We show that load-sharing models (a very special class of multivariate probability models for nonnegative random variables) can be used to obtain basic results about a multivariate extension of stochastic precedence and related paradoxes. Such results can be applied in several different fields. In particular, applications of them can be developed in the context of paradoxes which arise in voting theory. Also, an application to the notion of probability signature may be of interest, in the field of systems reliability.

A vexing question in Bayesian epistemology is how an agent should update on evidence which she assigned zero prior credence. Some theorists have suggested that, in such cases, the agent should update by Kolmogorov conditionalization, a norm based on Kolmogorov’s theory of regular conditional distributions. However, it turns out that in some situations, a Kolmogorov conditionalizer will plan to always assign a posterior credence of zero to the evidence she learns. Intuitively, such a plan is irrational and easily Dutch bookable. In this paper, we propose a revised norm, Kolmogorov–Blackwell conditionalization, which avoids this problem. We prove a Dutch book theorem and converse Dutch book theorem for this revised norm, and relate our results to those of Rescorla (2018).

We give a dynamic extension result of the (static) notion of a deviation measure. We also study distribution-invariant deviation measures and show that the only dynamic deviation measure which is law invariant and recursive is the variance.

Sufficient conditions are given under which ratifiable acts exist.

In this paper we propose a strategy that gives an optimal lower bound of the average gain for the two-envelope problem within the McDonnell and Abbott (2009) and McDonnell et al. (2011) framework. We obtain this result with partial information about the probability distribution of the envelope's contents.

A decision-making body may utilize a wide variety of different strategies when required to make a collective decision. In principle, we would like to use the most effective decision rule, that is, the rule yielding the highest probability of making the correct decision. However, in reality we often have to choose a decision rule out of some restricted family of rules. Therefore, it is important to be able to rank various families of rules. In this paper we consider three classes of decision rules: (i) balanced expert rules, (ii) the so-called single expert rules, and (iii) restricted majority rules. For the first two classes, we show that, as we deviate from the best rule in the family, the effectiveness of the decision rule decreases. For the last class, we obtain a very different phenomenon: any inner ranking is possible.

In a decision problem with uncertainty a decision maker receives partial information about the actual state via an information structure. After receiving a signal, he is allowed to withdraw and gets zero profit. We say that one structure is better than another when a withdrawal option exists if it may never happen that one structure guarantees a positive profit while the other structure guarantees only zero profit. This order between information structures is characterized in terms that are different from those used by Blackwell's comparison of experiments. We also treat the case of a malevolent nature that chooses a state in an adverse manner. It turns out that Blackwell's classical characterization also holds in this case.

We study the uncertain dichotomous choice model. In this model, a group of expert decision makers is required to select one of two alternatives. The applications of this model are relevant to a wide variety of areas. A decision rule translates the individual opinions of the members into a group decision, and is optimal if it maximizes the probability of the group making a correct choice. In this paper, we assume the correctness probabilities of the experts to be independent random variables selected from some given distribution. Moreover, the ranking of the members in the group is (at least partly) known. Thus, one can follow rules based on this ranking. The extremes are the expert rule and the majority rule. The probabilities of the two extreme rules being optimal were compared in a series of early papers, for a variety of distributions. In most cases, the asymptotic behaviours of the probabilities of the two extreme rules followed the same patterns. Do these patterns hold in general? If not, what are the ranges of possible asymptotic behaviours of the probabilities of the two extreme rules being optimal? In this paper, we provide satisfactory answers to these questions.

Sapir (1998) calculated the probabilities of the expert rule and of the simple majority rule being optimal under the assumption of exponentially distributed logarithmic expertise levels. Here we find the analogous probabilities for the family of restricted majority rules, including the above two extreme rules as special cases, and the family of balanced expert rules. We compare the two families, the rules within each family, and all rules of the two families with the extreme rules.

In this paper, we study the first instant when Brownian motion either spends consecutively more than a certain time above a certain level, or reaches another level. This stopping time generalizes the ‘Parisian’ stopping times that were introduced by Chesney et al. (1997). Using excursion theory, we derive the Laplace transform of this stopping time. We apply this result to the valuation of investment projects with a delay constraint, but with an alternative: pay a higher cost and get the project started immediately