In international affairs, legal arguments and political actions shape each other. Unlike in domestic affairs, there is no enforcement authority, and hence there is much debate over how international law affects politics. Many existing approaches do not help us to assess what implementation efforts tell us about a state’s commitment to international law. Some study the effect of law on state behaviour but have a too static understanding of law and state preferences. Others focus on the justificatory discourse that accompanies norm implementation but do not assess individual states’ commitment to contested norms. This chapter studies what a state’s effort to implement a norm tells us about its sense of obligation towards that norm. I propose there are three signposts of obligation in the words and actions that accompany a state’s norm implementation: consistency, publicity, and engagement with the international community. I show that depending on whether the behaviour and discourse of a state displays a strong or weak sense of obligation, we can characterise a state’s norm implementation as exposing weak or strong normative influence or discursive or behavioral norm avoidance. I illustrate these different degrees with cases that involve a variety of different norms and states.

The Cambridge Platonists’ philosophy of religion might be summed up as a tension between their commitment to the fixed nature of reason and goodness on the one hand and a commitment to freedom and distaste for all forms of tyranny and imposition on the other. This last chapter contends that the Cambridge Platonists not only acknowledge this tension, but embrace it, revelling in the paradoxical way that absolute fixedness and absolute freedom come together at the highest levels of being. This is made possible by what Stephen Darwall (writing specifically of Cudworth) has identified as an early theory of ‘practical reason’. This Platonic theory of practical reason draws together all the elements of the Cambridge Platonists’ outlook considered in earlier chapters – moral realism, divine communicative intent, and participatory epistemology, illustrating the extent to which this Platonic outlook binds together not only the thought of Whichcote, More, Cudworth and Smith but also runs through each of their views on different philosophical topics such as obligation, freedom and pedagogy.

This chapter focuses on the ways in which English infantrymen understood duty and how their perceptions of their military role drew both on military and civilian culture. It underlines the differences between officers’ and other ranks’ understanding of their obligations. The army itself defined duty, like morale, as a set of ‘moral’ criteria. Officers’ duties were defined in their commissions and the King’s Regulations; their duty, at least to their men, was of an infinite nature. In contrast, the rank-and-file’s ‘contract’ with the military was finite and secular. In 1914, regulars viewed their job with a clinical and professional eye. However, for reservists and the civilian soldiers that followed them, the idea of ‘doing one’s bit’ came to dominate their perception of duty. Importantly, though, the cultural pressure of ‘respectability’ (drawn from both the military and civil society) informed their rationalisation of service. ‘Military cultures’ were also influential, particularly those of cheerfulness and obedience, which informed men’s actions, attitudes, and performance. What is more, the need to maintain ‘good character’ also exerted its own pressures. Men’s wartime record would influence their prospects once peace returned. Significant, too, was the soldiers’ perceived duty to England. After all, they were the defenders of the homeland.

The following chapters examine the theoretical upshots of the positive epistemological view proposed in this book. The account developed so far delivers the result that epistemic justifiers constitute epistemic oughts. In this chapter, I discuss the worry that such accounts threaten to give rise to widely spread epistemic dilemmas between paradigmatic epistemic norms. I argue for a modest scepticism about epistemic dilemmas. In order to do that, I first point out that not all normative conflicts constitute dilemmas: more needs to be the case. Second, I look into the moral dilemmas literature and identify a set of conditions that need to be at work for a mere normative conflict to be a genuine normative dilemma. Last, I argue that while our epistemic life is peppered with epistemic normative conflict, epistemic dilemmas are much harder to find than we thought.

This chapter examines the first idea-complex of equality and obligation evident in WTO law by identifying each of its constituent elements and their inter-relationship as a coherent whole, that is, the way they align and thread together. The WTO Agreement’s focus on equality and distributive justice begets a primary emphasis in law on obligation, which in turn gives rise to a constitutive structure that is prospectively oriented and reasoned deductively.

The issue of consent to international law obligations and liabilities remains both highly complex in theory and extremely relevant in practice. Although the topic has been addressed quite regularly in the form of articles and chapters, there have been, surprisingly for such a central topic, few monographs on consent to international law in general and no edited volume in English language. Re-examining the issue of consent to international law in depth and in the contemporary circumstances of international law is a timely project therefore. The best way to do so in a rich and nuanced way is to give a voice to many authors at the same time, and this is the purpose of this collection of essays. This introduction sets the volume’s stage: first, it clarifies the relevance of the issue and the reasons that led to putting the book together; second, it introduces the main conceptual and normative challenges addressed in the volume and explains what it hopes to achieve; third, it provides some information about how the book is structured; and, finally, it sketches out the content of its successive chapters and their articulation.

Of particular concern in the literature on business is the importance of trust and the disabling consequences of broken trust on business partnerships. Chapter 3 draws on extensive interviews in exploring the issue of trust, and reports novel findings which lead to new theoretical formulations. It has been central in sociological understanding that embeddedness in social and business exchanges generates and maintains interpersonal trust. Should opportunistic behaviour or violation of trust occur it is routinely assumed that such breaches would be exposed or punished, including reputation loss and exclusion from future exchange opportunities. What is less explored is that breaches of trust in many instances may not lead to disclosure of such a behaviour or termination of exchange relationships. Chapter 3 expands our understanding of broken trust. It identifies and explores mechanisms which operate in avoidance of confrontation, exposure and retaliation in instances of breaches of trust and also strategies employed by entrepreneurs in continuation of exchange relationships with violators of trust. The chapter examines underexplored aspects of the complexity and dynamics of business exchange relations and points to a rethinking of trust and social exchange.

Ethics has tended to concentrate on (1) what we should do, (2) virtues of character, or (3) the importance of motivation in appraising actions. All three are ethically important. But there is a dimension of moral responsibility that should have a place beside obligations to act, virtues of character, and appraisals of actions in relation to their motivation. It is the manner of actions. This can be right or wrong, an object of intention, and behavior for a reason. Interpersonal relations are not a behavioral grid with fixed points representing only act-types. This chapter explores manners of action. The result is a wider conception of acting rightly than the common understanding on which (despite the adverb) it is simply doing the right thing; a partial account of how acting rightly figures in the content of intention; and a sketch of the moral dimensions of the manners in which we act.

Actions are not merely what we do but essentially connected with intentionality, particularly beliefs and intentions, and thereby with the will. Some actions are basic; others we do by doing something basically – “at will.” Act-types are the kind of thing we can exemplify repeatedly or multiple agents can exemplify simultaneously, say speaking. Act-tokens are individual actions tied to a particular agent, time, and mode of performance. Ethics must address both: types as contents of intentions and primary indicators of obligations, and tokens as morally significant in ways that, like their underlying motives, are not fixed by their type. This chapter also clarifies control of action, direct and indirect. It is not just basic acts that are under direct voluntary control; most of the salient manners of our actions are. Moral obligation and moral responsibility for action extend to those as well as to the acts they color – or discolor.

The theory of obligation addresses the central ethical question of what we ought to do. The theory of moral creditworthiness concerns motivation appropriate to fulfilling obligation. The theory of manners of actions concerns how they are performed. The triple-barreled theory of moral conduct the book develops integrates these dimensions of behavior. The theory covers obligatory deeds – the types of things we ought to do – the vehicles of conduct: concrete doings that are right or wrong in virtue of their type, morally or non-morally motivated by intentions that explain them, and morally appropriate or inappropriate in manner in virtue of how they are performed. Among the central moral principles examined are those of justice and harm-avoidance, veracity and fidelity, beneficence and self-improvement, and reparation and gratitude. How are these to be understood? Are some reducible to others? This chapter clarifies these principles through both narrative examples and conceptual exploration.

In this chapter, we consider a group of philosophers who formed their views in opposition to voluntarist natural law. Although there are important differences between Spinoza, Cudworth, Shaftesbury, and Leibniz, all four were united by their opposition to voluntarism. For voluntarists, even natural law is a kind of positive law since it is created by God’s discretionary imposition. Against this, Cudworth complained that voluntarism makes morality “positive, arbitrary and factitious only” and unable to explain morality’s “eternal and immutable” character. Leibniz was also a critic of positivist law, and he subversively reinterprets law in terms of love. Justice, he says, is the “charity of the wise.” For his part, Spinoza opposes not just positivist law but law itself. Indeed, although his great metaphysical work is titled Ethics, it constitutes nothing less than a metaphysical reduction of ethical or normative categories. At the same time, he develops a deeply attractive account of human freedom that inspired thinkers to come (including Nietzsche). Shaftesbury draws mostly from Cudworth, but in a way that gives rise to the moral sense tradition of Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith.

No philosopher is more strongly associated with deontological ethics or is a more canonical modern moral philosopher than Immanuel Kant. In this chapter, we focus on Kant, though we begin, after a brief introduction of Kant and his historico-philosophical significance, with Rousseau. Rousseau is best known as a political philosopher, but there are elements of his thought that have great importance for moral philosophy and its history and, especially, for Kant. Kant credits Rousseau as the source of his signature claim of the equal dignity of rational persons. And Rousseau’s conception of political society as an “association” that “defend[s] and protect[s] the person and goods of each associate with the full common force,” but where each “nevertheless obey[s] only himself,” has obvious resonances with Kant’s “kingdom of ends” in which all are governed by self-legislated law. At the same time, Rousseau offers important points of contrast to Kant. Whereas Rousseau’s emphasis is essentially social and political, Kant will attempt to argue for morality as a common law binding all agents that is grounded in practical reason alone. Rousseau, by contrast, points toward an alternative grounding in sociability that is reminiscent more of Grotius, Pufendorf, Smith, and Reid.

In “Modern Moral Philosophy” Anscombe famously argues against the main thrust of European ethical philosophy since the mid-seventeenth century. Her main complaint is that the conceptual structure of modern moral philosophy – focusing on obligation, duty, right, and wrong, rather than the classical Greek focus of virtue and the good life – cannot be sustained without divine legislation, which many moderns have tried to avoid. Modern Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to Kant will carefully analyze both canonical and lesser known texts to demonstrate that philosophers of the period have resources to answer Anscombe’s Challenge. Many of the philosophers studied were central in this: early modern natural lawyers Grotius, Pufendorf, and Hobbes; critics of natural law, like Leibniz and Shaftesbury; moral sentimentalists Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith; rationalists like Clarke, Price, and Reid; and, of course, Kant. One of the most interesting sources of response is a connection many philosophers made between morality and accountability and insights they had about the psychological prerequisites and presuppositions of accountability.

Hugo Grotius is best known as one of the originators of international law. Philosophers of the period also saw him as making a fundamental break with ancient philosophy and Thomistic classical natural law deriving from Aristotle. Grotius carried forward an important distinction made by Francisco Suarez between “law” and “counsel.” Good moral reasons may counsel action without yet requiring it. Law, by contrast, obligates, and obligation is conceptually related to accountability. It concerns what we would be blameworthy for failing to do without excuse. Grotius develops a theory of natural rights and law and sets the philosophical agenda by asking what could ground such a law (Anscombe’s Challenge). His response is human “sociability,” by which he means not simply any desire to affiliate, but the drive to live with others on terms of mutual accountability.

This chapter describes the development of prosocial motives and the social contexts within which these motives emerge and differentiate. Initially, prosocial behavior is based on a blend of motives, namely, participating in social interaction and early forms of feeling for others. During early childhood, concern-based guilt emerges and mere participation transforms into contributing to collaborative activities. During childhood, the normative turn complements these motives by a sense of obligation (living up to), and, during adolescence, aspiring to one’s ideal self can become an important prosocial motive. In this sense, doing good often is an expression of central human motives, namely, belonging to others, feeling for others, contributing to joint endeavors, affirming a sense of responsibility and normative obligation, and striving for our ideal selves.