This paper explores the factors that influence citizens' attitudes toward the alternative provision of health care services, leading them to be willing to make extra, informal payments within the public health care system. We question whether these attitudes depend primarily on inherent normative preferences, such as beliefs about the government's responsibility to its citizens, or on certain aspects of the reality that they experience, such as satisfaction with the quality and quantity of services as well as the fairness of public systems. Analyzing the findings from a national survey, the paper shows that practical considerations and real-world conditions strongly relate to attitudes more than normative perceptions do.

Chronic diseases are highly important for the future level and distribution of health and well-being in western societies. Consequently, it seems pertinent to assess not only efficiency of chronic care but also its impact on health equity. However, operationalisation of health equity has proven a challenging task. Challenges include identifying a relevant and measurable evaluative space. Various schools of thought in health economics have identified different outcomes of interest for equity assessment, with capabilities as a proposed alternative to more conventional economic conceptualisations. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the conceptualisation of health equity evaluation in the context of chronic disease management. We do this by firstly introducing an equity enquiry framework incorporating the capabilities approach. Secondly, we demonstrate the application and relevance of this framework through a content analysis of equity-related principles and aims in national chronic disease management guidelines and the national diabetes action plan in Denmark. Finally, we discuss how conceptualisations of equity focused on capabilities may be used in evaluation by scoping relevant operationalisations. A promising way forward in the context of chronic care evaluation may emerge from a combination of concepts of capabilities developed in economics, health sciences and psychology.

Singapore's health system generates similar levels of health outcomes as does Sweden's but for only 4.4% rather than 11.0% of gross domestic product, with Singapore's resulting health sector savings being re-directed to help fund both long-term care and retirement pensions for its elderly citizens. This paper contrasts the framework of financial risk-sharing and the configuration and management of health service providers in these two high-income, small-population countries. Two main institutional distinctions emerge from this country case comparison: (1) Key differences exist in the practical configuration of solidarity for payment of health care services, reflecting differing cultural roots and social expectations, which in turn carry substantial implications for financing long-term care and pensions. (2) Differing arrangements exist in the organization of health service institutions, in particular balancing public as against private sector responsibilities for owning, operating and managing these two countries' respective hospitals. These different structural characteristics generate fundamental differences in health sector financial and delivery outcomes in one developed country in Far East Asia as compared with a well-respected tax-funded health system in Western Europe. In the post-COVID era, as Western European policymakers find themselves forced to adjust their publicly funded health systems to (further) reductions in economic growth rates and overall tax receipts, and as the cost of the information revolution continues to rise while efforts to fund better coordinated social and home care services for growing numbers of chronically ill elderly remain inadequate, this two-country case comparison highlights a series of health system design questions that could potentially provide alternative health sector financing and service delivery strategies.

Using yearly panel data from 2011 to 2017 on New Zealand District Health Boards (DHBs), this study combines principal component analysis and data envelopment intertemporal analysis with the double-bootstrap approach to estimate the technical efficiency of health care providers along with the trend of efficiency performances. The results show that although most large DHBs have improved their level of technical efficiency between 2011 and 2017, the majority of medium- and small-sized DHBs have not seen any noticeable improvement in their level of technical efficiency. The results also show that large and tertiary DHBs operate at a high level of technical efficiency. In contrast, most of the medium- and small-sized DHBs posted some of the lowest technical efficiency scores. Furthermore, the results show that medium- and small-sized DHBs have a higher average length of hospital stays which is found to be associated with decreasing levels of technical efficiency scores.

Wales is a small country, with an ageing population, high levels of population health need and an economy with a significant reliance on public services. Its health system attracts little attention, with analyses tending to underplay the differences between the four countries of the UK. This paper helps redress this via a case study of Welsh mental health policy, services and nursing practice. Distinctively, successive devolved governments in Wales have emphasised public planning and provision. Wales also has primary legislation addressing sustainability and future generations, safe nurse staffing and rights of access to mental health services. However, in a context in which gaps always exist between national policy, local services and face-to-face care, evidence points to the existence of tension between Welsh policy aspirations and realities. Mental health nurses in Wales have produced a framework for action, which describes practice exemplars and looks forward to a secure future for the profession. With policy, however enlightened, lacking the singular potency to bring about intended change, nurses as the largest of the professional groups involved in mental health care have opportunities to make a difference in Wales through leadership, influence and collective action.

In the last decades, several European health systems have abandoned their vertically integrated health care in favour of some form of managed competition (MC), either in a centralised or decentralised format. However, during a pandemic, MC may put health systems under additional strain as they are designed to follow some form of ‘organisational self-interest’, and hence face reduced incentives for both provider coordination (e.g. temporary hospital close down, change in the case-mix), and information sharing. We illustrate our argument using evidence for the Covid-19 pandemic outbreak in Italy during March and April 2020, which calls for the development of ‘coordination mechanisms’ at times of a health emergency.

One of the main governance decisions that policymakers need to make is whether to implement public services via centralized or decentralized forms. As Costa et al. discuss in their article, when public services are implemented via competing systems, service providers contend to provide good services with the ultimate objective of gaining market quota. This is known as managed competition (MC), as the authorities will have to manage the panoply of public and private organizations offering the service. The alternative is to manage the service more centrally, in what it is identified as vertical integration. As the authors describe, several governments around the globe have abandoned their vertical integrated models in favour of decentralized models. This is the case, as the authors recall, for most health services in Europe. While there is an emerging body of evidence suggesting that decentralized MC outperforms vertically integrated models both in terms of efficiency and in terms of service quality, little is known on how these systems react under different circumstances. This means, for example, how these systems can cope with a sudden increase in their service demands.

Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, discussions about the capabilities of health and social systems to control and contain infectious diseases have been reignited. In Resilient Managed Competition During Pandemics: Lessons from the Italian Experience, Costa-Font, Turatti and Levaggi ask whether or not institutional differences between the managed competition (MC) systems in three of Italy's regions may have affected their performance – and hence, population health outcomes – during the pandemic. Fuchs (2000) previously argued that institutional arrangements not only ‘matter’, but also sometimes ‘matter a great deal’ (p. 149, emphasis in original) and this may be particularly true in emergencies.

Despite denials of politicians and other advisors, trade-offs have already been apparent in many policy decisions addressing the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic and its social and economic consequences. Here, we illustrate why it is important, from a wellbeing perspective, to recognise such trade-offs, and provide a framework, based on the economic concept of ‘marginal analysis’, for doing so. We illustrate its potential through consideration of optimising the balance between reducing the reproductive rate (R) of the virus and further opening of the economy. The framework accommodates both perspectives in the health-vs-economy debate whereby, depending on where we are within the marginal analysis framework, either health issues are allowed to dominate or, below some threshold of R and/or background level of infection, health and economic considerations can be traded off against each other. Given the inevitability of such trade-offs, the framework exposes crucial questions to be addressed, such as: the critical value of R and/or background infection, above which health considerations predominate, and which may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; and the value of lives forgone resulting from the small increases in R and/or background infection levels that may have to be tolerated as the economy is gradually opened.

In Ireland, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has led to a total of 230,599 cases of infection as on 20 March 2021, and 4323 deaths. Although the Irish hospital network has not been overwhelmed, it has faced pressures, with a total of 13,313 persons hospitalised, including 1402 admitted to the intensive care unit. Out of caution, in spring 2020, in anticipation of possible surges in hospitals in light of international experience, the Irish government reached an agreement with private hospitals to access their capacity for three months to alleviate pressure on the public system, as part of its comprehensive response to the pandemic. This piece analyses the agreement with private hospitals, based on the legally binding Heads of Terms of the agreement, which were signed by the parties, along with publicly reported details from media reports and Oireachtas (parliamentary) committee hearings. We argue that although the new relationship could, in theory, have paved the way to the nationalisation of the whole hospital system, in fact, the experiment is best interpreted as a lost opportunity to integrate and simplify Ireland's hospital system.

The UK, and England in particular, has suffered egregiously poor outcomes in managing the Covid-19 pandemic. This short perspective points to the explanation in terms of both current British politics and the public health policy inheritance. Boris Johnson's Premiership was born in an opportunistic assertion of British exceptionalism, and Johnson's initial, fate-tempting reaction to the novel Coronavirus set the UK on the wrong path. Furthermore, the gradual erosion of professionalism in (especially health) policy-making over almost four decades, and the hollowing-out of the health protection infrastructure, both facilitated and accentuated a toxic approach to managing Covid-19.