Recently economists have expressed increasing interest in studying the determinants of happiness. Their main task has been to identify economic and non-economic sources of well-being to define policies aimed at maximising happiness in nations. As yet, it has not been precisely explained why ‘happiness economics’ is actually a part of economic science. In this article, we show that happiness can be an economic concept providing a critical review of the literature on (a) economic applications of happiness data and (b) economic consequences of happiness. Happiness data have been used to analyse microeconomic phenomena and to value non-market goods. Happiness may act as a determinant of economic outcomes: it increases productivity, predicts one’s future income and affects labour market performance. A growing number of happiness studies indicate a role of personality traits in understanding the link between well-being and economic outcomes.

This introduction overviews four approaches to theoretical and empirical research on the ‘gig’ economy, framing them within the concept of the ‘fissuring of the workplace’. It outlines arguments that ‘gig’ or digital work is not a new phenomenon but a resurgence of older, unregulated labour extraction methods and outlines the need for a more nuanced way of measuring the dimensions of job insecurity and their corrosive effects. In foreshadowing potential policy approaches to addressing the regulatory deficit surrounding gig economy work, it argues for an eclectic approach to using and strengthening legislation designed to safeguard the rights of consumers and providers of services, including contractors, and regardless of employment status. Finally, it foreshadows a study of how a successful union movement respond to the gig economy – negotiation with a digital platform to bring advertised hourly pay rates into line with the minima set within the industrial relations system for employment in the relevant industries.

Digital platform businesses primarily utilise on-call contingent workers, using their own tools and equipment, to perform the productive work associated with the supplied service. The expansion of this business model has led some to proclaim that traditional ‘jobs’ will come to an end. Some welcome this development, others fear its consequences for the stability and quality of work – but most see it as driven primarily by technology, and therefore largely ‘inevitable’. This article provides historical and theoretical perspective on the expansion of digitally mediated work, to better understand the range of forces (technological, economic and socio-political) at work. It shows that the major features of platform work were all visible in earlier periods of capitalism, but they became less prominent with the rise of the ‘standard employment relationship’ in the 20th century. The rise and fall of the standard employment relationship is described with reference to the changing context for the labour extraction effort of private employers. A better understanding of the complete range of forces driving changes in work organisation, and a rejection of the assumption that they are technologically determined and hence inevitable, can inform regulatory and political responses to the rise of platform work.

By the end of the 20th century, there was general agreement that most labour markets were in transition and that employment was becoming less secure. However, official labour market data have not shown a dramatic increase in temporary or casual employment. This article takes a new look at the changing characteristics of employment and offers a new method to measure employment security: the Employment Precarity Index. We use the Employment Precarity Index to assess how insecure employment associated with a ‘gig’ economy might affect well-being and social relations, including health outcomes, household well-being and community involvement.

Paid work associated with digital platform businesses (in taxi, delivery, maintenance and other functions) embodies features which complicate the application of traditional labour regulations and employment standards. This article reviews the extent of this type of work in Australia, and its main characteristics. It then considers the applicability of existing employment regulations to these ‘gig’ jobs, citing both Australian and international legislation and case law. There is considerable uncertainty regarding the scope of traditional regulations, minimum standards and remedies in the realm of irregular digitally mediated work. Regulators and policymakers should consider how to strengthen and expand the regulatory framework governing gig work. The article notes five major options in this regard: enforcement of existing laws; clarifying or expanding definitions of ‘employment’; creating a new category of ‘independent worker’; creating rights for ‘workers’, not employees; and reconsidering the concept of an ‘employer’. We review the pros and cons of these approaches and urge regulators to be creative and ambitious in better protecting the minimum standards and conditions of workers in these situations.

The ‘gig economy’ uses digital platforms to bypass many of the regular responsibilities and costs of employment. Ambiguity as to whether gig-economy workers are independent contractors, dependent contractors or employees allows the undermining of traditional labour standards governing minimum wages and other legislated employment conditions. Labour law and institutions need to catch up to the new reality of this form of work and develop new tools to protect and enhance minimum standards for workers in digital platform businesses. Unions, business and government all have a role to play in the long term. Meanwhile, direct engagement between these new firms and workers’ advocates can also help to mitigate the risks posed to labour standards by digital business models, by addressing regulatory gaps. This article is a case study of innovative negotiations between one platform business (Airtasker) and Unions New South Wales, a peak trade unions body in New South Wales, Australia, in order to establish agreed minimum standards for engagements negotiated through this platform.

Chinese employers practise extensive personal screening of applicants during the recruitment process. This study identifies four motives for these practices – statistical, customer taste, employer taste and regulatory. It discusses their distinctive roles in the Chinese labour market and in regard to labour-market regulations. Using a convenience sample of large Chinese employers, the study evaluates the economic and institutional determinants of screening approaches and implications for firms’ performance. Statistical screening, based on the assumption that social group membership is an indicator of productivity or loyalty, is found to be related positively to employers’ capitalisation, labour-market power and private ownership, and negatively to skill supply in provincial markets. Customer-taste screening is prevalent in the services and sales sectors, and interestingly in wealthy first-tier cities. Employer-taste screening endures in privately owned firms, and in skill-intensive industries and first-tier cities, and appears linked to customer-taste screening. Some forms of screening breach anti-discrimination laws and persist because of lax enforcement of such laws, but requests for personal data on job applications forms may also reflect compliance with equity indicators. Regulatory compliance-based screening is related positively to firms’ market power, capitalisation and state ownership. The implications of the different screening practices for public policy and corporate strategy are examined.