Researchers have extensively studied how large firms and SMEs use business and political ties to obtain tangible and intangible resources in transition economies. However, how SMEs establish these ties in the context of power-imbalanced dependence by using unethical and illegal “strategic practice” such as bribery remains underexplored. Furthermore, how SMEs deploy strategies to mitigate such risky actions in the process of resource acquisition is also given limited attention in the literature. Lack of exploration of these issues leaves significant gaps in our understanding of how SMEs are able to initiate and operate their ties for survival and growth despite enormous institutional constraints. We analyze the negative and positive effects of power dependence on business resource acquisition via regression analysis using survey data drawn from 232 Chinese SMEs. The findings indicate that power-imbalanced dependence among SMEs is associated with their use of bribery to establish political ties with officials for access to resources. The moderating effect of power-mutual dependence on this relationship is also examined. Theoretical significance and managerial implications of these findings for SMEs in transition economies are discussed.

Models of distributive politics often assume that fixed budgets constrain the efforts of incumbents to retain power. Yet, significant variation exists in politicians' abilities to push distributive costs forward by funding current fiscal policy through sovereign borrowing. This article theorizes how and when variation in sovereign credit access influences the central goal of democratic incumbents: political survival. Credit allows incumbents to reward supporters without immediately extracting domestic revenue. Excessive borrowing, however, risks higher interest rates or possible market exclusion. Considering sovereign borrowing's benefits and costs, we argue that the marginal effect of credit access on political survival is greatest for those incumbents that require other parties to implement fiscal policy. An analysis of incumbent party tenure in seventy-one democracies from 1977–2007 demonstrates that affordable sovereign finance is associated with longer tenures under divided government but has no significant effect on survival under unified governments.

Why do private banks lend preferentially to politically connected firms? Focusing on the case of Egypt during the later years of Mubarak's rule, we identified politically connected firms, and we documented, using the Orbis corporate data on large firms in Egypt, that they received a disproportionate amount of the loans going to the private sector during 2003–11. We then investigated the determinants of their borrowings, and we found evidence that connected firms were more attractive to banks both because they made larger profits, and because they were seen to be implicitly guaranteed by the state against failure. We also found evidence that non-connected firms had a lower demand for loans.

What explains subnational policy choices over tax cut after decentralization? We test two different explanations in the context of the 2002 tax reform in Russia. A popular strand of literature suggests that decentralization induces more regional competition over investment, motivating subnational tax cuts. A second body of literature suggests that personal business interests of regional governors can account for their different policy choices. Governors with personal business ties refrain from tax cuts because they increase market competition. We find no support for the regional competition hypothesis, but strong statistical evidence for the business connection hypothesis. Our findings have important implications for research on fiscal decentralization and on the connections between business interests of leaders and their policy choices.

Scholarship in international political economy (IPE) has noted the rise of resource nationalism in since the early 2000s. Despite the increased presence of state regulation in the resource sector, resource nationalism has not been incompatible with foreign investment. This article contributes to better understand resource nationalist policies that emerged in recent years and offers new theoretical insights to explain state-IOC relations by integrating obsolescing bargaining theories and constructivist approaches. Drawing on the case of Venezuela, this article explains how the Chávez regime pursued a hybrid model of control and welcoming of investments in the oil sector. The article argues that both bargaining insights and ideational considerations are important in explaining this model. In the context of high oil prices and sunk investments, it is unsurprising that a leftist government would seek to renegotiate contracts to seek better deals from extractive companies. Yet, focusing exclusively on those incentives misses important ideational drivers for the government to keep investors in the country. For Chávez's government, effecting changes in the oil policy was possible after waging an intense battle with its NOC, PDVSA, over control. Association with foreign investment became crucial to build its socialist model and to control its own company.