There is evidence that some countries negotiate trade agreements during economic downturns. Why would a leader do this? We argue that political leaders can gain from such agreements because of the signals they send to their public. The public are less likely to blame leaders for adverse economic conditions when they have implemented sound economic policies, such as signing agreements designed to liberalize trade and prevent a slide into protectionism. In hard economic times, leaders – especially those in democratic environments – may find that trade agreements are a useful way to reassure the public. Since majorities in many countries around the world view trade favorably, leaders may see agreements that prevent them from adopting protectionism as a way to maintain support. We evaluate this argument by analyzing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) formed since 1962. We find that, on average, democratic countries are more likely to form PTAs during hard economic times. We also find that democratic leaders who sign PTAs during downturns enjoy a longer tenure than their counterparts who do not sign such agreements.

The expansion of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) in 2015 was the most successful attempt at trade liberalization under the auspices of the WTO since its inception in 1995. Its success makes it a template for other trade liberalization efforts. In this article, I explain how the ITA expansion came to pass and explicate the contours of the template it provides. I highlight four factors that were crucial to the ITA expansion's successful completion: a narrower scope without a single undertaking approach, a negotiating group that contained many but not all WTO members, a focus on tariffs rather than non-tariff barriers, and avoiding a nationalistic opposition. I conclude by discussing what lessons these factors and the ITA expansion suggest for other ongoing trade negotiations such as the Environmental Goods Agreements (EGA).

This paper examines the supply-side determinants of international trade in crops that are intensive in genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The theoretical framework is a variant of the Heckscher–Ohlin model, which we estimate using cross-country data for 1995 and 2010 to examine soybeans, maize, and cotton trade. The data include measures of country land endowments, which we disaggregate into GMO and non-GMO components, as well as recently released measures of GMO regulations. Findings show land endowments are a primary source of comparative advantage in GMO intensive industries before and after the advent of GMOs. Further, an increase in a country's allocation of land to GMO crops has a positive effect on her net exports in GMO intensive industries. This positive effect occurs both across countries and time. Finally, a country's GMO regulations have a negligible effect as a supply-side determinant of comparative advantage. However, a country's decision about whether to adopt GMO technologies does matter to trade. These findings are robust with respect to a variety of considerations.

The 2014 Halal Product Assurance Act (Halal Act) is the first law in Indonesia requiring mandatory Halal certification and labelling. Local and foreign business entities, while in agreement that Halal assurance through certification and labelling is important for Muslim consumers, have expressed their anxiety over whether such requirements will mean extra costs, particularly for small and medium enterprises. At the same time, the mandatory labelling regime involves several WTO issues under the TBT Agreement, which raise questions regarding Indonesia's compliance with its obligations. As a defence, Indonesia could argue that its mandatory halal labelling measure falls under the exception for protecting ‘public morals’. The WTO panel in the US–Gambling dispute noted that the meaning of ‘public morals’ and ‘public order’ varied depending on a range of factors, including prevailing social, cultural, ethical, and religious values. Should the WTO allow all types of moral and religious belief, even if they restrict trade? How can public moral policy objectives be applied in ways that do not violate WTO law? This paper seeks to examine the WTO consistency of the new Indonesian Halal Act, and whether the public moral objective underlying mandatory halal certification/labelling can be defended as an exception in the context of the TBT Agreement.

This article discusses ways in which the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and post-GATS free trade agreements may limit the EU's ability to regulate privacy and personal data protection as fundamental rights. After discussing this issue in two dimensions – the vertical relationship between trade and national and European Union (EU) law, and the horizontal relationship between trade and human rights law – the author concludes that these limits are real and pose serious risks.

Inspired by recent developments in safeguarding labour, and environmental standards and sustainable development, the article argues that privacy and personal data protection should be part of, and protected by, international trade deals made by the EU. The EU should negotiate future international trade agreements with the objective of allowing them to reflect the normative foundations of privacy and personal data protection. This article suggests a specific way to achieve this objective.

This paper discusses an important legal issue raised by the United States in its recent attempt to block the reappointment of an Appellate Body member. According to the US, in some of his decisions, the member has made overreaching findings that amount to obiter dicta. As obiter dictum is a unique concept in the Common Law system, the US argument may only stand if the concept may be found in the WTO legal system as well. With a careful analysis of the concept of dicta in Common Law and a close examination of the effects of past panel and Appellate Body decisions in WTO dispute settlement, the paper rejects the US argument by refuting each of the three premises of the US argument, i.e., the WTO legal system based on Common Law; WTO follows stare decisis; and the WTO has rules against dicta. In addition to original contributions on the nature of the WTO dispute settlement system in theory, the article also provides some practical advice on how the controversy may be resolved.

In 2016, the US objected to the reappointment of a member of the WTO Appellate Body, ‘accusing’ him inter alia of having participated in a decision where the Appellate Body had indulged in unnecessary analysis in the nature of obiter dicta. Henry Gao has used the occasion to investigate, with a fresh approach, the very concept of obiter dicta in international jurisprudence.

This dispute concerns the challenge by the United States to measures taken by China to comply with the rulings and recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the original proceeding China–Broiler Products. Based on a redetermination issued by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), China continued to impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties on imports of broiler products from US producers (Keystone, Tyson, and Pilgrim's Pride). Overall, the compliance panel concluded that China failed to bring its measures into conformity with the Anti-Dumping Agreement (AD Agreement) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).

The dispute relates to anti-dumping measures imposed by the European Union (EU) on imports of palm oil from Indonesia. It relates to the same investigation that was at issue in EU–Biodiesel (Argentina). The panel and Appellate Body reports in that dispute were adopted in October 2016. Two of the panellists in the dispute involving Argentina served as panellists in the current dispute.