In the previous chapter, I have discussed the process of professionalisation in the INC as evinced in its evolution from a mass-bureaucratic party to an (increasingly) electoral-professional party. This has entailed a growing dependence on technological solutions and data fetishism to correct for the perceived weakness in the party's organisational strength, thereby leading to an increase in the influence of party employees vis-à-vis party bureaucrats. This chapter provides a contrasting trajectory of internal professionalisation through the case study of the BJP. Much like the INC, professionalisation in the BJP can be found in different enclaves within the party where party employees perform tasks in domains ranging from campaign management to data analytics.

Scholars have frequently paid attention to the fact that the BJP has one of the strongest and most institutionalised party machinery throughout the country (Basu 2005; Jaffrelot 1996; P. Jha 2017b). Thus, a focus on the BJP becomes analytically instructive to understand the ways in which cadre-based parties can retain their organisational strength, ideological coherence and independent identity in an era of professionalisation. At the same time, the BJP is also unlike most other political parties. It is unique insofar as its organisational structure is inextricably linked to the wider Hindu nationalist movement in India and thus cannot be understood without taking into account the ‘division of labour’ within the Sangh Parivar—the family of Hindu nationalist organisations at the helm of which is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). It should be noted that the relationship between the RSS and the BJP is a complicated one, and at many points in history there have been moments of disagreement and divergence between the leadership of the two organisations. Notwithstanding these occasional differences, since the mid-1980s the functioning of the BJP has carried the unofficial imprimatur of the RSS leadership. The close coordination between the two has been made possible through the imprint of the RSS that is writ large in the organisational machinery of the BJP. We can detect this imprint in four major ways.

First, since its establishment, the senior leadership of the BJP has been drawn from the ranks of dyed-in-the-wool RSS swayamsevaks and pracharaks.

Here I move from historical analysis to philosophical explication of the concept of liberty, and I introduce the main conceptual components of the idea of freedom I defend.

This chapter examines the nature of slavery, and particularly chattel slavery, in the trans-Atlantic region in the modern period in order to structure the analysis of freedom to follow in subsequent chapters.

The warfare of the Greek city states was limited by their means, lacking military academies, professional officers and standing forces. Small communities fought local wars with levies of citizens, often highly motivated, but precious to the polity, which could not be kept in the field for long. Fruits of victory were modest, and defeat could put the survival of the whole state at risk. Fortification as a passive defensive policy was essential. In offensive warfare, states and coalitions mostly pursued a strategy of opportunism, in which the desirable was subordinated to the attainable. Commanders typically tried to avoid decisive engagements due to the risks involved; they focused their attacks on exposed targets like farmland, small towns, isolated garrisons and unprepared enemy troops. They relied heavily on local dissenters and deserters to guide and facilitate operations. When wealthier states like Corinth, Athens and Syracuse found themselves able to invest in warfare, we clearly see their dissatisfaction with this strategic straitjacket. The rapid development of fleets, extensive fortification networks, standing corps of specialist troops and siege technology allowed these states to dominate their less fortunate neighbours. This gives the lie to old notions that the Greeks preferred their wars to be limited in scope. A state that had much more than the others could disrupt the entire system, as Macedon would eventually show.

Chapter 4 examines issues of citizenship and religion, with a particular focus on the status of non-Muslims and women. After discussing the problematic notion of citizenship in the Arab world, the chapter analyzes the specific meaning and scope of citizenship in the post-2011 constitutional systems. The chapter shows, on the one hand, that despite significant improvements with respect to the past, non-Muslims and women are still excluded from full citizenship, which remains a prerogative of male Muslims. On the other hand, however, over the past few years, prominent religious leaders and institutions have called for a more equality-based approach toward citizenship’s rights for all people, irrespective of one’s sex and religious belief. Given the profound influence that religion exerts on law and society in Arab countries, these calls might well lead to the adoption of legal reforms aimed at reducing discrimination against women and non-Muslims, and might represent a first step toward replacing the differentiated citizenships that currently exist in Arab countries, with one single, full, and inclusive citizenship.

Finally, Chapter 6 reveals and analyzes the extensive rewards that ladies-in-waiting earned for fulfilling their normal duties as well as for loyally serving their mistresses during periods of national importance and political tension. Elite female servants benefitted from their positions at court, both in terms of material rewards and their ability to ease themselves into political situations. All female attendants earned some form of in-kind benefit, with room and board included for their service and formal clothing allowances distributed. Some servants garnered significant financial remuneration, through land grants assigned in perpetuity, expensive jeweled gifts, or extravagant annuity stipends. Others earned more modest wages, annuities, or gifts of secondhand clothing. When ladies and damsels scored patronage that offered nonmonetary privileges, they ranged from minor legal exemptions to significant pardoning of major crimes. Gift-giving redistributed wealth from monarch or aristocratic employer through lesser-status ranks in the household, but at the same time the theatricality of gift-giving and the allocation of sumptuous clothing linked to the royal or noble household enhanced the prestige of the bestower as they demonstrated their numerous, loyal servants and the affluence that allowed them to grant such gifts.

According to a study by the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM), one of the top associations of commerce and industry professionals in India, by the time of the 2014 general election, political consulting in India had grown to become an INR 7–8 billion industry (ASSOCHAM 2014). It was estimated that there were nearly 150 political consulting firms actively operating in India—both in major cities and in small towns and rural areas—that could charge anywhere up to INR 5 million for each constituency in which they were working. These firms could offer services including, but not limited to, voter profiling, media management, PR, campaign planning and constituency-based research, with some candidates using such firms even outside the election season.

The sudden rise and meteoric expansion of political consulting firms in India appears nothing short of miraculous if we note that before 2014, the very mention of political consultants in India was conspicuous by its absence. In the late 1990s, scholar Fritz Plasser conducted a ‘Global Political Consultancy Survey’ which interviewed political consultants, party managers and party employees in 40 countries (Plasser 2000; Plasser and Plasser 2002). Based on the results of the survey, Plasser (2000) found that in contrast to other parts of the world, none of the party managers interviewed in India claimed to have used the services of a political consultant. Furthermore, 77 per cent of all party managers in India expressed doubts about the possibility of ‘American campaign strategies’ ever being replicated in India. This led Plasser (2000, 44) to remark that ‘India is a special case, which can be attributed to the exceptional cultural barriers and the lack of money, as well as the Indian exceptionalism regarding their form of democracy’. Notwithstanding its purported ‘cultural barriers’, in a little over a decade, India witnessed the rise of the multi-million-dollar industry of political consulting. This chapter will demonstrate how the rise and expansion of political consultants can be attributed to an admixture of the demand- and supply-side variables outlined in Chapter 2.

This chapter provides a rough summary of how the United States came to be a federation of states rather than a unitary nation. To that end, it offers a thumbnail sketch of the timeline from the British colonial period to adoption of the US Constitution. The debates at the constitutional convention and the advocacy in both the Federalist and Antifederalist Papers are highlighted, with particular emphasis on the role of state sovereignty and the menu of choices that were open to the framers.

The chapter establishes the role of context in an analysis. This is done by defining context, presenting a context continuum that can be used to understand an object of study, and introducing the types of conditions that shape understandings of discourse. Six different approaches to studying context are discussed in this chapter: systemic functional linguistics, the SPEAKING model, frames, indexicality, contextualization cues, and next-turn proof procedure. After reading this chapter, readers will understand what context is and why it is important; be able to study context using different models and constructs; and know how discourse and context work together to create meaning.