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Bargaining power and the evolution of un-fair, non-mutualistic moral norms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2013

Francesco Guala
Francesco Guala*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Università degli Studi di Milano, 20122 Milan, Italy. francesco.guala@unimi.ithttp://users.unimi.it/guala/index.htm
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Abstract

Mutualistic theory explains convincingly the prevalence of fairness norms in small societies of foragers and in large contemporary democratic societies. However, it cannot explain the U-shaped curve of egalitarianism in human history. A theory based on bargaining power is able to provide a more general account and to explain mutualism as a special case. According to this approach, social norms may be more variable and malleable than Baumard et al. suggest.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , February 2013 , pp. 92 - 93
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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References

Binmore, K. (2005) Natural justice. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
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Dubreuil, B. (2010a) Human evolution and the origins of hierarchies. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar