Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-8ctnn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T16:48:43.726Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

So, are we the massively lucky species?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2012

Derek C. Penn ,
Keith J. Holyoak  and
Daniel J. Povinelli
Derek C. Penn
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095. dcpenn@ucla.eduhttp://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/holyoak@lifesci.ucla.eduhttp://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/
Keith J. Holyoak
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095. dcpenn@ucla.eduhttp://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/holyoak@lifesci.ucla.eduhttp://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/
Daniel J. Povinelli
Affiliation:
Department of Biology, University of Louisiana, Lafayette, LA 70560. povinelli@louisiana.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We are in vehement agreement with most of Vaesen's key claims. But Vaesen fails to consider or rebut the possibility that there are deep causal dependencies among the various cognitive traits he identifies as uniquely human. We argue that “higher-order relational reasoning” is one such linchpin trait in the evolution of human tool use, social intelligence, language, and culture.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 4 , August 2012 , pp. 236 - 237
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ahn, W., Kalish, C., Medin, D. & Gelman, S. (1995) The role of covariation versus mechanism information in causal attribution. Cognition 54:299–352.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Andrews, G., Halford, G. S., Bunch, K. M., Bowden, D. & Jones, T. (2003) Theory of mind and relational complexity. Child Development 74(5):1476–99.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Carruthers, P. (2005) The case for massively modular models of mind. In: Contemporary debates in cognitive science, ed. Stainton, R., pp. 205–25. Blackwell.Google Scholar
Carruthers, P. & Smith, P. K. eds. (1996) Theories of theory of mind. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Cheng, P. W. (1993) Separating causal laws from casual facts: Pressing the limits of statistical relevance. In: The psychology of learning and motivationvol. 30, ed. Medin, D. L., pp. 215–64. Academic Press.Google Scholar
Cheng, P. W. (1997) From covariation to causation: A causal power theory. Psychological Review 104:367–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cho, S., Moody, T. D., Fernandino, L., Mumford, J. A., Poldrack, R. A., Cannon, T. D., Knowlton, B. J. & Holyoak, K. J. (2010) Common and dissociable prefrontal loci associated with component mechanisms of analogical reasoning. Cerebral Cortex 20:524–33.Google Scholar
Gentner, D. (2003) Why we're so smart. In: Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and thought, ed. Gentner, D. & Goldin-Meadow, S., pp. 195–235. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gomez, R. L. & Gerken, L. (2000) Infant artificial language learning and language acquisition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4(5):178–86.Google Scholar
Gopnik, A. & Schulz, L. eds. (2007) Causal learning: Psychology, philosophy, and computation. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Halford, G. S., Wilson, W. H. & Phillips, S. (1998) Processing capacity defined by relational complexity: Implications for comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21(6):803–31; discussion 831–64.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N. & Fitch, W. T. (2002) The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science 298:1569–79.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Holyoak, K. J. & Cheng, P. W. (2011) Causal learning and inference as a rational process: The new synthesis. Annual Review of Psychology 62:135–63.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Lagnado, D. A., Waldmann, M. R., Hagmayer, Y. & Sloman, S. A. (2007) Beyond covariation: Cues to causal structure. In: Causal learning: Psychology, philosophy, and computation. ed. Gopnik, A. & Schulz, L., pp. 154–72. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Penn, D. C. & Povinelli, D. J. (2007a) Causal cognition in human and nonhuman animals: A comparative, critical review. Annual Review of Psychology. 58:97–118.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Penn, D. C., Holyoak, K. & Povinelli, D. J. (2008) Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31(2):109–78.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pinker, S. & Jackendoff, R. (2005) The faculty of language: What's special about it? Cognition 95:201–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Povinelli, D. J., Reaux, J.E., Theall, L.A. & Giambrone, S. (2000) Folk physics for apes: The chimpanzee's theory of how the world works. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Robin, N. & Holyoak, K. J. (1995) Relational complexity and the functions of the prefrontal cortex. In: The cognitive neurosciences, ed. Gazzaniga, M., pp. 987–97. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Tenenbaum, J. B., Griffiths, T. L. & Kemp, C. (2006) Theory-based Bayesian models of inductive learning and reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(7):309–18.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tetzlaff, M. & Carruthers, P. (2008) Languages of thought need to be distinguished from learning mechanisms, and nothing yet rules out multiple distinctively human learning systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31:148–49.Google Scholar
Zelazo, P. D., Jacques, S., Burack, J. A. & Frye, D. (2002) The relation between theory of mind and rule use: Evidence from persons with autism-spectrum disorders. Infant and Child Development 11:171–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar