From less than three dozen in 1949, the number of small hydropower stations in the People’s Republic of China grew to nearly ninety thousand by 1979. By the early 1980s, these stations were distributed across nearly 1,600 of China’s 2,300 counties. In 770 counties, small hydropower was the primary source of rural electricity generation. This article offers a history and assessment of these developments, unsettling our traditional emphasis on large-scale hydroelectricity. The article begins by reconstructing the PRC’s enormous investments in small hydropower from the 1950s to the early 1980s. This reconstruction, the first of its kind in the English language, not only helps reassess key periods and events in the history of the PRC but also establishes the position of small hydropower in the hydraulic history of the twentieth century. The article then turns to a discussion of the claimed impacts of small hydropower. As electricity became available for the first time in many parts of the Chinese countryside, it affected patterns of economic and social activity for hundreds of millions of people. Finally, the paper explores what the case of small hydropower can offer to conceptual and theoretical problems surrounding development, innovation, and the environment. Returning to the long-standing debate over scale and development, China’s experience with small hydropower reminds us of the important role played by smaller-scale, appropriate, and self-reliant technologies in global energy history.

This article explores the socio-ecological impacts of Fascist hydropower extraction in the Alpine valleys of Italy, focusing on the Toce river basin during the interwar period. It investigates the conflicts between local communities and hydropower initiatives by private energy companies under Fascism, thereby revealing the regime's communication strategies rooted in its political ecology. By analysing newspaper articles, propaganda outlets and communal archival documents, the study uncovers statal and local perspectives on infrastructure development and its enduring consequences. How the political ecology of Fascism in a high-altitude hydropower construction site became an expression of Fascist modernity will thereby be shown. Despite objections from valley inhabitants, Fascist hydropower projects persisted, perpetuating socio-ecological inequalities after 1945. Even postwar efforts for compensation failed to address the long-lasting impacts on mountain communities. This research reveals the intersection of political ecology and modernist infrastructure development in Mussolini's Italy, and thus also highlights the legacies of Fascist resource extraction policies on the country's peripheral Alpine regions.

In both Sweden and Finland, water law has traditionally provided strong protection for hydropower operations by issuing permanent environmental licences. This national protection has started to erode as a result of the requirement of the European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD) for permit reviews to improve the ecological status of rivers. In the light of this dynamic between European and national frameworks, this article compares the Swedish and Finnish implementation of the WFD regarding existing hydropower operations. Whereas Sweden has adopted comprehensive legislative and policy reforms that embrace a systemic perspective on reconciling hydropower with the current societal and ecological circumstances, Finland has relied on bottom-up collaborative processes at the grassroots level. The article shows that both approaches are problematic in so far as they push the boundaries of proper implementation of the WFD and, by extension, the achievement of the ecological objectives of the WFD in waters affected by hydropower. Our comparison highlights tensions between EU law requirements for formal legal effectiveness in national implementation, and the WFD's aspirations for adaptive river basin-based governance.

Over the last decade China has become a dominant player in Africa's rapidly growing hydropower sector. These mega projects typically employ thousands of Africans yet research on labour relations at these sites remains extremely limited. This article provides a rare systematic analysis of workers’ experiences on a Chinese-financed-and-constructed hydroelectric dam in Africa. We find that chronic verbal abuse of African workers by Chinese managers is a defining feature of labour relations at this project in Uganda. This abuse has tainted many workers’ attitudes towards the Chinese contractor Sinohydro, the Chinese government, and to a lesser extent Chinese people themselves. Workers also perceive Ugandan organisations and the Ugandan government as complicit in these poor labour relations. These findings underscore the limits of accountability to labour standards by Chinese firms operating in Africa, especially in contexts where host organisations and governments fail to advocate aggressively for the rights of African workers.

This study is an attempt to determine whether the need to get hydropower project appraisals perfectly right during the pre-construction phase, so as to prevent significant overruns along with benefit shortfalls, should supersede the need to deliver projects at the earliest possible time so as to meet the needs of the people. To achieve the study objective, we test whether the Hiding Hand principle is predominantly benevolent or malevolent. We argue that if the Hiding Hand is benevolent, then project stakeholders are better off focusing on the quick delivery of power projects; however, if it is malevolent, then more attention should be given to perfecting project appraisals. It transpires from the statistical analysis that the Benevolent Hiding Hand dominates the Malevolent Hiding Hand in the selected World Bank-financed hydropower projects (33% v. 21%), and that ultimately, 75% of the projects were even more successful than anticipated—while 25% of the projects failed. Our findings further show that while a total loss of 2.335 billion USD in the sampled dams was caused by the Malevolent Hiding Hand, 11.259 billion USD was gained as a result of the Benevolent Hiding Hand. The predominance of the Benevolent Hiding Hand justifies placing some weight on proceeding with hydropower projects that show significant promise even if all the implantation risks are not fully quantified at the appraisal stage, especially in developing countries.

China's west has long been framed as an undeveloped frontier, set apart by poverty and a resource-based economy. Since the 2000s, however, utility-scale renewable energy infrastructure has expanded rapidly in western China, promising local economic benefits tied to national low-carbon transition. This paper contends that these benefits have been precarious and unevenly distributed. I argue that utility-scale renewable energy has remade western China as a “low-carbon frontier,” a resource-rich region that generates low-carbon value for the national green economy. I highlight three features of low-carbon frontiers: they are constructed as spaces of exploitable low-carbon resources, creating an investment boom; they are enclosed through new land arrangements and infrastructure construction, rapidly and with little coordination; and they are reliant on external markets and policy decisions, entrenching dependency. These conditions make it difficult for frontier regions to capture sustained economic development benefits from the boom in the absence of persistent central state supports. I analyse these features by comparing two sets of technologies with similar, but ultimately diverging, trajectories: small and large hydropower in China's south-west, and solar and wind in the north-west.

In 1992, Congress passed The Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act with the goal of “full restoration of The Elwha River Ecosystem and native anadromous fisheries.” As part of that act, the federal government was required to produce a benefit-cost analysis on dam removal of the Elwha and Glines Canyon dams, which was published in 1994. This article revisits that initial 1994 benefit-cost analysis; background on its methods and assumptions is given, comparisons are made to current state-of-the-art techniques in benefit-cost analysis, and an ex post benefit-cost analysis of the project is conducted for comparison purposes. We find that the cost and scope of the project exceeded original expectations, the cost of the foregone electricity generation was less than expected, and that anticipated recreational and fisheries benefits were both delayed, and lower, than expected. Furthermore, issues such as the value of hatchery-spawned versus wild anadromous fish seem not to have been anticipated in the original analysis, highlighting the fact that in doing an ex ante analysis, researchers must expect that unexpected factors may influence the ex post results of any project.