Do voters punish left‐wing parties that pursue neo‐liberal policies? We address the question in the context of post‐communist countries, where the left implemented significant and painful market‐oriented reforms. For the left, owning these reforms means backing away from its popular image and policy platform and plausibly generates two electorally consequential outcomes: a ‘brand dilution’ effect that weakens voters’ attachment to left parties and is magnified by the economic vulnerability of the left's core constituency; and an ‘expectations effect’ that increases demand for right‐wing politicians. Overall, the left should lose votes, particularly when voters can easily attribute responsibility for policies. Our analysis uses updated data on the vote shares for all parties and elections in post‐communist democracies from 1991 to 2010. We find support for the theory: Incumbent left‐wing parties of the chief executive are punished at the ballot box for moving to the right on economic policy. This, likely, comes from a ‘brand dilution’ effect, as we find that such vote losses feed the fortunes of non‐incumbent left‐wing and populist parties.

Right‐wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to examine, first, whether right‐wing populist candidates in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right‐wing populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are investigated. While right‐wing populist candidates turned out to be far more likely to support direct democracy, right‐wing populist supporters did not mirror the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than other voters. The findings have implications both for how we conceive of the relationship between populism and direct democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.

Contributing to the emerging debate on non-resident citizens’ electoral preferences, this article addresses how migratory contexts affect their propensity to vote for populists. Employing two original datasets with information of external voting results from Latin America and Southern Europe, this study suggests that while external voters are on average slightly less likely to vote for populists than domestic voters, this varies meaningfully from country to country. It depends on the type of populism, populists’ incumbency, and the ideological preferences in the country of residence.

Its reliance on social media and television to mobilise supporters and popularise the figure of its charismatic leader, political science lecturer Pablo Iglesias, is one of the main characteristic features of Podemos, a new, left-leaning populist party that has shaken the political establishment of Spain since its irruption as a decisive political force in the 2014 European elections. Podemos could actually be defined as a ‘transmedia party’, as it combines the use of social media to reach young constituents with traditional TV talk show appearances to reach a wider, and also older, audience. This dualism (traditionalism and innovation) is also present in Podemos’ own configuration as a blend of a social movement and a vertically ruled political party, with a simultaneous presence outside and inside representative structures like parliaments and local governments. Far from hiding from recurrent accusations of populism, Podemos takes pride in being considered a populist movement. Actually, their leaders see their party-cum-movement as a practical implementation of the theories of the Argentinean philosopher Ernesto Laclau: their left-leaning populist formation is the necessary vanguard of a new democratic majority that will replace the current neoliberal hegemony. This unusual reflexivity is studied through a critical discourse analysis of published interviews with Podemos’ leaders.

The rise of populist radical right parties (PRRP) in Europe has led to an unprecedented number of publications focused on this phenomenon. While many of these studies analyse the causes of this rise, much less attention has been paid to its effects. Previous research has shown the success of their xenophobic arguments in conditioning the public debate. However, to what degree public opinion has normalised this discourse remains unclear. This study aims to address whether the electoral success of the PRRP leads to changes in anti-immigration attitudes across twenty-one European countries. Although the previous analysis confirms that the presence of these parties has increased significantly, examining data from European Social Survey (ESS), the results reveal two key findings: a shift towards a more favourable perception of immigration among some sectors of the population and a limited effect of the contextual factors, including the presence of the PRRP.

As a result of the steady rise of populist parties and politicians all over the world – and particularly since the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump – populism research has become increasingly popular and widespread. The field, however, also faces some tricky challenges. First, it is easy to confuse populism with related concepts like, for instance, ‘nativism’ and ‘Euroscepticism’. This brings the risk of sloppy conceptualisation, and, as a result, invalid inferences. Second, populism research remains relatively detached from adjacent fields, and fruitful fertilisation across literatures is still rather uncommon. In order to deal with these challenges, populism research should become both more and less focused. How can these two seemingly conflicting recommendations be reconciled? When it comes to conceptualisation/categorisation strategies and drawing conclusions from studies by other researchers, populism scholars should employ a narrow framework and be precise, distinctive and consistent. Yet when it comes to exploring the literature in search of new hypotheses, scholars should employ a more open mind‐set. After all, theories developed in adjacent fields can inspire populism scholars to formulate innovative new questions and expectations.

One of the most important challenges facing Political Science Faculty is the way in which the curriculum engages with, and responds to, the populist tide that has spread across a significant number of countries in recent decades. Over recent years there has been an increased level of research activity that has sought to explain the factors for the rise in populism. Yet less attention has been focused on the way in which the political science curriculum could, or should, respond to this change. This article provides an introductory landscape that sets out these challenges and identifies the contextual background for the three articles which comprise this symposium.

Currently, we are facing a challenge in quality citizen participation from populism, which is bringing not renewal of democracy, but corrosion—and potentially its dismantling—from the inside. Many people are being misled by nationalist entrepreneurs who are not committed to democracy or solving the problems which the average person faces, but to their own power and personal egos. Whether the challenges come from the political left or right, democracy needs consistent and quality participation by all of its citizens. As a significant part of the citizenry fails to fight for democracy, factual evidence, and the rights of all of the people, I argue that political scientists must re-examine what we are doing inside and outside of the classroom to foster students’ and communities’ growth in political knowledge, democratic skills, and democratic values and habits. This essay explores three points—content, quality of information, and context—to demonstrate how we can improve teaching and learning in civic education. Collegiate-level educators can ensure that we are positively contributing to the preservation and advancement of our democracies and battling the forces that seek to undermine our democracies.

Gender and politics research faces a crossroad in the age of populism. On the one hand, gender and sexuality research is on the way to institutionalisation across a growing number of academic systems in Europe. On the other, gender and sexuality research has become increasingly contested and attacked, and has become the bête noire of the populist and radical right. This contribution contends that gender research is under threat not only because of the gender component, but also because of the scholarly research. There are thus lessons to be drawn for the wider discipline of political science. This article first sketches out the dualization in the institutionalization of gender-related research. It then situates the hostility towards gender and sexuality research in the broader (and growing) opposition to gender + and sexual + equality. It concludes with some preliminary observations about the how this hostility may be part of a wider contestation of academic expertise and scholarly knowledge that is being led, at least in part, by populist forces of all stripes.

When and why do economic grievances result in support for populist parties? We address a long-standing puzzle in understanding populist voters. Existing studies have produced mixed results about how economic characteristics drive support for populist parties. We argue this is because scholars have overlooked the central importance of internal political efficacy, i.e., a belief in one’s ability to affect political outcomes. Using three pooled waves of the European Social Survey (ESS 2014, 2016, and 2018) with over 80,000 individual observations over time, we find that the economic determinants of populist support are contingent on internal political efficacy. Although there are reasons to think that the combined effect of economic circumstances and efficacy may be stronger on support for the populist left because of their stronger emphasis on social justice, we do not find evidence of this with the limited observations of the populist left in our sample. Critically, our findings contrast with the simplified and theoretically unsatisfying explanations of populist support we often encounter in the literature that are based solely on economic dissatisfaction. Instead, our results imply that recent trends in European politics are not only about economic issues but also about a voter’s belief in having agency and competence to affect change.

Studies on populist parties – or ‘supply‐side populism’ more generally – are numerous. Nevertheless, the connection with demand‐side dynamics, and particularly the populist characteristics or tendencies of the electorate, requires more scholarly attention. This article examines in more detail the conditions underlying the support for populist parties, and in particular the role of populist attitudes amongst citizens. It asks two core questions: (1) are populist party supporters characterised by stronger populist attitudes than other party supporters, and (2) to what extent do populist (and other) attitudes contribute to their party preference? The analysis uses fixed effect models and relies on a cross‐sectional research design that uses unique survey data from 2015 and includes nine European countries. The results are threefold. First, in line with single‐country studies, populist attitudes are prominent among supporters of left‐ and right‐wing populist parties in particular. Second, populist attitudes are important predictors of populist party support in addition to left‐wing socioeconomic issue positions for left‐wing populist parties, and authoritarian and anti‐immigration issue positions for right‐wing populist parties. Third, populist attitudes moderate the effect of issue positions on the support for populist parties, particularly for individuals whose positions are further removed from the extreme ends of the economic or cultural policy scale. These findings suggest that strong populist attitudes may encourage some voters to support a populist party whose issue positions are incongruous with their own policy‐related preferences.

This article provides the contextual background to the symposium on Populist Discourses and Political Communication in Southern Europe. It explains the symposium’s objectives and introduces the rationale of its articles on Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Within this context, the editors also highlight the specific conditions for the emergence of typical forms of Southern European populism, as well as its distinctive features, focusing on the challenges populism poses to politics and media research. The implications of the phenomenon for the future of the European project are also addressed.

Populism has become a resilient political phenomenon. Much of the normative political science on this topic is concerned with the relationship between democracy and populism. At the same time, the characterisation of post-war democracy has emerged as a key focal point in recent contributions to political history. This research note explores how both these developments and their disciplines might benefit from closer collaboration. It highlights, therefore, some of the distinctive features of populism’s relationship with democracy and shows how these might be accounted for by incorporating insights from history. At the same time, it argues that historiography has largely ignored the populist question in the history of post-war democracy and makes some suggestions as to how the history of populism might be included in this research.

A global trend of populism affects established democracies in Europe and around the world. Instrumental to this wave is the notion of the People, harnessed by populists’ rhetoric to their political advantage. Yet only little is known on the various, even contradicting meanings of the People in political discourse. Drawing on popular sovereignty theories and representation studies, in this paper I develop a theoretical framework of four key facets of the People—political, national, spatial, and abstract, and their two dimensions—concrete and diffuse. I argue that while elections are associated primarily with the political facet of the People, cross-temporal approaches to electoral representation highlight the People as a multifaceted construct. I explore these theoretical conjectures with computational text analysis of news media coverage of the 2016 American election. I find that the People is a multidimensional construct, with temporal dynamics that connect the political facet with the broader political agency of the People. However, this connection holds only before the 2016 election, and not after them. The results are discussed in relation to populism and the challenges democracies are facing.

Is it possible to rescue the concepts of ‘the people’ and popular sovereignty from their use and abuse at the hands of right-wing populist politics? In this article I look at two competing challenges to populist ideas of popular sovereignty. Underpinning a liberal critique of populism is a constrained view of democracy that either rejects any ideal of popular sovereignty altogether or reserves popular sovereignty for hypothetical moments of constitutional justification. The second view, which I call democratic pluralism, defends a dispersed view of popular sovereignty in which the people are conceived of as both inclusive and as ruling. In conclusion, I argue that this second option offers the most adequate answer to the populist challenge.

Empirical literature regarding which actors support the most participatory democracy is surprisingly scarce. Discussing the core ideological features of populist and post-materialist-centred parties, we expect that these parties emphasise participatory democracy more than their competitors. Additionally, populist parties should embody a monist demand for greater participatory democracy, while post-materialist-centred (PMC) parties should advocate a pluralist understanding of it. Drawing on party electoral manifestos, we verify these assumptions in several national elections across Europe. Our findings show mixed support for the theoretical expectations. Both post-materialist and populist parties support participatory democracy more than other parties, and their principles diverge. More precisely, our data confirm that PMC parties advocate a pluralist understanding of participatory democracy. Yet populist parties show a fuzzier picture. While populist radical right parties exhibit a monist profile, radical left populist parties are much more in line with post-materialist arguments.

During the pandemic, science became one of the most salient issues in European polities. At the same time, relevant sectors of European societies were sceptical about science-driven policy to contain the pandemic (e.g., lockdowns or vaccine mandates). The literature so far has analysed the relevance of trust in experts and trust in science in determining compliance to pandemic-related policies. However, we still do not know what are the drivers that lead to (dis)trust science. In this paper, we contribute to fill this gap, by analysing the association between technocratic and populist attitudes and trust in science. Using a novel survey, fielded in Italy, among a sample of 5.000 respondents, we show that populism and technocracy are strongly related with (dis)trust in science in opposite directions.

Deliberative democracy is a growing branch of democratic theory. It suggests understanding and assessing democracy in terms of the quality of communication among citizens, politicians, as well as between citizens and politicians. In this interview, drawing on his extensive research on deliberative practice within and beyond parliaments, André Bächtiger reflects on the development of the field over the last two decades, the relationship between normative theory and empirical research, and the prospects for practicing deliberation in populist times.