Modern capitalism and globalisation rely on the free movement of capital across borders. Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is unusual in applying not just to movement between Member States, but also to capital movements between Member States and third countries. It makes all measures which deter foreign investment unlawful, unless they can be shown to serve a public interest aim and be proportionate. Those principles have been applied to rules on land ownership, taxation and also to golden shares: a mechanism by which governments retain an influence over privatised strategic industries. That influence, because it serves the public interest and not profit, is considered by the Court of Justice likely to deter investors. The implicit view that any constraints on companies which hinder their profit-making are prima facie contrary to Article 63 is controversial. On the other hand, the Treaty also recognises the need for many restrictions on free movement of capital, to protect the cohesion of tax systems, or as part of sanctions or measures against money laundering.

Chapter 3 establishes the nexus between South African policies on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and their defiance thereof, and the continued parallel development of nuclear weapons. Drawing on recently declassified documents, I trace the national position of the South African government on NPT accession and the application of IAEA safeguards over the 1980s. Most importantly, the focus lies on domestic decision-making and how a small number of people in the South African government decided whether to sign the NPT. This also includes a careful analysis of Pretoria’s relations with the US government under President Ronald Reagan and related exchanges with the IAEA Secretariat under its Director-General Hans Blix, developing in parallel over the period from 1981 to 1988.

With a focus on the African Union, this chapter examines the Security Council’s practices when interacting with regional organisations in collaborative peace operations. The Security Council plays a critical role in two ways: (i) it identifies security threats and the required responses, and it authorises UN missions to deal with them; and (ii) it determines the role, if any, to be played by regional organisations and authorises the action they can take to address threats to peace in their regions. Africa is both the site of conflicts that have necessitated UN peace operations or the Council’s authorisation of enforcement actions, as in Libya in 2011, and home to that regional organisation which has engaged the most with the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. The overarching argument of this chapter is that – notwithstanding changes in the post-Cold-War international political landscape and the rise of other voices from the periphery – the status of the Security Council as custodian of the collective security system remains undiminished. Its centrality and primacy have not been challenged or usurped by the African Union or other regional organisations.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is essential for nuclear disarmament and world peace. This chapter compares three dispute-settling mechanisms in the NPT legal complex using the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) as an example: political measures, non-compliance mechanisms (NCMs), and international courts and tribunals (ICTs). It evaluates the value of each mechanism to ensure Iran’s compliance with its commitments. The discussion includes NCMs like the JCPOA and the UN Security Council regimes and ICT proceedings like ICJ (International Court of Justice) and CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union). Fact-finding processes at the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) are also emphasized. Finally, the relevance of these models for climate change, environmental protection, and creating a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone is discussed.

This chapter describes the first week of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the immediate sanctions and export control measures that followed. While focusing on the U.S. response, it describes key steps taken by the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Australia, and others. The chapter links developments in the ground war to the key economic responses by the forces aligned against Russia. As the extent of the Russian invasion became clear, sanctions were announced and subsequently ratcheted up extremely rapidly. The chapter also highlights the extraordinarily coordinated nature of the sanctions response.

This chapter discusses restrictions on the import of Russian oil and natural gas into the U.S. and Europe. The chapter also situates this discussion in the context of European dependence on Russian energy supplies and resulting difficulties in enacting energy-related sanctions and trade restrictions. It discusses how a price cap was implemented in order to make energy-related sanctions placed on Russia more effective. Finally, it considers how policymakers are attempting to balance current energy needs with longer-term goals like reducing dependence on Russian energy supplies and building towards a more sustainable future.

This chapter explores the extraterritorial application of the U.S. sanctions: namely, the ability of those sanctions regulations to reach non-U.S. actors or activities taking place outside of the United States. The chapter examines a recent trend towards increasing extraterritorial enforcement by the U.S. sanctions authority. In particular, the chapter discusses the objections of China to such extraterritorial application of U.S. sanctions laws. Of particular focus are Russia’s and China’s attempts to de-dollarize and resort to alternative financial networks to lessen the impact of these sanctions.

By the end of 2022, the sanctions were voluminous. But the economic and other measures deployed against Russia were not as comprehensive as other sanctions regimes had been. Technically, the sanctions remained targeted. There was no comprehensive trade embargo, for example, against Russia by the United States or the European Union. Regulated parties, however, tended toward overcompliance; companies also ceased to do business with Russia for reputational reasons. These trends meant that the implementation of targeted sanctions often resembled comprehensive ones in practice. But the Russia sanctions were not so sweeping as those imposed upon Cuba, Iran, North Korea, or Syria, for instance.

This chapter considers the impact of the sanctions in the short-term: both the economic impact on the Russian state and the Russian people, as well as sanctions’ failure to prevent further military action by Russia in Ukraine. Unintended knock-on or ripple effects of the sanctions are also discussed, as are the effects of the sanctions on world trading patterns and the economic health of other nations. The chapter also considers the potential long-term effects of sanctions on the Russian economy.

This chapter provides an in-depth look at how the sanctions regulations have affected finance and currency flows around the world. It examines SWIFT, the inter-bank worldwide messaging system, and how certain Russian banks were eventually banned from the platform. The chapter discusses correspondent banking, in which banks hold accounts for each other, and payment systems, which serve a variety of functions including facilitating the conversion of currencies. It examines how the sanctions disrupted the ability of Russian banks to carry out business using these tools.

This chapter discusses the disruptions to the world food and fertilizer supply arising in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This chapter discusses the humanitarian impacts of sanctions, both in terms of the sanctions against Russia and with respect to the use of sanctions more generally.

This chapter details the basic structure of sanctions and export control regimes, and describes the sanctions programs that were in place or developed within the last ten years. It briefly discusses the most comprehensive sanctions regimes, including those imposed by the U.S. against Iran, Cuba, Syria, and North Korea. This section focuses in particular on the structure of sanctions regulations before 2022 applicable to Russia. These sanctions were more limited in nature, but were enacted with increasing frequency and scope in the immediate years before the invasion, responding to a growing list of threats from within Russia related to cyber attacks, interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea.

This chapter reviews how the recent sanctions have been enforced, both by domestic authorities and through multilateral cooperation. chapter also examines strategies taken by would-be sanctions evaders to conceal their attempts to circumvent the broad sanctions. Enforcement plays a key role in the ability of the sanctioning jurisdictions to effectively implement their sanctions and incentivize change in the behavior of the target or by parties indirectly affected by the sanctions.

Chapter 4 focuses on Chinese coercion in the East China Sea, where China has maritime territorial and jurisdictional disputes with Japan. I explain the trend of Chinese coercion in the East China Sea while conducting two in-depth case studies: the Sino-Japan boat clash incident of 2010 and the incident of Senkaku nationalization in 2012. As the cost-balancing theory argues, the costs and benefits of coercion explain when and how China coerces. In the pre-2005 period, the need to establish resolve was generally low, whereas the economic cost was high. China, therefore, refrained from coercion. The need to establish resolve was briefly higher in 1996 and 1997, but China did not utilize coercion in these cases because of its equally high need for resolve and high economic costs. Because the East China Sea is not China’s core interest, its issue importance is not sufficiently high to justify the use of coercion. When the need to establish a reputation for resolve is high and the economic cost low, China used coercion, as seen in the post-2005 trend and, in particular, the 2010 and 2012 cases. It refrained using from military coercion for fear of potential geopolitical backlash.

Chapter 6 turns to Chinese coercion regarding foreign leaders’ reception of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader. China did not use coercion against European states over the Dalai Lama visits in the pre-2002 period, despite a high need to establish a reputation for resolve in the 1996–2002 period. The cost-balancing theory would have predicted China would use coercion in this period because Tibet is a core-interest issue. This slight deviance from the theory suggests that China’s economic costs with respect to the United States and Europe, in general, trumped other factors in China’s coercion calculus prior to 2002. Except for during the 1996–2002 period, the patterns of Chinese coercion are in line with the theory’s predictions. Furthermore, China did not coerce all the states that receive the Dalai Lama in the post-2006 period. Instead, it focused on major European countries because the need to establish a reputation for resolve was high in major European countries, whereas the economic cost had lowered. This chapter indicates that the cost-balancing theory does not apply only to security issues but can also generalize to political issues, such as visits with the Dalai Lama.

Chapter 5 looks at Chinese coercion regarding Taiwan, involving foreign arms sales to Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995 and 1996. China used moderate coercion measures toward the United States over arms sales to Taiwan until 2008. The cost-balancing theory does not perfectly explain the 1992 case of US weapons sales to Taiwan, which instead highlighted economic concerns. As for the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, China escalated to militarized coercion, the magnitude of which was the greatest among all cases of Chinese coercion concerning territorial disputes, Taiwan, and Tibet in the post-Cold War era, because Taiwan is a “core interest.” This chapter demonstrates the significance of the issue importance variable in issues involving Taiwan and shows that the cost-balancing theory travels beyond territorial disputes. This suggests that because Taiwan continues to be one of China’s core interests, it is highly likely China will resort to military coercion again in the future. In particular, if Taiwan decides to pursue judiciary independence, then it is highly likely that China will resort to military coercion, or even the use of force.

Chapter 3 examines Chinese coercion in the South China Sea. My previous work examines the overall trends of Chinese coercion in the South China Sea. I find that China used coercion in the 1990s because of the high need to establish a reputation for resolve and low economic cost. China used militarized coercion because the US withdrawal from the Subic Bay in Southeast Asia and the focus on Europe reduced China’s geopolitical backlash cost of using coercion. China then refrained from coercion from 2000 to 2006 because of the high economic cost and low need to establish a reputation for resolve. It began to use coercion again after 2007, but because of the increasing geopolitical backlash cost since the post-2000 period, Chinese coercion remains nonmilitarized, which includes economic sanctions and gray-zone coercion. This chapter also examines three case studies – the cross-national comparison of China’s coercion against the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, the Sino-Philippine Mischief Reef incident in 1995, and the Sino-Philippine Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012. These case studies demonstrate that the mechanisms of the cost-balancing theory are present in them.