Historians have tended to view postwar labor migration, including the Turkish-German case, as a one-directional story whose consequences manifested within host country borders. This chapter complicates this narrative by arguing that Turkish migrants were mobile border crossers who traveled as tourists throughout Western Europe and took annual vacations to their homeland. These seasonal remigrations entailed a three-day car ride across Central Europe and the Balkans at the height of the Cold War. The drive traversed an international highway (Europastraße 5) extending from West Germany to Turkey through Austria, socialist Yugoslavia, and communist Bulgaria. Migrants’ unsavory travel experiences along the way underscored East/West divides, and they transmuted their disdain for the “East” onto their impoverished home villages. Moreover, the cars and “Western” consumer goods they transported reshaped their identities. Those in the homeland came to view the Almancı as superfluous spenders who were spending their money selfishly rather than for the good of their communities. Overall, the idea that a migrant could become German shows that those in the homeland could intervene from afar in debates about German identity amid rising racism: although many derided Turks as unable to integrate, they had integrated enough to face difficulties reintegrating into Turkey.

This chapter considers the process by which an intelligence transfer of power took place in British India. This event ran parallel to, but was conducted in a very different manner and resulted in quite different outcomes from, the political decolonisation of South Asia. The chapter examines plans hatched by the British Security and Secret Intelligence Services to maintain an intelligence foothold in the subcontinent and unpicks how such schemes fostered a bitter and protracted struggle for bureaucratic power and influence between MI5 and MI6. It probes debates held at the highest levels within the British government over whether covert action should be undertaken in independent India, by whom, and to what purpose. It interrogates the efficacy of Indian agency in negotiating the security challenges confronted by an under-resourced post-colonial state, and that counterparts in the West (and the Eastern bloc) saw as a valuable Cold War prize.

Spying in South Asia examines the misguided and self-defeating Cold War interventions undertaken by British and American intelligence and security agencies in post-colonial India. British and American policymakers mounted intelligence operations in the Indian subcontinent on the basis of questionable, and often conflicting assumptions: that covert action could steer Indian opinion in a pro-Western direction; that British and American intelligence agencies could be insulated from Indian antipathy for colonialism and neo-colonialism; that Western intelligence support would corrode India’s relations with the Soviet Union; that controversies surrounding American intelligence practice would not cut through with the Indian public; that the subcontinent’s politicians would not employ the CIA as a lightning rod for India’s domestic travails; and that secret intelligence activity could help to arrest a decline in British and American influence in India. Today, India’s emergence as an economic titan, renewed Sino-Indian tensions, and backwash from the ‘War on Terror’, keep the subcontinent in the global headlines.

The starting point of this chapter is the observation that would-be dictators are abundant around the globe, but some succeed in setting up and sustaining a rebel army while others do not. As argued in this chapter, a key ingredient for rebel success and conflict longevity is funding. One source of financing is the stolen spoils of nature. Think, for example, of blood diamonds. Beyond this particular example, we also discuss in this chapter systematic evidence on how access to mineral rents triggers an escalation of fighting activities of armed groups. In addition to resource rents, it is foreign funding that results in prolonged conflict, and may lead to proxy wars between fighting factions supported by rival foreign powers. The destructive potential of these sources of funding is examined by drawing on examples and empirical evidence from Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and India.

Liberalism is at the heart of modern ‘Western’ history, politics, and international relations. Central to understandings of liberty, freedom, democracy, rights and the rule of law, liberalism has animated debates on abolition and empire, war and peace. This chapter provides an account of liberalism as a contested phenomena that originated at least in the eighteenth century and has had profound international political consequences ever since. To tell this story, the chapter begins by considering how to make sense of the contestations surrounding liberalism, before examining how and why liberalism matters to International Relations at key moments of its development as a discipline: in the age of empires, the inter-war years, during the Cold War and ‘new’ world which ensued, and now in this epoch of endless war.

The Cold War was the most important feature of the international system in the second half of the twentieth century. The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States shaped the contours of conflict and cooperation among states and peoples between 1945 and 1991 and its dynamics permeated almost all corners of the globe. Whether in Baghdad, Bangkok or Brussels, the influence of geopolitical and ideological conflict was unmistakable. The Cold War created rivalries and political faultlines that have continued to shape international relations years after its passing. Sino-American competition has become so intense that many think the world is on the brink of another period of bipolar rivalry.

This chapter introduces an idea that has enjoyed a remarkable, if hotly contested, development in the post-Cold War era: humanitarian intervention. Based on a commitment to principles of humanity and respect for life, such action seeks to alleviate the unnecessary suffering caused by violent conflict through intervening in another state, with force under limited conditions. The chapter outlines the origins of humanitarianism and the history of humanitarian intervention before discussing the shift to the responsibility to protect (R2P). As world politics becomes ever more complex, debate about global responsibilities to protect suffering strangers will continue to shape the theory and practice of international relations. While abuse of human beings has not become less widespread, the preoccupation with COVID-19 and domestic priorities meant that little consideration was given to robust action against middle powers perpetrating mass atrocities in such places as Myanmar and Tigray, let alone against major powers in Ukraine and Xinjiang.

When Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg, and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker returned to Germany from Farm Hall, they needed to justify their wartime work on uranium without appearing to have betrayed the German war effort. Hahn was aided by his Nobel Prize and his presidency of the Max Planck Society. Hahn used his prestige to systematically defend German science and repress its nazification, contributions to the war effort, and participation in war crimes. Heisenberg and Weizsacker helped create the legend of Copenhagen: they had supposedly traveled to occupied Denmark in order to persuade Niels Bohr to help them forestall all nuclear weapons. This legend was popularized by the author Robert Jungk, but denied, at least privately, by Bohr. When the West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss suggested that the Federal Republic should have its own nuclear weapons, Hahn, Heisenberg, and Weizsäcker joined fifteen other prominent German scientists to issue the Göttingen Declaration, rejecting West German nuclear weapons and refusing to participate in the development of such weapons. Weizsäcker subsequently refined his stance on nuclear weapons.

This chapter shows how Soviet policymakers thought about foreign trade and the role of natural resources in the early Cold War, focusing on the Khrushchev period and the conflicting views on the use of energy.

Chapter 1 sets the scene for this book, providing the requisite background for the chapters that follow. It begins with a short overview of the military regime, focusing on repression and the gradual restoration of democratic freedoms, highlighting the role the latter played in facilitating the country’s burgeoning environmental movement. It then turns to the dictatorship’s plans for industrial growth and energy production. The chapter closes with an overview of the symbolism that surrounds big dams and an introduction to the influential generals and engineers responsible for orchestrating the dictatorship’s dam-building campaign. This chapter also lays the groundwork for the book’s first argument, that political pressures encouraged the military regime to build big dams quickly and with little regard for their social and environmental impacts.

This chapter examines Kerouac in the context of 1950s literary culture in the United States, with particular emphasis on the Cold War. The 1950s was the decade Kerouac became famous overnight with the publication of On the Road, and the decade he produced the bulk of his most significant writing, including Visions of Cody, Doctor Sax, The Subterraneans, The Dharma Bums, and Mexico City Blues, among others. This chapter explores the relationship between Kerouac’s literary production during the 1950s and the multilayered cultural imperatives of the Cold War.

This chapter examines Iran’s growing security interests in Africa during the 1970s, as its sphere of influence broadened following the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971. The shah spoke in this period about his Indian Ocean policy – the plan to form an economic and security union of the countries bordering the Indian Ocean, which would work together to free the area from imperial power interference. This formed the basis of Iran’s grand strategy in the mid- to late 1970s. The chapter explores Iran’s increasing preoccupation with Soviet expansion in the Horn of Africa, and how this prompted the shah to develop relations with countries such as Sudan and, after the Ethiopian Revolution and the fall of Haile Selassie in 1974, Somalia.

Continuing from the account of Iran–South Africa relations in Chapter 3, this chapter looks in particular at the increasing importance of Iranian oil to South Africa in the wake of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, as a result of which, by 1978, Iran supplied over 90 per cent of South Africa’s crude oil imports. Because of its importance as a supplier of oil, not just to South Africa but also its neighbouring countries, Iran attained an influential position in Southern Africa during this period. Its influence was such that in 1977 and 1978, the United States and Britain asked the shah to help negotiate a settlement with the Ian Smith government to end the crisis in Rhodesia. The chapter explores Iran’s role in the crisis, not only its support of US-British initiatives, but also its outreach to Rhodesia’s revolutionary politicians, like Joshua Nkomo, who travelled to Iran and met with the shah several times during this period. As the chapter will show, Iran’s involvement was driven by concerns over the possibility of civil war spreading into neighbouring countries, and the implications of this for Iran’s Indian Ocean aspirations.

Building on Chapter 5, which established the basis of Iran’s security concerns in Africa, this chapter looks at the reasons for and nature of Iran’s support for Somalia’s Siad Barre in his war against Ethiopia in 1977–78. The chapter examines the complex relationship between the shah’s Iran and the Carter administration, and questions the extent to which the shah’s much-talked-about independent foreign policy was actually independent from US interests and demands. For although the shah wanted to support the Barre regime in Somalia, he was constrained by the United States, which would not allow him to supply US-made weapons to the regime. On the other hand, the shah’s lobbying on behalf of Barre, and his pledges to come to Somalia’s aid if it were attacked by Ethiopia, were taken seriously by, and influenced policy-making decisions in, not only the United States, but also Ethiopia, Cuba and the Soviet Union.