This chapter tests cycles of silence in Lagos to evaluate its applicability in a Global South context where, unlike Baltimore, the state and the police have limited resources. The chapter’s results come from an original survey of shopkeepers, paired with interviews and observation, in the city’s expansive markets, pockets in which “area boy” crews engage in violence and extortion. Consistent with the patterns found in Baltimore, area boy violence reduces cooperation by boosting perceived retaliation risk and making cooperation norms appear to be weaker than they are. Underlying cooperation support exists among shopkeepers, the chapter’s final section explains, in part, because the area boy crews have largely failed to gain legitimacy with Lagosians.

This chapter tests cycles of silence theory in Baltimore to evaluate its applicability in a Global North context where the state and the police are well resourced. It provides background on how Baltimore residents become exposed to violence by drug crews and details the results from an original survey of residents in the city’s violence- affected communities. Violence heightens perceived retaliation risk, and the heightened risk perception in turn pushes residents who support cooperation to keep that support private. As result, residents share less information than they otherwise would in absence of this norm suppression. The chapter’s final section explains that the underlying cooperation support exists, because the drug crews have largely failed to gain legitimacy in eyes of residents.

This chapter details cycles of silence theory explaining how criminal groups constrain citizen cooperation with the police. Criminal group violence not only reduces cooperation by heightening retaliation risk to cooperators but also by making community norms favoring cooperation appear weaker than they are to citizens. Due to violence- induced retaliation risk, citizens who support cooperation are forced to keep that support private. The potency of social norms in driving human behavior means that this suppression of norms that favor cooperation ultimately reduce witnesses’ willingness to come forward with information. The chapter also interrogates the theory’s central premise that underlying support for cooperation exists in communities. Perceptions of police and criminal group legitimacy are an important driver of support, so cycles of silence dynamics primarily operate in communities where criminal groups have failed to gain legitimacy. The chapter then theorizes why criminal groups’ primary goal of illicit economic gain undermines their legitimization efforts.

As indicated by the title, this chapter covers cases raising issues not covered in other chapters. Most prominent are cases concerning recusal not related to campaign fundraising or expenditures, most of which do not result in an order for recusal. Other issues covered include judicial districting unrelated to voting rights, retaliation, challenges to the creation of new positions arising in the context of filling them, method of selection (appointment or election) unrelated to filling an interim vacancy, recall, and a range of other miscellaneous issues.

This personal chapter reflects the experience and observations of a clinical and forensic psychologist that has treated victims and worked in the legal system for decades. The chapter describes the myriad of decisions and barriers victims face when reporting and the unanticipated consequences of reporting.

This essay examines the reciprocal contest of wills as mediated through the use of political violence from roughly 1773 to the end of the war in 1783. In other terms, it covers the escalating application of violence and how that led to outright war in April 1775, as well as the war itself. In both periods, violence was used to influence the will of one’s opponent and the political preferences of the undecided—but sometimes its political intent was exceeded, with escalatory effects. Three broad categories of violence are considered here. The first, “intimidative and catalytic” was primarily associated with the period from 1773 to 1776, in which violence was used by both sides, mostly publicly, to force political opponents to accede or step aside. Some of those efforts at intimidation catalyzed further violence, leading ultimately to armed military confrontation. Once the war had begun, the strong conventions associated with “war” shaped military behavior by both sides’ regular forces, although not always successfully, and always subject to logistical requirements. These behaviors form the second category of “Regular and Logistical.” The third category, “Retaliatory” was primarily associated with peripheral militia forces, which were much less restrained by the customs and usages of war, and often instead indulged in escalating retaliation.

Chapter 5 is concerned with Articles 22.6 DSU and 4.10 SCM Agreement – namely, those provisions that allow one Member to bring retaliatory measures against another Member where that other Member fails to bring its measure into compliance with the covered agreement(s). The chapter argues that, although not reflected in current jurisprudence, there should be a need to demonstrate the causal link between a Member’s failure to bring its measure into conformity with a DSB ruling and the level of nullification or impairment incurred (that is, a causal link analysis). The chapter also raises parts of the jurisprudence that would seem to support a non-attribution analysis being used in this context, too. The chapter then puts forward the Non-attribution/Causal Link Analysis as one method for performing these analyses.

Chapter 8 deals with the potential remedies available to protesters when their constitutional rights are violated. It focuses on damages remedies intended to make protesters whole for such injuries. The law of public protest severely restricts such remedies. Under principles of “qualified immunity,” the law generally immunizes all but the most incompetent officers from civil liability. Empirical evidence shows that in protesters’ First Amendment and Fourth Amendment cases, defendants’ qualified immunity claims are granted 60 percent of the time. Protesters also face nearly insurmountable obstacles in terms of holding municipalities liable for constitutional violations. The Supreme Court has recently limited protesters’ ability to bring First Amendment “retaliation” claims. Finally, the Court has all but sounded the death knell for First Amendment damages claims against federal officials. The chapter joins the chorus calling for qualified immunity reform. It also encourages states and localities to restrict officers’ ability to invoke qualified and other immunities, and to create causes of action against officials for violations of state constitutional law.

Chapter 7 conducts part two of the deeper dive into the new regulations, but here the focus is on the changes made to the investigation and adjudication of sexual assault. The chapter explains the ways in which the new procedures differ from those under the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, and how they better protect complainants and the accused. In considering the fairness of the new procedures, the chapter compares them to the consensus recommendations of the 2017 ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force on Campus Due Process and Victim Protection. Along the way, suggestions are offered for how schools can implement the new regulations in a way that is compliant with those regulations but better protects the rights of victims and the accused.

Chapter 3 investigates the problematic beginnings of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) issued by the Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (OCR) under President Obama. It explaina how the DCL misrepresented existing data, violated the Administrative Procedure Act by changing the law without going through notice and comment, and flouted existing norms. In the process, the chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the changes brought about by the DCL, including mandating a lower standard of proof in sexual assault hearings.

This chapter examines the phenomenon of cyberterrorism through the lens of political psychology. The emergence of cyberterrorism as a novel threat has roiled international security and given rise to a new wave of research that seeks to understand how exposure to destructive digital attacks influences political attitudes and behaviour. In this chapter, we review the leading empirical studies that have emerged as part of this new research focus. We begin by presenting a consolidated political psychology model of exposure to cyberterrorism that guides our analysis throughout the chapter. We then apply this model to the two predominant political outcomes that recur in the empirical literature – public confidence and trust in institutions, and foreign policy attitudes. Finally, we pinpoint the key gaps in our understanding of the psycho-political effects of cyberterrorism exposure and propose a research agenda that accounts for the evolving nature of the field.

This chapter discusses the remedies that are available under WTO law. It explains that the preferred solution to a dispute is a mutually agreed solution. If this is not possible, and the defending party does not implement any adverse rulings, the defending party may offer compensation (in the form of equivalent trade concessions). The last and least desirable option is retaliation, or the suspension of concessions. The chapter explains the procedures for each of these possible remedies, with a particular focus on the arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU of the amount of retaliation proposed by the complaining party. The chapter also discusses the “sequencing” problem arising out of the deadlines to request the right to retaliate in the DSU. Finally, the chapter discusses the special rules governing disputes over subsidies and the role played by suggestions by the panel and Appellate Body on implementation.

Kami Chavis utilizes KRS-One’s 1993 song “Black Cop” to consider the contradictions inherent in being a black police officer. The song reveals the complex role that black police officers play in the subjugation of black communities. In the song, black officers are portrayed as utilizing the same street justice and harassment as their white counterparts to “oversee” black people, just as plantation owners and enslavers used black overseers on plantations to keep enslaved people subjugated. In fact, the lyrics suggest the deliberate use of the black officer to effectuation the continued oppression of the black community. The George Floyd death was the last ember to land upon a long-burning fire that would spread throughout the country. In response to protests against police brutality, several municipalities made significant and broad changes to their police practices. Among these changes are demands to diversify the police, arguing that if there were just more black officers, this might ameliorate the complaints of racial profiling and police violence against blacks. However, a careful analysis of Black Cop and its enduring themes require us to examine this proposition.

Chapter 5 explores the nature of international economic obligations. It suggests that remedies in international economic regimes have a restorative rather than punitive purpose. It is argued that attribution of breach may not be relevant, or that relevant, in the international economic law context. This study posits that what international courts and tribunals ask is not who is responsible for a breach but rather who is best placed to bear responsibility. In international economic law, shared responsibility typically raises the question of the proper respondent(s).

Authoritarian and retributive discipline policies that characterize the crime control model of school discipline feed into a cycle of harm whereby aggressive behaviors, including retribution and revenge, are likely to be reinforced as normative responses to an unjust and unequal environment. These policies are ineffective at reducing violence and delinquency, can result in poor academic outcomes, are disproportionately applied, and have negative impacts on the school climate. They also fail to capture the importance of teaching students the social and behavioral skills that are associated with better academic and behavioral outcomes. By contrast, the school climate is an important malleable component that can have positive impacts on a variety of outcomes. Whole school approaches to positive discipline such as Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports and Restorative Justice are far more promising policies to improving the school climate and associated student outcomes, including retaliatory behavior.