The US–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) introduced a new compliance institution for labor rights in trade agreements: the facility-specific Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (RRM). The RRM was developed to tackle one particular thorn in the side of North American integration – labor rights for Mexican workers – as it had had detrimental, long-term political–economic consequences for the US–Mexico trade relationship. This article reviews the unique political–economic moment in the United States and Mexico that prompted the creation of this tool. It describes how the RRM works and the considerable financial and human resources the US and Mexican governments deployed to operationalize it. The article then reports a number of stylized facts on how governments used the RRM during its first three years, largely in the auto sector. It proposes paths of potentially fruitful political–economic research to aid understanding of the full implications of the RRM and concludes with preliminary lessons as well as a discussion on the potential for policymakers to assess facility-specific mechanisms for labor or other issues, such as the environment, in future economic agreements.

In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the EU and most other advanced economies imposed extensive sanctions on Russia, intending to harm its production capabilities and hinder its economic activities by restricting its access to international trade and financial markets. This paper develops an empirical framework based on the synthetic control method to assess the impact of the war and the following sanctions on bilateral and sectoral exports to Russia almost in real time. The war and the following sanctions reduced aggregate exports to Russia by a third between March and December 2022, with the effects being stronger for sanctioning countries than for non-sanctioning ones, albeit with substantial country-level heterogeneity within each group. Exports to Russia in high-tech sectors – relatively more targeted by trade sanctions – have been disproportionately affected.

Our paper sheds light on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) cooperation among trading countries. We contribute to the existing literature a data-driven analysis on the effectiveness of various forms (in monetary value, duration, and diversification) of SPS related technical assistance received by 33 countries from 1993 to 2015. The World Trade Organization's (WTO's) SPS Agreement encourages biosecurity for countries through technical assistance, to safeguard human health and productivity from contamination by biological hazards (pests, pathogens, or invasive species). Our panel model finds that WTO's SPS program encourages simultaneously agricultural trade and biosecurity. We implement a Multiple Indicator Solution (MIS) to correct bias from the endogenous technical assistance. The effectiveness of technical assistance depends on geography and the level of development among the heterogeneous countries referred to in our data. This investment in biosecurity benefits both donors and recipients of technical assistance. Based on our results donors should be encouraged to invest in countries with below average resources and abilities.

China has been one of the most important sources of growth in global wine demand this century, accounting for 7% of the world's wine consumption and imports by 2017, or four times its 2005 shares. But China's per capita wine consumption peaked in 2012, has fallen every year since 2017, and in 2022 was one-third of its peak, and its imports have more than halved since 2017. Certainly, the COVID-19 disruption and associated slowdown in China's income growth would account for some of that. However, the fall in China's alcohol consumption began three years earlier, and between 2019 and 2022, the fall was considerably larger for wine (47%) than for spirits (17%) and beer (3%). Thus, wine's share of alcohol consumption in China fell by two-fifths over those three years. The article speculates on the reasons behind the dramatic downturn in this globally important market and finishes by imagining future trends and drawing implications for wine-exporting countries.

The 1980s and 1990s saw a policy revolution in developing countries in which many highly protected (if not closed) economies were opened to world trade. These reforms were largely undertaken unilaterally, but international economic institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization supported these efforts. This paper examines the ways in which these institutions promoted, or failed to promote, trade policy reform during this pivotal period.

While the theory of economic policy offers a potential framework for thinking about the joint pursuit of economic objectives (EOs) and non-economic objectives (NEOs), over time the theory of economic policy was formalized in a way that considers NEOs as constraints that are given, rather than as goals that may themselves be endogenous alongside EOs. We examine the analytical treatment of NEOs as co-determined with EOs, revisiting some of the ground broken by Alan Winters in his analysis of NEOs. We review the place of NEOs in the theory of economic policy, discuss current practice in the representation of such objectives as exogenous constraints, and develop an argument for representation of NEOs as objectives in themselves.

Over the past three decades, tariff protection to farmers has fallen and partly been replaced by domestic support, whilst support for farmers in some emerging economies has grown. Against that backdrop, this paper provides new estimates of national economic impacts of global agricultural tariffs and domestic supports. Using the latest global economy-wide GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model calibrated to 2017, we simulate (a) the removal of food and agricultural domestic supports and agri-food tariffs and (b) the removal also of tariffs on imports of non-agricultural goods. We find that agricultural support policies are still an important part of the global welfare cost of all goods’ trade-restrictive policies (albeit only half as costly as in 2001), and tariffs still dominate the global welfare cost of all farm-support programs. That farm support could be re-instrumented to relieve natural resource and environmental stresses, boost food and nutrition security, and alleviate poverty and income inequality.

We analyse the ‘indirect effects’ of Brexit on African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries’ exports that use the UK as a platform to access the EU market and vice versa. First, we use the EORA26 multi-region input–output database for 186 countries and 26 sectors to characterize the ACP domestic content embedded in bilateral trade between the UK and the EU. Second, we apply the GTAP-VA module to carry out a simulation of how the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement will impinge on 121 countries and 65 products. The results suggest that while ‘indirect effects’ on ACP countries’ exports may exist, their economic magnitude is small in aggregate because ACP countries supply only small amounts of inputs used in UK–EU bilateral trade. Our simulations also show that these effects may be offset by the likely increase in ACP domestic content in exports because of TCA friction, mainly towards the UK.

The trade of intermediates now accounts for a growing share of global trade. In this highly fragmented global production system, any change in tariff rates can generate a higher impact than that of initial direct tariffs. To assess the impact of tariffs on global value chain participation, this study uses value-added trade statistics and cumulative tariff rates for 12 sectors from 168 countries for the years 1990–2015. The visual inspection suggests that initial tariffs result in higher tariff rates (almost 14%) due to a knock-on impact along with supply chains. The main empirical finding is that both faced and imposed tariff rates have significant negative impacts on sectoral global value chain participation. The effect is also persistent in the analysis if we employ cumulative tariff rates. Apart from these policy determinants, sector- and country-level endowments, such as higher relative length, capital intensity, foreign direct investment stock, and human capital appear to be the major drivers for higher total, forward, and backward global value chains participation. Even if our main results are robust, there are also some distinctions in the effects of tariff rates depending on the country- and sector-level heterogeneities. In a policy-related debate, given the cascading impacts of these liberalization initiatives, autonomous, regional, and global liberalization efforts are critical for all sectors to reap the benefits from the global production system.

This article reviews Adam Smith’s clearly articulated views about the desirability of free trade and his equally strong view on the necessity of sound institutions and ‘the tolerable administration of justice’ as key ingredients of successful economic management. It starts with Smith’s views on free trade and shows how pertinent they are to today’s high-level trade policy challenges. It then considers a more detailed day-to-day instrument of policy—the Trade Remedies Authority (TRA). Following Brexit, the TRA was created as an arms-length body for investigating cases for granting temporary import restrictions to specific products according to a reasonably well-defined objective process. The article demonstrates how, over the first 2 years of its life, the TRA has been reduced from a useful administrative instrument to a fig leaf for a political process for granting protection to petitioners. Unfortunately, this tendency to displace analytical approaches to policy by purely political ones can now be observed in many activities of UK governance.

In an era where legally binding international trade agreements are increasingly shaping domestic regulation in a wide range of areas, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between the US, Australia, Japan and nine other Pacific Rim Countries, representing over 40% of world trade, has been described as setting the standards for 21st century trade agreements. This article analyses why the negotiations have dragged on for 5 years, and the resistance to the potential impacts of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement on national democratic decision-making on health, environmental and other public interest regulation.

The Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) is currently being negotiated between the US, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, Peru, Chile, Vietnam and Malaysia. The TPPA is intended to multilateralise the bilateral legally binding agreements the US has with four of these countries, including Australia, as the building block for a legally binding Free Trade Agreement in the Asia Pacific area. The TPPA re-opens many of the issues debated in the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement in 2004. These include pressures from US industry groups for changes to Australian regulation like the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, regulation and labelling of genetically engineered foods and local content rules for Australian media. The paper analyses the endurance of the agenda despite the changes of government in the US and Australia since 2004, and discusses the contradictions and uncertainties of the strategy in Australia and in the Asia Pacific.

In the context of the working-class backlash against free trade represented by Brexit, the recent surge of right-wing political parties in Europe and the 2016 US presidential election, it is timely to take stock of the threats to jobs and wages posed by recent negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The European Commission selectively relied on econometric analyses, predicting a positive impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Its proposed legal text on ‘Trade and sustainable development’ fell short of the European Parliament’s negotiating guidelines, which themselves failed to ensure protection of labour standards. The activities of corporate lobbies threatened the effective protection of workers’ rights. Major risks to workers’ rights are posed by discrepancies between US and European Union labour and social law and labour standards. The most recent legal text lacks compliance monitoring provisions and sanction mechanisms against member states failing to ratify core labour conventions. The investment court system does not resolve the problems of the discredited investor-state dispute settlement mechanism for which it is the proposed replacement. The year 2016 has provided a foretaste of the dislocation likely from trade and investment regulation that sees social and environmental standards and labour rights simply as barriers to corporate profits.

In the wake of the global financial crisis, unemployment rates and openness to trade have been the subject of considerable research, especially in developing countries. This study analyses the impacts of trade policy on unemployment rates in Nigeria. Using time series data from 1970 to 2010, it adopts the vector error correction methodology. In order to explore the impact of a range of variables on the relationship between trade openness and national unemployment rates, these variables, in a system of equations, include measures of trade openness, public recurrent spending on education, foreign price shocks and real gross domestic product or alternatively income per capita. The findings reveal that in the long run, real output and income per capita lead to a decline in unemployment, but trade openness policy is associated with an increase in unemployment. Foreign policy shocks, as proxied by commodity prices, also exert a positive effect on unemployment rates and do not contribute subsequently to restoring the system to equilibrium. However, the initial impact of openness and foreign price shocks captured by short-term dynamics are observed to reduce unemployment.

Trade issues lie at the heart of the two biggest constitutional challenges the UK has faced in decades: Brexit and Scottish independence. Brexit has demonstrated the economic importance of borders and led to renewed calls for Scottish independence. While there are a range of possible trading arrangements an independent Scotland could pursue, all of them involve economically significant change. In this paper, we describe Scottish trade patterns and review the range of options that a newly independent Scotland might have for its trading arrangements. We then model the relative economic importance of these different potential trading arrangements.

The existing literature shows that transparency and monitoring reduce trade costs, improve regulatory practices and build and sustain trust. In this paper, using 555 specific trade concerns (STCs) raised by the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) committee in the period 1995–2018, we develop a novel classification of STCs. We distinguish between STCs aiming to exchange information (transparency STCs) and those aiming to monitor compliance with the TBT agreement (monitoring STCs). We show that: (i) when STCs intend to foster transparency, they are mainly used in relation to notified measures, thus suggesting that they are used to acquire not only new but also higher quality information than that provided merely by notifications; (ii) when STCs intend to challenge the compliance of WTO members with the TBT Agreement, they primarily address draft measures, thus suggesting that they are used to promote accountability and improve good regulatory practices; and (iii) STCs raised at the draft stage are less likely to escalate to a dispute than those raised on adopted measures. Guided by these findings, we suggest the potential for some reforms to improve the efficiency of the system. These include: introducing a reporting system on the outcome of STCs; using STCs raised in committees to fill the gap of missing notifications; systematically using the STC mechanism at the stage of draft measures; and building in the dispute settlement system the requirement to raise the matter and discuss it within the relevant committee before filing a formal dispute settlement case.

Unhappy with the rulings of the WTO dispute settlement system, which disproportionately targeted US use of trade remedies, the United States ended the entire system in 2019. There are multiple hurdles to agreeing to new terms of trade remedy use and thus potentially restoring some form of binding dispute settlement. First, a change would affect access to policy flexibility by the now large number of users of trade remedies. Second, although China's exports are the overwhelming target of trade remedies, exporters in other countries increasingly find themselves caught up in trade remedy actions linked to China. Third, critical differences posed by China's economic model may call for new rules for trade remedies, but no consensus on those rules has emerged. Even some of the most promising reforms have practical limitations, create additional challenges, or may be politically unviable.

The stalling of WTO multilateralism and the proliferation of preferential trade agreements in recent decades have drawn substantial attention to the impacts of preferential liberalization. A critical question is how they affect the trade barriers imposed against outsiders. I examine the relationship between preferential trade liberalization and protection against non-member countries by testing the predictions of a political–economy model based on the previous literature. Focusing on a specific model allows me to uncover the mechanisms via which preferential liberalization affects external import protection, whereas most of the existing literature has focused on establishing the sign of the effect only. Furthermore, I focus on not only tariffs, as most studies do, but also on the temporary trade barriers of antidumping and safeguards. I test the predictions for Latin America and obtain results that provide solid evidence supporting two mechanisms from the theory, which lead to lower protection against non-members of a preferential trade agreement. First, a lower preferential import protection level means that the increase in preferential imports from increasing the external tariff creates a smaller increase in tariff revenue. Second, as preferential import protection is cut, there is a decrease in the markup and sales of domestic firms, and thus raising the external import protection generates less profit. Moreover, this second effect is present when the political motivation of the government is sufficiently strong.

Legitimate reasons for the imposition of non-tariff measures (NTMs) within regulations have triggered their extensive use. Among these measures, technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures allow countries to impose restrictions on the import of low-quality products suspected of harming domestic consumers’ health, plant life, or the environment. This paper analyses two regulative and standard-like NTMs – TBTs and SPS measures – and the quality of traded products that is driven by their imposition, which is a general underlying motive for the adoption of such regulations. A dummy variable measuring the existence of these NTMs and a count variable indicating their stringency are used in the analysis. Moreover, two other variables indicate flows of NTMs imposed in each year and stocks of these NTMs accumulated over years. The results indicate that TBTs and SPS measures do indeed imply a higher quality of traded products. Stringent TBTs with more regulations imposed in each year (i.e. flows of count TBTs) have the largest impact on the quality of traded products. However, for SPS measures, only the existence of a regulation (i.e. the dummy variable on flows of SPS measures) on a traded product has the strongest impact on its quality.

The tariff preferences in FTAs do not apply automatically to all imports. Instead, importers can request to use the tariff preferences, but must then show that the imported goods fulfil the formal requirements (e.g. rules of origin) of the FTA. This is costly, which is a likely reason why tariff preferences are not always used. This research note examines preference utilization under the FTA between the EU and South Korea, which was formally ratified in 2015 (but had been provisionally applied from 2011). We use firm and transaction level data for Swedish imports from South Korea during November 2016 to answer the question ‘Who uses the EU's FTAs?’ With information on firm size, product category, import mode (direct imports or customs warehousing), preference margin, potential duty savings, and transaction size, we provide a detailed picture of when firms choose to utilize the tariff preferences. The results suggest that the differences across importers are not primarily related to firm size, as is sometimes suggested in extant literature. We also find that it is the size of the import transaction rather than the size of the preference margin that determines preference utilization.