Neighborhood democratization refers to homeowners’ efforts to create a liberal commons in an authoritarian state, or, more specifically, their wresting of control over their neighborhoods through democratic elections from management companies and developers, whose neighborhood dominance local governments often acquiesce in for a variety of reasons. This chapter defines neighborhood democratization, identifies its challenges, and argues that the success or failure of neighborhood democratization depends on how the party-state balances its demand for effective governance and the risk posed by homeowner mobilization and association.

Is the term “authoritarian commons” an oxymoron? No, it is not. It highlights the tension and interaction between homeowners and the authoritarian state. Total party-state control risks eroding party-state legitimacy simply through incompetence, whereas delegating service delivery to independent-minded middle-class residents can endanger party-state control. Overall homeowners appear to represent the best chance of democratizing urban governance in Chinese megacities. Homeowners’ associations have been a rare form through which Chinese citizens can get associated and have real elections recognized by law and respected by the government.

This chapter launches the contemporary section of the book. The overarching argument is that despite the binaries leveraged by leaders and analysts alike, political contestation in the twenty-first century, as in the nineteenth and twentieth, is not reducible to an “Islamist vs. secularist” cleavage. Instead, contestation and key outcomes are driven by shifting coalitions for and against pluralism, notably, an Islamo-liberal/secular liberal coalition that marked the sixth major, pluralizing alignment since the Tanzimat reforms. It would transform state and society, even though the coalition itself proved short-lived as democratization stalled against a backdrop of debates over Islamophobia, the headscarf, minority rights, freedom of expression, media freedoms, and sweeping show trials.

Chapter 9 looks comparatively within monarchies to assess whether the theory contributes to understanding why some monarchies survived and others were overthrown in the past two centuries. It begins by analyzing two datasets of ruling monarchies from the 1800s to the 1900s, showing that monarchies that shared more power with parliaments were less likely to fall to revolutions. It then uses case studies of the Iranian and Nepali monarchies to illustrate how centralizing monarchs made themselves vulnerable to blame and attracted mass opposition, ultimately leading to their downfalls. The chapter suggests that the theory has implications for understanding historical transitions from monarchy, and it underscores that kings who forego their delegation advantage and monopolize power are also vulnerable to being blamed and facing mass opposition when they govern poorly.

Chapter 10 concludes the book. After summarizing the main arguments and findings, the chapter reflects on the book’s implications for understanding the relationship between popular politics, elites, and institutions in authoritarian regimes. In doing so, the chapter also considers how the theory might apply to other types of authoritarian rule, focusing on its application to military regimes in particular. The chapter concludes by discussing how the theory can contribute to understanding democratic transitions, and by reflecting on the similarities and differences between authoritarian and democratic political systems.

The chapter examines the role of forced displacement in increasing the demand for state intervention and expanding the size of the state bureaucracy in West Germany. It discusses the government elites’ strategies for dealing with the needs of expellees and receiving communities and reviews expellees’ ability to influence government policy. Statistical analysis is used to demonstrate that counties with a greater proportion of expellees to population had more civil servants per capita.

The conclusion discusses the benefits of an examination of imperial collapse through streetscapes, highlighting the significance of the urban war experience in this process. In this light, the 1918 revolutionary moment acquires major significance as a complex movement revolving around issues of democratization and social justice, beyond Bolshevik or national revolutions. The everyday experiences of Prague citizens in the First World War and in the transition period nurtured disappointments and expectations that found repercussions in the struggles faced by the First Czechoslovak Republic at home in the interwar years.

This chapter concludes the book offering a final analysis of the story of the continuing Kazakh Spring.

This chapter provides an overview of the literature on labor politics, social movements, and political parties, and locates the main argument in this literature. It operationalizes the two organizational traits, hierarchical relations and factionalism, to show how they produce three strategies. It concludes by laying out the research methods used to carry out the analysis and reach these conclusions.

The high economic growth created jobs to reduce inequality as well as poverty. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the effect was more than offset by other factors, like the widening wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. There was also a large amount of transfer to the rich through the real estate market, while fiscal policy transferred little to the poor. Industrial relations were repressive. In the 1980s, inequality slowed to widen as the offsetting factors weakened and the transfer through the real estate market decreased, but industrial relations became more repressive. South Korea sustained high economic growth through the democratization process because, while staving off a possible disaster, democratization was limited in scope. Democratization failed to narrow inequality as it interacted with other forces, but it led to reforms to enhance the transparency of the economy. Independent unions emerged with democratization, but it aggravated the non-performing loans problem.

This chapter covers: strong belief among economists in the merit of laissez faire, during the nineteenth century; intolerance for government interference; countries’ unification and its impact on the government’s economic role; use of import duties during laissez faire; the impact of the Industrial Revolution on government policies; the growth of urbanization and fall in rural societies; workers become more organized and more unionized; the growth of negative externalities and need for regulations and for taxes to deal with them; the growth of equity concerns while a new rich bourgeoisie comes into existence with the Industrial Revolution, the new rich form a new class and replace the old nobles; the rise of large monopolies and of some very rich individuals while workers’ wages remain low, and working conditions remain poor; socialist views become more popular and strikes more frequent; they also become more violent; and the decline of extended rural-based families creates the need for alternative safety nets.

Populism’s use of democratic practices and sources of authorization to undermine liberal institutions is the latest incarnation of a much older pattern, one inherent to popular sovereignty. I compare historical moments in which the principles of democratic rule and liberalism have been in tension or even seemingly incompatible with each other, the nineteenth-century United Kingdom and United States. By the time democratization appeared in the UK, liberalism was firmly entrenched as a public philosophy, and British liberals accordingly sought to limit the authority of “the people” through exclusions and an insulated and empowered state. In America, a founding moment in the construction of a liberal tradition came after the principle of democracy had been established as a defining principle of the regime. Many of the activists in the abolitionist movement sought to secure liberal principles not by restricting popular influence but by expanding and redefining “the people” so that it would undergird a more liberal political community. Neither of these efforts was successful, but are useful for thinking through similar tensions today.

British and Danish policymakers in the long nineteenth century developed schools to support nation-building, industrialization, and democratization; yet they made different choices about the timing of public-school systems, workers’ access, variation of educational programs, pedagogical methods, and mechanisms for oversight. Beliefs about the purpose of education informed policy choices and fiction writers were important sources of ideas about education. British writers portrayed education as an essential tool for the cognitive development of the child and believed that a well-educated individual should master a prescribed curriculum to attain full selfhood. The right and left disagreed about the advisability of educating workers, yet even many on the left worried that educating the working class could “contaminate” the nation’s culture. Danish writers recognized the value of education for individual self-development, but both left and right also viewed schools for farmers and workers as essential for a strong society. Fiction writers joined political movements to put education and they fulfilled vital services in these movements. They were the spin doctors who provided cognitive frames about educational problems and solutions, and they popularized social problems with vivid, emotional language. A chorus of literary voices provided the soundtrack, inspiration, and subliminal messaging for campaigns supporting school development.