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Is language-of-thought the best game in the town we live?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2023
Abstract
There are towns in which language-of-thought (LoT) is the best game. But do we live in one? I go through three properties that characterize the LoT hypothesis: Discrete constituents, role-filler independence, and logical operators, and argue that in each case predictions from the LoT hypothesis are a poor fit to actual human cognition. As a hypothesis of what human cognition ought to be like, LoT departs from empirical reality.
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Target article
The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences
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Author response
The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science