Chapter 10 explores the increasingly blurred line between public and private authority in designing and applying the AI tools, and searches for appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure the rule of law and protection fundamental rights. ADM tools are increasingly sorting individuals out, with important consequences. Governments use such tools to rank and rate their citizens, creating a data-driven infrastructure of preferences that condition people’s behaviours and opinions. Some commentators point to the rule of law deficits in the automation of government functions, others emphasize how such technologies systematically exacerbate inequalities, and still others argue that a society constantly being scored, profiled, and predicted threatens due process and justice generally. Using the case of Houston Federation of Teachers v. Houston Independent School District as a starting point, Lin asks some critical questions still left unanswered. How are AI and ADM tools reshaping professions like education? Does the increasingly blurred line between public and private authority in designing and applying these algorithmic tools pose new threats? Premised upon these scholarly and practical inquiries, this chapter seeks to identify appropriate safeguards necessary to ensure rule of law values, protect fundamental rights, and harness the power of automated governments.

This chapter assesses the compatibility of capital controls and other CFMs with the multilateral trade framework; that is, the WTO’s GATS. The GATS contains several provisions that relate to controls and restrictions on services in general, and to financial services in particular. This chapter begins by setting out the framework for obligations in the GATS relevant to cross-border capital movements before explaining and evaluating the relevant exceptions. While the exceptions should in theory allow capital controls to be put in place in a manner that is consistent with the GATS, each of the exceptions contain uncertainties which, depending on how they are interpreted, could mean capital controls would fall outside the scope of the exceptions. Recent jurisprudence, however, should provide some comfort to governments seeking to make use of exceptions in the financial services sector, namely the so-called prudential exception. In this regard, the GATS should not be viewed as a major impediment to the implementation of CFMs implemented in good faith and for prudential reasons.

With cracks in the liberalisation approach to capital flows appearing during the Asian Financial Crisis and subsequent crises in the early 2000s, policymakers and commentators began to understand that unregulated finance and cross-border flows could generate extreme financial instability. Capital controls have become widespread. For some, the controls are limited in nature and duration, but for others the controls are widespread and remain in place for an extended period. This shift has occurred at the same time the IMF has been more accepting of CFMs and in particular shifted its position on the extent to which they can be a source of instability in emerging markets. This chapter focuses on the role and legitimacy of CFMs. The chapter first provides a definition of CFMs and explains their role and impact in terms of capital flow management. Next, the chapter explains why CFMs are so controversial and elaborates on their operational aspects and overall desirability. The chapter concludes with a discussion on why CFMs remain difficult to manage from a macro level in the absence of a global regulatory framework.

The chapter describes and analyses the principles of European Macroeconomic Constitution and how it guides the ECB and EU in its macroeconomic governance. The principles can be divided into objectives and safeguards. The main objective of the economic constitution, integration through internal market, continues but gets price stability as the main macroeconomic objective, and to an extent a more elaborated open market economy principle to guide EU institutions. The safeguards start from central bank independence that are further defined by the prohibition of central bank financing and a narrow central banking model without explicit value judgments. Member States remain responsible for the other areas of economic policy with the obligation of sound fiscal policy. The principles form a logical whole and complement the earlier microeconomic constitution. However, the assumptions and theory backgrounds of the two constitutions differ substantially, which has many implications, including for the role of law and courts as well as independent experts, such as the ECB. These implications have even become apparent already in the earlier case law by the CJEU.

The chapter analyses the fate of the constitutional principles of the European Macroeconomic Constitution after the recurring crises. The measures by the ECB stretched the principles to the limits and beyond. The objectives of internal market and price stability fared relatively well, but the principle of open market economy less so. However, the institutional choices and safeguards were all seriously altered, where the prohibition of central bank financing and Member States responsibility for sound fiscal policy were among the key principles that were the most fundamentally transformed. This, apart from the concerns about the constitutionality of individual measures, raises fundamental questions about the European Macroeconomic Constitution. The accountability and even legitimacy of the ECB relied on its unique position as a central bank of an economic constitution. It empowered it, gave it independence, but also constrained and controlled it. The chapter argues that the preconditions for an independent expert role of the ECB have been challenged by its measures and the inability of the judicial review to sustain sufficient boundaries. Consequently, the accountability and legitimacy of the ECB have been compromised, and with that also the rule of law with regard to the EMU is under threat.

Chapter 1 explains the function of Article 1 as the threshold provision defining the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards. It explains what safeguard measures are for purposes of WTO law.

This chapter aims to discuss the main features of Protocol Article 16 and Article 773 TCA. In particular, it outlines the main differences between these safeguards and those safeguards inspired from the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that are typically included in standard trade agreements. It also explores how the distinctive features of Article 16 of the Protocol may impact the judicial review of safeguard measures. The chapter considers (i) safeguards as regulated under the law of the WTO, (ii) the safeguard provisions contained in the Protocol and the TCA and (iii) the extent to which the invocation of the safeguard provisions contained in the WA and the TCA might be capable of being judicially reviewed both under the arbitration provisions of the TCA and as a matter of EU and UK law.

The success of any arms control treaty generally depends on its ability to achieve its primary objectives and intended outcomes. At the heart of measuring such success are effective compliance criteria and verification mechanisms. This includes the ability to apply metrics to assess tangible outcomes and measurable outputs and benchmarks of achievement, including on-site visits. In relation to nuclear issues, this also means that verification of both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared peaceful activities (i.e., correctness of conduct), and the absence of undeclared or clandestine nuclear activities in a particular state (i.e., completeness in following treaty terms).

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 2017 marks an important development in nuclear arms control law, diplomacy and relations between states. Adopted by the UN General Assembly on July 7, 2017, it was supported by 122 nations, representing a potential disruptor to the nuclear status quo. It is the first treaty to ban nuclear weapons outright, taking a clear humanitarian approach to disarmament. Despite its success in coming to fruition, however, it is not celebrated by all nations. The permanent members of the UN Security Council neither participated in its negotiations, nor adopted the final text. No state with nuclear weapons endorses the Treaty and indeed they openly oppose its very existence.

This chapter gives more clarity on indigenous peoples as communities that, given their special social and cultural connection with land and natural resources, are inherently vulnerable to the global spread of projects that necessitate significant, and often irreparable, land disturbance and the transnational legal dynamics and behaviours that facilitate that disturbance. Far greater effort is needed to think about the indigenous movement in a more pluralistic framework: as specifically vulnerable to development projects in a much broader outlook, that is, beyond settler-colonial geographical area and one in which private concessionaires and financiers are, through contractual and policy mechanisms, shaping the movement with significant impacts for rights recognition and implementation. This chapter also defines the specific characteristics of modern development projects that matter for indigenous land rights issues, including the diminished role of the state in these projects and the implementation gaps that appear in development finance mechanisms for resettlement. The chapter concludes by examining the private legal nature of the plural contracts that secure a development project.