In chapter 11, To act now if we are to act at all (June 16 - Jun 27) the relative calm in Austria is followed by increasing concern about Germany which looses foreign exchange. The Bank of England, the New York Fed, the Banque de France and the Bank for International Settlements arranges a $100 million credit to the Reichsbank. Meanwhile,on June 20, US President Herbert Hoover announces his plan for a one year moratorium, which is received positively in most of Europe, but not in France. George Harrison assumes a more active role in trying to defuse the concern about a breakdown in Europe, and he enters into dialogue with the Banque de France, which is more open to a solution than the French government. The chapter ends with some optimism that the Hoover proposal may have changed the situation in Europe.

Chapter 13, Germany will collapse (June 19 - July 10) begins with everyone’s eyes on Germany where the uncertainty about the French position towards the Hoover plan increases every day. More generally, politics comes to play a larger role, as Norman increasingly emphasizes that it’s about politics, and Harrison has to take Hoover’s plan into account. At the same time leadership in the epistemic community of central bankers shifts away from Norman toward Harrison, who enters into a dialogue with French central bankers. Tensions arise between Norman and Harrison, as the begin to subscribe to divergent narratives of the situation and what needs to be done. In Germany, the situation gets more concerning by the hour, and Hans Luther travels to London and Paris in an unsuccessful attempt to secure a giant credit to the Reichsbank.

Chapter 10, A world political problem (June 11 - June 16). This chapter recounts the endgame of the Austrian crisis, while instability spreads to Germany. Norman comes to realize that in reality there is not much the central banks can do, since the real issue is "a world political problem" going all the way back to the Versaille Peace Agreement of 1919, the German war reparations and the allied’s war debts. The International Creditors Committee negotiate in Vienna with the Credit Anstalt and the Austrian government and at the very last minute they succeed in getting guarantee for their deposits, while promising to leave them for at least two years. At the same time, on June 16, negotiations with French bankers over the Austrian bond loans fails, and the Bank of England singlehandedly steps in with a bridge credit to the government. Together, the loan and the standstill agreement stops the Austrian crisis, at least for a while.

Chapter 14, Aqnxiety within Germany at climax (July 11 - July 23). In this chapter tension reaches its climax as the Darmstädter und Nationalbank (Danatbank) fails on July 13. Without help from outside of Germany, the German government declares a bank holiday and introduces exchange controls, effectively ending the gold standard in Germany. The New York Fed and Harrison declines to intervene and the BIS does not have the resources or the inclination to intervene. Norman’s position that the situation goes back to the Versaille Peace agreement and is now a matter for governments strengthens. A conference in London is unable to come up with new solutions and meanwhile sterling comes under pressure. The fear of contagion beginning in early May is now a reality.

Chapter 8, Surrounded with trouble (June 5 - June 10). The BIS board decides to grant a second credit to the BIS, but only after a prolonged discussion and it is made conditional on the placement of the Austrian government loan. There is increasing concern about the schilling as capital flows out of the country and the government issues take increasing priority, without being placed. At the same time, Germany’s reparations issues become ever more present as the German Chancellor Brüning meets with Prime Minister MacDonals at Chequers. Shortly before, Brüning published a statement saying that the burden on the German people has reached its limit. The international creditors too become increasingly nervous about the Austrian situation.

Northern Europe was the site of another great medieval experiment in statecraft, the Hanseatic League of cities that monopolized trade in the Baltic and North Seas. In a time and place of weak central authority, German-speaking cities in the northern tier of the Holy Roman Empire were the most powerful force in Northern Europe. They waged war against territorial states, winning steep concessions from the Danish Empire in 1370 that marked the league’s zenith. What was the source of Hanse power? Lübeck in northern Germany was the de facto capital. This city was the product of German migratory conquests in a vast Christianization effort. Soon it was an alpha city in a far-flung network that controlled trade from England to Russia and points between. The league led by Lübeck was locked in a zealous, centuries-long struggle to gain and protect trading privileges in the burgeoning financial centers of a new urban age. The Hanse cities formed a network within a network, establishing strongholds in the globally significant nodes of Bergen, Bruges, London, and Novgorod.

This chapter explores the link between eternity clauses and electoral democracy by looking at two instances of unamendable democracy: party bans, both direct and indirect, and the protection of parliamentary mandates. These two approaches are illustrated via a range of case studies: the ban of anti-democratic parties in Germany; bans of ethnic, separatist, and religious parties in Turkey; indirect unamendability and its chilling effect on party competition in Israel; and the judicial protection of parliamentary mandates as unamendable in Czechia. Whereas such measures are adopted in the name of protecting democracy, the analysis here indicates that courts will not always strike the right balance between safeguarding and unduly narrowing democratic commitments. In some cases, they may even unintentionally undermine multipartyism itself or significantly influence electoral outcomes. Thus, the bluntness and open-ended nature of unamendability risks having a chilling effect on electoral democracy in both fragile and more stable democratic contexts.

The chapter explores how Germany engages with its nationals abroad, covering the diplomatic/consular, economic/social and military dimensions. As of 2020, around 2.9 million Germans permanently lived outside Germany, mostly in other European countries and North America, and approximately 24 million Germans went abroad for their main holidays in 2021. The chapter finds that Germany’s activities towards these German nationals residing or travelling abroad is relatively limited overall, with a focus on supporting and assisting German citizens. There is only little evidence for policies to co-opt Germans abroad, for example in the context of return schemes for highly-skilled German citizens, and no indication for repression at all, as befits a liberal democracy. While Germany’s engagement is typically of low domestic salience, Germany can mobilize significant resources to support its nationals abroad at times of crisis (e.g., natural disasters or hostage situations), in particular through its global diplomatic network. Germany has also used its armed forces for military evacuations from conflict zones, often in close coordination with its European and transatlantic partners. Germany can thus be described as a capable protector that is, however, reluctant to engage with its national communities abroad on a more comprehensive and proactive basis.

In June 2020, the German Federal Government adopted its National Hydrogen Strategy (NWS), which was updated in July 2023, viewing green hydrogen as a key to the energy transition. To achieve net greenhouse gas neutrality by 2045, as required by law, the NWS envisages a rapid market ramp-up for hydrogen. This policy is supported by the recent amendment of the Energy Industry Act (EnWG), which introduces provisions for a prompt creation of a so-called hydrogen core network. However, for now, the required infrastructure does not exist. Against that background, this chapter will examine the existing permission regime in Germany for pure hydrogen infrastructure, specifically its transportation via pipelines and its large-scale storage in salt caverns as the best short-term storage option. The analytical focus will be trained on existing legal barriers that stand in the way of accelerating the construction and repurposing of infrastructure to disseminate hydrogen. To secure the planning and approval framework for the rapid expansion of hydrogen infrastructures in Germany, necessary adjustments to the current legal framework are proposed.

This chapter introduces cases motivating the book and presents a three-step argument about the effects of forced migration on societal cooperation, state capacity, and economic development. It reviews evidence from post-WWII displacement in Poland and West Germany, discusses the applicability of the findings to other cases, and highlights the main contributions of the book.

In 2012, a German district court in the city of Cologne decided that male circumcision for non-therapeutical reasons amounted to criminal assault that could not be justified by parental consent. Over a period of several months, between the decision and the drafting of the amending legislation, the German public and academy became embroiled in a remarkably heated and emotional debate about the future of the practice. But this time, the resentment did not just appear in the notorious online world but became woven into medical and legal arguments against circumcision. Even though critics of circumcision were eager to stress that their concerns were children’s rights alone, the Cologne debate sent a signal to Germany’s Jews that the law could easily turn them into strangers again. Through a close reading of this legal controversy, this chapter examines how contemporary secular legal responses to religious infant male circumcision reproduce Christian ambivalence and rely on a supersessionary logic that renders Jews as stuck in a backward past, while constituting the majoritarian secularised Christian culture as a superior locus of equality and progress.

This is the first of two chapters concerned with the Jewish practice of infant male circumcision. In this chapter, I trace the history of circumcision as a trope for Jewish difference in European Christian thought and consider its symbolic role in debates about the legal equality of Jews. Christian thinkers spent much time pondering Jewish circumcision and what it told them about the supposedly ‘carnal’, particularistic, and anachronistic nature of Jews. Apart from constituting a trope for what differentiated Jews from Christians, the bodily sign eventually also became enmeshed in discussions about the possibility of Jewish emancipation where it offered a site to debate the fitness of Jews to become citizens. However, regardless of how much Christians disdained circumcision, they mostly respected the Jewish right to circumcise and due to a curious twist of history, some Christian societies eventually even embraced circumcision themselves. More recently, circumcision has emerged as a human rights issue and I explore the role of Christian ambivalence in contemporary calls for a ban on the practice in the name of children’s rights and gender equality.

Summarizes the industrial policies of Germany since the late nineteenth century, emphasizing the idea of relationship-oriented, as opposed to transaction-oriented, capitalism.

This chapter provides the historical background necessary to understand the book’s empirical analysis. It discusses the political decisions that led to the displacement of Germans and Poles at the end of WWII and challenges the assumption that uprooted communities were internally homogeneous. It then zooms in on the process of uprooting and resettlement and introduces data on the size and heterogeneity of the migrant population in postwar Poland and West Germany.