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Evidence for LoTH: Slim pickings
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2023
Abstract
In this commentary, I contend that a representative sample of the arguments in the target article miss the mark. In particular, the interface problem provides no warrant for positing similarities between representational formats, and the evidence from neurocognitive, animal, and behavioral studies is inconclusive at best. Finally, I raise doubts about whether the authors' central hypothesis is falsifiable.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences
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Author response
The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science