cities (Basel, Geneva, and Zurich) since the end of the nineteenth century and assess whether urban oligarchies endure in the twentieth century and what role kinship ties play in the reproduction of power structures. Building on a systematic database of 5,199 urban elites who hold power positions in the main economic, political, academic, and cultural institutions, we describe the evolution of Swiss patrician families between 1890 and 1957. Using social network, kinship, and sequence analysis, we provide a comprehensive investigation of the Swiss patrician elite’s evolution at both the individual and the family level. Our analyses show a general decline of patrician families’ presence in urban positions of power, however with significant variations according to both the cities and the spheres of activity. Furthermore, we identify distinct trajectories of families who have either lost their access to power positions, managed to access again or have remained in urban power positions according to different survival strategies. Beyond the Swiss case, we contribute to the literature on power and kinship through an interdisciplinary approach combining historical and sociological perspectives.