Chapter 1 places the institution of belligerent reprisals in relation with the two conceptual frameworks of reciprocity and enforcement. First, it sketches the trajectories by which international law has approached the phenomenon of belligerent reprisals, identifying extant prohibitions and clarifying the requirements for their lawful adoption. After recalling outstanding questions in the international regulation of the mechanism, it describes the two paradigms that legal theory could draw from to conceptualize belligerent reprisals. On the one hand stands reciprocity, as embodied chiefly in the termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach; on the other, the paradigm of enforcement as manifested in countermeasures. Having described their main tenets, the chapter shows how these two blueprints, despite co-existing in the early theories on belligerent reprisals, have come to be seen as mutually exclusive, thereby offering two clearly distinct alternatives for the following formalization of the purpose and function of the mechanism.

Chapter 2 explains how belligerent reprisals have come to be interpreted as tools to induce compliance with the laws of armed conflict. It does so by highlighting three cumulative processes. First, it looks at the role that post–World War II tribunals, the ICTY and the ICRC have played in stressing the procedural elements of belligerent reprisals, emphasizing the highly formalized set of steps to be taken before the adoption of the measure while downplaying the retaliatory act itself. Then, it claims that the main thrust of this proceduralization lies in the creation of a regulatory framework that attributes a specific legal meaning to the retaliatory conduct and, by so doing, allows for an assimilation of belligerent reprisals with the notion of countermeasures. In turn, this analogy leads to the attribution to belligerent reprisals of a sanctioning character that protects the primary norm from the risk of persistent non-compliance. The outcome of these three processes is the attribution to belligerent reprisals of a chiefly coercive purpose, interested in inducing compliance with the laws of armed conflict and markedly influenced by the enforcement paradigm.

This chapter starts from the premise that secondary sanctions are invariably adopted to exert pressure upon foreign economic or financial actors operating in third states, with the intention to modify their conduct in alignment with the primary sanctions already imposed by the sanctioning state against the target state. As follows, due to their extraterritorial scope and their exceptional capacity to encroach upon the sovereignty of other countries, the legal status of secondary sanctions under international law is controversial. This contribution seeks to elucidate if secondary sanctions may amount to economic coercion and whether as a result these measures could constitute a breach to the principle of non-intervention. The chapter closes by exploring the potential avenues for regime interaction between the rules governing the exercise of jurisdiction by states and the principle of non-intervention in the context of secondary sanctions.

The growing range and changing nature of unilateral sanctions have seen the emergence of a new label of so-called ‘secondary’ sanctions, as opposed to the more traditional ‘primary’ sanctions. While there is no accepted legal definition of secondary sanctions, in essence, secondary sanctions restrict economic transactions between third countries which may be entirely lawful under the law of these countries. Their extraterritorial character gives secondary sanctions their distinctive and particularly controversial character. Secondary sanctions create inter-State tension and may possibly violate a number of public international law regimes. They may harm the politico-economic interests of third States and cause headaches for private economic operators, whose potential exposure to secondary sanctions complicates the already complex web of multi-jurisdictional norms governing their international business transactions.

Did the threat of war trigger the extraction-coercion cycle? In this chapter I use a panel of Latin America from 1830 to 1913 to test the effects of looming international threats on domestic taxation and internal conflict. It is believed that due to the availability of foreign loans and taxable imports, states in the region did not have to engage in extraction from the local population, nor did they have to coerce individuals to comply with such policies. I summarize this argument in the form of testable hypotheses and point to factors—naval blockades and sovereign debt defaults—that might have hindered access to such external resources. I then focus on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and how they affected revenues, tariff levels, foreign loans, civil wars, coups, etc. My analyses show MIDs had a negative effect on tariffs and revenue and diminished the likelihood of a new loan—all results that contest the established conventional wisdom. Conversely, MIDs are associated to currency depreciation—a domestic-oriented inflationary tax—and domestic conflict—in particular, civil wars and coups. The chapter shows war did trigger the extraction-coercion cycle.

Chapter 6 develops an integrated framework of leader–subordinate dynamics in Chinese SOEs. How do leaders interact with subordinates to execute their agendas, and how do subordinates respond? Grounded in reward, coercion, and legitimate bases of power, the chapter identifies SOE leader tactics such as leveraging position authority, conducting personnel ploys, emphasizing material and status gains, invoking external threats, underscoring superiors’ directives and policies, and appealing to subordinates’ personal duty and morality. Subordinates may react by praising and supporting the leader or by expressing alternative views, delaying or subverting implementation, shirking, engaging in critical expression, or quitting. Leader–subordinate interactions are iterative and evolve over time.

Humans have the ability to recognize that when they perform actions, they produce effects in the external world. Even though humans are not the only animalsl with this mental capacity, their ability to perform actions is accompanied by a feeling of authorship, a feeling that “I” am the one who did it. This is what academics have called the sense of agency. When individuals claim reduced responsibility because they were “only obeying orders”, this defense is often viewed with skepticism, because the defendant has a clear motive of avoiding punishment. However, scientific methods can now be used to investigate the experience of receiving orders and how it influences how the brain processes information. As this chapter shows, obeying orders impacts the sense of agency and the feeling of responsibility at the brain level. Further, working and living in some highly hierarchical and sometimes coercive social structures, such as the military, can also impact the sense of agency when people make decisions. It thus appears that hierarchies provide a powerful ground to obtain a reduced feeling of responsibility and agency in individuals.

When we witness another person experiencing pain, be it emotional or physical, we have an empathic reaction. And even if we commit a harmful action against another person, we most of the time experience guilt in the aftermath, which prevents us from performing the same action in the future. Guilt and empathy are critical moral emotions that together usually prevent us from harming others. However, as this chapter shows, systematic processes of classification and dehumanization at play before a genocide can alter moral emotions towards another part of the population. Activity in empathy-related brain regions is generally reduced towards individuals that we consider as outgroup or towards dehumanized individuals. Neuroscience studies have further shown that when obeying orders to hurt another person, neural activity in empathy- and guilt-related brain regions is reduced compared to acting freely. Such results show how obeying orders diminishes our aversion to harming others.

In this chapter, I discuss in what sense and to what extent institutions have political authority. I take institutions with legitimate authority to be justified in wielding political power, where this political power is backed by the threat of coercion. Against the position that international institutions are not coercive, I claim that applying an adequate conception of coercion – which takes the concept of enforcement as paradigmatic for coercion, rather than the concept of pressure – enables us to understand some international institutions as coercive. It also lays open the assumption that a single conception of authority applied to all international institutions misconceives the diversity in aims and purposes of international institutions. Institutions that coordinate morally mandatory aims and institutions that coordinate mutual advantage can both be plausibly understood as coercive, even though their authority differs in scope and in what standards they must satisfy. Finally, I discuss whether the standard of state consent is appropriate for international institutions: while it is plausible for institutions that coordinate mutual advantage, it is implausible as a standard of legitimacy for institutions that coordinate morally mandatory aims – such as institutions of international criminal justice.

This chapter lays out a novel theory of elite cohesion, coercive capacity, and authoritarian social order. Enabling and controlling coercive agents is a fundamental challenge confronting all dictators. Actors like secret police chiefs pose a grave threat to incumbent authoritarian elites because they hold the means of violence and could use them to overthrow their masters. Elites’ task of monitoring and controlling their coercive agents is a collective action problem. All members of an authoritarian ruling coalition are better off if they cooperate to control coercive agents. However, individual authoritarian elites have incentives to defect from cooperation. When authoritarian elites cannot cooperate to prevent insubordination by coercive agents, they reduce coercive capacity. Institutions promote authoritarian elite cohesion. They provide structures of shared expectations or focal points that allow authoritarian elites to pool their resources, cooperate, and control coercive agents. In Cold War communist Central and Eastern Europe, Stalinism was the institutional structure that promoted elite cohesion and led to the construction of large, capable coercive institutions across the region.

This chapter examines the meaning of a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) of the UN Charter, focusing on its required effects, gravity and intention. It analyses the required type of effects, namely, whether they must be physical, the required object/target, the required level of directness between the act and its harmful effects, and if temporary or potential effects count. With respect to gravity, it argues there is no de minimis threshold for a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4) but that gravity is nonetheless relevant to the contextual requirement that the act be in ‘international relations’ and is an indicative element of a ‘use of force’. Finally, it analyses whether a particular intention is required for a ‘use of force’ under article 2(4), examining accident, mistake and coercive and hostile intent. This section considers the relationship between the prohibitions of the ‘threat’ and ‘use’ of force, the non-intervention principle and the object and purpose of article 2(4). It concludes that like gravity, a coercive or hostile intent is relevant to the contextual requirements of article 2(4) and is an indicative element of a ‘use of force’.

In this conclusion, I draw broader lessons for the study of authoritarian regimes from the analyses of this book. I call for greater attention to coercive institutions by scholars of authoritarian politics, and for authoritarian regimes to be theorized as groups rather than unitary actors. I briefly discuss the applicability of my theoretical argument to the Chinese case. Under Mao Zedong, breakdown of elite cohesion during the Cultural Revolution was associated with a decline in the capacity of the Ministry of Public Security. This mirrors reductions in coercive capacity after post-Stalinist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe.