This chapter examines the effects that legally-oriented AI developments will have on consumer protection and to consumers’ need for legal advice and representation. The chapter provides a brief survey of the many possible ways in which AI may influence consumers’ legal needs. It provides comparative analysis of the benefits and risks of the use of AI in the legal sphere, discusses the state of regulation in this area and argues in favor of a new regulatory framework.

Young people are increasingly impacted by the effects of the climate crisis, which are causing significant mental health harms. They are aware that government policies and decision-making have furthered reliance on fossil fuels, even in the face of the known dangers of climate change. To protect their human rights and future well-being, young people are turning to courts to hold their governments accountable for protecting their rights to a life-sustaining climate. Some courts around the world are granting young people access to seek remedies, while in other places, including the United States, such access is still denied. While access to justice is vital, young people have yet to see courts use the best available climate science as the basis for defining and protecting their rights. This article explores the obstacles young people face today in seeking and obtaining legal remedies, identifies human rights that are implicated by the climate crisis, and discusses why access to courts is a crucial aspect of the quest for a legally binding, science-based legal remedy for climate change that protects the rights of young people.

The Investment Court System is the core feature of the EU international investment policy. In its Opinion 1/17 the CJEU confirmed the legality of the new ICS in CETA under EU law, providing important legal and policy implications for the future co-existence of EU law and international investment law. This chapter offers a critical assessment of the ICS, examined through the CJEU’s reasoning in Opinion 1/17. First, we discuss the nature of the ICS in relation to the EU judicial system. Second, we consider the effects of the ICS on the autonomy of the CJEU and the interpretation of EU law. Finally, we focus on the main features of the ICS in light of the rule-of-law criteria, as the core EU value. Where relevant, the CJEU’s Opinion is supplemented by remarks of late Advocate General Bot, which uncover a number of relevant political considerations. The design and functioning of the ICS thus provide important insights into the EU’s understanding of the rule of law in international investment law, which is ultimately envisaged to be implemented through a Multilateral Investment Court.

The chapter examines the relevance of (international) human rights law for international arbitration. It advances the proposition that (international) human rights law is part of the fabric of international arbitration. Hence the chapter sets out firstly thehuman rights norms and human rights methodology as far it is relevant in the international arbitration context. It then discusses human rights as the means to justify the existence of international arbitration. In its main part, the chapter considers the relevant human rights norms in commercial and investment arbitration and discusses the application of international human rights law in the commercial and investment arbitration context.

Every day, courts across the country deliver rulings in civil legal disputes that, while perhaps unremarkable to many observers, have profound importance for the litigants themselves: custody disputes, debt collection, and wage garnishment, evictions, and protection orders for victims of domestic violence, to name but a few. Advocates for civil justice reform have long identified the growing number of self-represented litigants in these proceeding as a cause for concern, highlighting the need for broad reform. The number of self-represented litigants hasn’t decreased, but reform has been slow to come. The COVID-19 pandemic has offered a chance to change that. This chapter reviews civil access-to-justice efforts both before, during, and hopefully after the pandemic. Using as raw material a unique survey of state chief justices and also Michigan’s experience both before and during the pandemic to make justice more accessible, this chapter examines barriers to widespread reform in state courts, including the challenge of local political and fiscal control in states with non-unified court systems as well as the broader challenge of promoting change in a profession that is notoriously slow to embrace it. In small ways and large, the pandemic will continue to drive important change in how courts deliver justice.

The United States has a serious and persistent civil justice gap. Computationally driven litigation outcome prediction tools might offer a solution by reducing uncertainty and lowering the cost of legal services. Yet the field remains in its infancy: this chapter identifies the data, methodological, and financial limits that have impeded development in general and the potential to expand access to justice in particular. The chapter also raises a note of caution about unintended consequences. As outcome prediction reaches maturity, such tools might reify existing case outcome patterns and lock out litigants whose claims are novel or boundary-pushing. This legal endogeneity may reduce access to justice for some categories of would-be litigants and diminish the flexibility and adaptability that characterize common law reasoning. Empirical questions remain about the way(s) that outcome prediction might affect access to justice. Yet if developments continue, policymakers and practitioners should be ready to exploit the tools’ substantial potential to fill the civil justice gap while also guarding against the harms they might cause.

Court-connected ODR has already shown itself capable of dramatically improving access to justice by eliminating barriers rooted in the fact that courts traditionally resolve disputes only during certain hours, in particular physical places, and only through face-to-face proceedings. Given the centrality of courthouses to our system of justice, too many Americans have discovered their rights are too difficult or costly to exercise. As court-connected ODR systems spread, offering more inclusive types of dispute resolution services, people will soon find themselves with the law and the courts at their fingertips. But robust access to justice requires more than just raw, low-cost opportunities to resolve disputes. Existing ODR platforms seek to replicate in-person procedures, simplifying and clarifying steps where possible, but litigants without representation still proceed without experience, expertise, guardrails, or the ability to gauge risk or likely outcomes. Injecting ODR with a dose of data science has the potential to address many of these shortfalls. Enhanced ODR is unlikely to render representation obsolete, but it can dramatically reduce the gap between the “haves” and the “have nots” and, on some dimensions—where machines can outperform humans—next generation platforms may be a significant improvement.

Compared to other highly skilled labour markets, the legal profession has been slow to adopt technological changes, but lawyers have been downright speedy compared to courts. Courts already generate voluminous amounts of data, but restrict access to it. The private sector, recognizing how legal data can help its clients, willingly incurs the costs to gather this data and develop proprietary tools to analyze it. As this trend continues, access to justice will worsen, further benefitting wealthier clients over opposing litigants as well as the courts, for no other reason than that courts will lag in their ability to efficaciously decide judicial matters. The judiciary—across all levels—could reverse this trend. The first step is to develop a more robust institutional framework for making court data publicly available. The second step is a willingness among courts to analyze this data when issuing decisions, both procedural and sustantive. Doing so requires courts to develop core competencies in existing and emerging legal technology. Democratizing access to judicial data will diminish the advantage currently enjoyed by affluent litigants, but accrue to the benefit of everyone else—including courts themselves.

Although proponents of online dispute resolution systems proclaim that their innovations will expand access to justice for so-called “simple cases,” evidence of how the technology actually operates and who is benefitting from it demonstrates just the opposite. Resolution of some disputes may be more expeditious and user interface more intuitive. But in order to achieve this, parties generally do not receive meaningful information about their rights and defenses. The opacity of the technology (ODR code is not public and unlike court appearance its proceedings are private) means that due process defects and systemic biases are difficult to identify and address. Worse still, the “simple cases” argument for ODR assumes that the dollar value of a dispute is a reasonable proxy for its complexity and significance to the parties. This assumption is contradicted by well established research on procedural justice. Moreover, recent empirical studies show that low money value cases, which dominate state court dockets, are for the most part debt collection proceedings brought by well-represented private creditors or public creditors (including courts themselves, which increasingly depend on fines and fees for their operating budget). Defendants in these proceedings are overwhelmingly unrepresented individuals. What ODR offers in these settings is not access to justice for ordinary people, but rather a powerful accelerated collection and compliance technology for private creditors and the state. This chapter examines the design features of ODR and connects them to the ideology of tech evangelism that drives deregulation and market capture, the aspirations of the alternative dispute resolution movement, and hostility to the adversary system that has made strange bedfellows of traditional proponents of access to justice and tech profiteers. The chapter closes with an analysis of front-end standards for courts and bar regulators to consider to ensure that technology marketed in the name of access to justice actually serves the legal needs of ordinary people.

America’s market for legal technology presents a puzzle. On the one hand, America’s market for legal services is among the most tightly regulated in the world, suggesting infertile ground for a legal technology revolution. On the other side of this puzzle is America’s advanced and free-wheeling market for legal tech, which is likely the most robust in the world. This chapter explains this seeming puzzle and then uses that explanation to make some predictions about where legal technology will continue to flourish in America and where legacy players—lawyers, law schools, and judges—will instead stymie its development. In order to predict the future we first must understand the present and the past, so the chapter presents a brief overview of lawyer regulation, the structure of the American market for lawyers and legal services, and the current state of legal tech. This more granular view of the innovation ecosystem can explain why some tech sectors are booming, while others remain stubbornly behind, and also where we’ll see continued and even accelerated legal tech growth and where we won’t.