While most Americans appear to acknowledge the large gap between the rich and the poor in the United States, it is not clear whether the public is aware of recent changes in income inequality. Even though economic inequality has grown substantially in recent decades, studies have shown that the public's perception of growing income disparities has remained mostly unchanged since the 1980s. This research offers an alternative approach to evaluating how public perceptions of inequality are developed. Centrally, it conceptualizes the public's response to growing economic disparities by applying theories of macro-political behavior and place-based contextual effects to the formation of aggregate perceptions about income inequality. It is argued that most of the public relies on basic information about the economy to form attitudes about inequality and that geographic context—in this case, the American states—plays a role in how views of income disparities are produced. A new measure of state perceptions of growing economic inequality over a 25-year period is used to examine whether the public is responsive to objective changes in economic inequality. Time-series cross-sectional analyses suggest that the public's perceptions of growing inequality are largely influenced by objective state economic indicators and state political ideology. This research has implications for how knowledgeable the public is of disparities between the rich and the poor, whether state context influences attitudes about inequality, and what role the public will have in determining how expanding income differences are addressed through government policy.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that U.S. state politicians manipulate rainy day funds for political purposes, but such claims remain untested in the literature. This article finds that lawmakers withdraw nearly three times more funds in response to a deficit shock of a given size if it occurs in an election year rather than in a non-election year; this occurs despite the fact that the magnitude of shocks does not vary over the electoral cycle. This effect is stronger when incumbents are eligible for re-election than when they are term-limited. When it comes to preventing political manipulation of funds, rainy day fund rules that increase the number of veto players who must approve of withdrawals seem to be more effective than rules that specify the economic conditions under which funds may be withdrawn.

As state judicial campaigns become progressively more expensive and political, judicial candidates have turned more frequently to lawyers and law firms for campaign contributions. Given that lawyers who contribute to judges' campaigns frequently appear before them in court, the potential for a conflict of interest arises. I ask whether judges are more likely to rule in favor of attorneys who provide financial support to their campaigns. Looking at cases decided in the Supreme Court of Georgia's 2003 term, I show that campaign contributions are indeed correlated with judges' decisions. Furthermore, I use a two-stage probit least squares estimator to show that these campaign contributions directly affect judicial decisionmaking.

This study assesses the effects of changing electoral structure on the representation of women in American state legislatures. Specifically, how does converting from multimember districts (MMDs) to single-member districts (SMDs) affect the proportion of women serving in the state legislature? I use a quasi-experimental design, comparing election results from the four states that eliminated MMDs during the reapportionment following the 1990 census to those in eight states whose systems did not change during this period. The weight of the evidence suggests that abandoning MMDs for SMDs decreases the representation of women in state legislatures.

This article serves three purposes. First, we present a new source of campaign finance data for the 50 states. This includes annual data on candidate expenditures in gubernatorial races from 1977 to 2001, as well as triennial and biennial data on campaign finance laws affecting gubernatorial races during this period. Second, we review the various sources of campaign finance data for the 50 states. Third, we examine the challenges of collecting and compiling data across the 50 states, since these data can vary so much in availability and measurement. We hope to provide some general lessons to researchers collecting or working with all types of cross-state data.

Numerous scholars have considered the relationship between gubernatorial power and political outcomes. In fact, gubernatorial power has been used as a key explanatory factor in analyses of topics such as gubernatorial approval, divided government, regulation, and even individual political behavior. The key to these studies is the precision with which scholars can measure gubernatorial power and many such studies rely on the Formal Powers Index (FPI)—a measure maintained by Beyle. In this article, we reconsider these commonly used power scores in three parts. First, we argue and show that FPI suffers from a key measurement error that is particularly problematic in analyses of time-series data. Second, we present a new approach to estimating gubernatorial power and explain how this approach deals with the measurement errors in the FPI. Finally, we use our new scores to replicate a study that originally relied on the FPI to analyze the effect of gubernatorial power. Given the prevalence of the FPI in the existing literature, our results have key implications for the study of the effects of gubernatorial power.

This essay places state supreme courts in state politics by tracking some of the major lines of research on these important institutions, documenting the importance of state supreme courts, and illustrating important variations among state supreme courts on a host of factors, including docket composition, the exercise of judicial review, litigant patterns, and turnover rates. Through analyses of original data on separation-of-powers relationships in the abortion controversy, it also provides a brief empirical demonstration of how courts influence and are influenced by the political and policy processes operating in the states, and how comparative research helps resolve fundamental controversies in political science. We conclude that there is a remarkable and unfortunate asymmetry between the political importance of state supreme courts and the attention given to them by the research community. Moreover, by capitalizing on the analytical advantages of comparative state judicial politics scholarship, scholars will be able to solve some of the most complex puzzles in the study of state politics.

Are the politics of welfare policy for the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor the same? We use pooled cross-sectional time-series analyses of state government discretionary welfare spending on general assistance (GA) and Supplemental Security Income supplements (SSI-S) to address this question. We find that efforts to assist the GA population decline as electoral competition increases while efforts to assist the SSI-S population increase, providing evidence that only the deserving poor are favored by heightened political competition. We also find that SSI-S benefits rise with ideological liberalism, electoral competition, and the percentage of African Americans in a state. When considered in light of the negative effect of larger African American populations on states' SSI-S efforts, this suggests targeting of particular groups. Finally, we find that SSI-S enrollments are reduced, but the per-recipient payments are increased under state administration, suggesting that state administrators are more likely to provide more services to existing clientele than to expand their client base.

Can government institutions strengthen the influence of public opinion on policymaking? While institutions often limit representation, I identify two institutional features of state lawmaking that may enhance democratic control, but in somewhat different ways. I hypothesize that one institution external to the state legislature—the ballot initiative—improves representation on specific issues, while one institution internal to the legislature—the committee discharge procedure—enhances responsiveness to mass preferences generally. This difference emerges because legislators engage in repeated interactions and logrolling across a wide range of issues while advocates of ballot initiatives do not. My analyses largely, although not entirely, support these hypotheses, with the initiative making abortion policy more responsive and committee discharge making policy generally more responsive. These results suggest a domain-specific influence of institutions that were previously thought to have similar effects on policy representation.

The authors use an informational-theoretical perspective to examine the appointment of legislative committees, using new measures of knowledge and expertise as well as a unique database. While competing theories (distributive and partisan) do not deny that legislative committees are a source of vital knowledge and expertise necessary for legislative policy making, information theory places the wisdom and expertise needs of collective decision making—that is, specialization—on very complex topics by legislative generalists as the raison d'être for a committee system. Thus, the authors investigate one of the fundamental arguments of information theory—that committees are formed to meet the basic knowledge and expertise needs of a legislative body. The findings from U.S. state legislative data indicate that significant member differences regarding prior knowledge and expertise exist by committee jurisdiction, state, and session, reinforcing the applicability of information theory while also suggesting the impact of setting and organizational factors. The authors also explore implications of these findings.

Does complete public financing of campaigns enhance electoral competition? Arizona and Maine implemented similar clean elections programs for state-level races in 2000, providing an opportunity to examine the consequences of public financing. Employing two measures of competitiveness, I find that clean elections programs in both states significantly increased competition in districts where challengers accepted public funding. These findings suggest that public monies do not simply attract low-quality challengers and that access to campaign funds is an important determinant of competitiveness. As a result, while public financing programs are not panaceas for uncompetitive elections, such programs can enhance competition in races where money is accepted.

As more children of undocumented workers graduate from U.S. high schools, many states are considering laws to grant these students in-state tuition status. Kansas, which adopted such a law in 2004, was an unlikely venue for this kind of policy, considering the negative attitudes toward illegal immigrants among the state's residents as well as its relatively small share of Hispanic residents. We argue that the passage of Kansas's in-state tuition bill occurred in large measure due to the skill of its proponents in framing the issue as one of access to public education. We use a mix of qualitative and quantitative data to show how proponents of the in-state tuition bill were able to direct attention toward public education—an issue more electorally palatable to legislators and their constituents—and redirect attention away from immigration policy. The success of the bill in Kansas has some applicability for similar legislation under consideration in other states; however, as immigration policy has become more politically charged, proponents of in-state tuition for undocumented students will face renewed challenges in the legislative arena, as Kansas also demonstrates.

Elected politicians can manage government agencies using administrative procedures that either enhance agencies' political responsiveness or their autonomy. Rational politicians will delegate autonomy when the benefits of agency decision-making are high, such as when the policy problem is technically complex. This article tests this hypothesis by investigating how state politicians design the institutional features of state clean air agencies and how these agencies perform under different administrative procedure regimes. I find that when a state's air pollution problem is complex, politicians eschew administrative procedures that enhance political control, and these agencies respond by choosing policies from a broader range of options.

This article examines the role of society and culture in shaping the opportunity structure and ambition formation of female gubernatorial candidates in all 50 states over a 40-year period. Using a new data set consisting of every woman who entered a gubernatorial primary from 1978 to 2008, the author analyzes how cultural factors and historical legacies—including the percentage of women in the workforce, higher education, and statewide elective offices—influence the opportunity structure and ambition formation of female candidates. The author argues that the female sociopolitical subculture within individual states heavily influences whether or not female candidates will enter and win their respective primaries and general elections. Rather than assuming that individual characteristics are the primary determinants of ambition formation, this research implies that it is necessary to analyze the political behavior within cultural contexts.

Do salient ballot initiatives stimulate voting? Recent studies have shown that initiatives increase voter turnout, but some methodological concerns still linger. These studies have either relied solely on aggregate data to make inferences about individual-level behavior or used a flawed measure of initiative salience. Using individual-level data from the National Election Studies, I find that ballot question salience indeed stimulated voting in the midterm elections of 1990 and 1994. In an election with moderately salient ballot questions, a person's likelihood of voting can increase by as much as 30 percent in a midterm election. On the other hand, consistent with most prior research, I find no statistically significant relationship between ballot question salience and voting in presidential elections.

Scholars are beginning to consider how state campaign finance regulation influences political behavior and elections, but they lack the systematic measure of these regulations needed to do so. This article describes a simple measure of state campaign finance regulation stringency that is based on state statutes in 2002. Further, this article explains the construction of the measure and assesses its validity and reliability. The index generally confirms qualitative assessments of state campaign finance regulation, and it is correlated with measures of related aspects of state campaign finance regulation, campaign spending, and fundraising.

Do citizens have the information they need to hold state politicians accountable? We consider what people know about state politics and whether knowledge of state government is rooted in the same factors that explain knowledge of national matters. We argue that while knowledge of national politics is rooted within individual dispositions like education and political interest, knowledge of state politics depends on the political climate of the state. When state political environments provide more information and greater incentives to become informed, people are more knowledgeable about state matters. Even if citizens are not always well versed in matters of state politics, they appear to monitor the business of the states. Citizens are most knowledgeable about state politics in the cases where information is arguably most important—when state governments are underperforming, when political competition is high, and when the political parties in the state are ideologically divided.

Recent demonstrations of growing economic inequality in the United States raise normative concerns about the political representation of all but the very wealthiest citizens. Building on existing cross-national work on the roles of unions in welfare states, I provide evidence that organized labor, as a political institution, limits unequal income distributions in the U.S. states. The states are useful to our understanding of labor's influence on inequality as states differ in their acceptance of labor unions, base levels of inequality, political preferences, industries, and levels of development but are all nested within a single overarching national framework. Over the 39-year period examined, states where unions maintain more members remain more equal within the labor market and after redistribution via government transfer. These effects persist after accounting for state-level policy, demography, and economic conditions. However, states where union membership has the largest influence on inequality have also seen growing attempts to reduce unionization rates. Overall, I find that unions are still able to limit the growth of economic inequality in spite of declining levels of union membership.

I use computer-assisted content analysis of gubernatorial state of the state addresses in 2000 and 2001 to measure state governors' ideology. These speeches provide an excellent direct measure of governors' preferences, values, and ideology. This method produced reliable and valid indicators of the ideology of state governors. The ideological content of these speeches clearly distinguishes governors on the basis of their party affiliation. Researchers should consider the content analysis of speeches and other public pronouncements as a useful way of assessing the views of governors and other public officials and incorporating them into models of state policy and politics.