In times of war, the first instinct is to relieve the suffering of human beings. Environmental and animal interests are always pushed into the background. However, warfare strongly affects natural resources, including animals, which makes animal issues a matter of great concern. Certain species have been vanishing at a rapid rate because of wars, often with disastrous effects on the food chain and on the ecological balance. Indeed, belligerents rarely take into account the adverse consequences of their military operations on animals. They even take advantage of the chaotic circumstances of war in order to poach protected species and to engage in the trafficking of expensive animal products. While generating billions of dollars each year, such poaching and trafficking allows armed groups to grow and to reinforce their authority over disputed territory. States have also trained, and continue to train, certain animals—principally marine mammals such as bottlenose dolphins and California sea lions—to perform military tasks, like ship and harbor protection, or mine detection and clearance. Millions of horses, mules, donkeys, camels, dogs, and birds are obliged to serve on various fronts (transport, logistics, or communications) and become particularly vulnerable targets.

In the final months of his administration, President Donald Trump issued a variety of pardons and commutations, including a number related to foreign relations. His decision to issue full pardons to four former Blackwater contractors, who were convicted of killing Iraqi civilians in the 2007 Nisour Square incident, drew particular condemnation and continued a pattern of clemency grants related to war crimes committed abroad. Trump also granted clemency to his former national security advisor, Michael Flynn, and other associates who were convicted as a result of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III's investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Additionally, Trump pardoned the Israeli handler of Jonathan Pollard, a convicted U.S. spy.

In their article, Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany claim that post-Tallinn Manual practice demonstrates that states entertain doubts about the applicability to cyberspace of the rules contained in the Tallinn Manuals. According to the authors, post-Tallinn practice reveals that states treat the application of international law to cyber operations as optional; operate in parallel—legal and nonlegal—tracks of conduct; and engage in gradated enforcement. They also claim that their study invites further research into the implications of state conduct in cyberspace for general international law theory. I will use this last point as a springboard to explain the process of normativization in cyberspace—that is, the process of subjecting states’ cyber operations and behaviors to legal standards. To do this, I will use Oscar Schachter's representation of a normative (legal) order as a three-story building. According to Schachter's metaphor, the third floor is occupied by public values and general policy aspirations; the second floor is occupied by law with its distinctive normative patterns of prescribing, proscribing, and applying; while the ground floor is occupied by the social reality of conduct. The three floors are not isolated but connected by escalators and staircases that go in both directions.

International practice, including international instruments and case law, confirms that states generally accept that they have a duty to provide prior notification of planned measures that may have a significant adverse effect upon co-riparians. The principle of “prior notification” is framed differently in various instruments, and it can broadly include the duty to “notify” and “consult” on planned measures. Prior notification helps to prevent and mitigate disputes, as underlined by the ICJ. Notification and consultation create the conditions for cooperation among riparian states and for ensuring the protection of international watercourses. On the contrary, the lack of notification and consultation may aggravate disputes as in the case of the Great Renaissance Dam along the Nile River. The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Watercourses Convention) provides a detailed procedural framework on prior notification and consultation. This essay outlines the established characteristics of the prior notification and consultation duty, then argues that the duty should be viewed not only as an inter-state obligation but also as including the obligation to inform and consult local communities.

This essay outlines a quandary facing international investment dispute settlement (IIDS): the tension between the wish to curb “dual hatting” and the wish to increase the diversity of those appointed as arbitrators in IIDS cases. Thoughtful observers are concerned by the effect on IIDS, either in fact or as a matter of appearance, of lawyers who wear “dual hats”—one as arbitrator in IIDS cases, and a second as counsel representing clients in other IIDS matters. Concurrently, other thoughtful observers are concerned that appointments to IIDS predominantly go to a small cadre of established arbitrators caricatured as “pale, male and stale.” This concern has prompted efforts to increase the pool of female and minority arbitrators. However, these individuals would be drawn primarily from the ranks of younger practicing lawyers who must continue to practice unless and until they receive sufficient appointments to make full-time service as arbitrators economically feasible.

In the last few years, states have advanced various proposals for cooperation in the use of countermeasures. In this Article, we ask whether, and if so under what conditions, states may lawfully collaborate in the taking of countermeasures against other states. We distinguish five different types of collaboration: (1) independent but coordinated action; (2) secondment; (3) joint action; (4) aid and assistance; and (5) what we term “proxy countermeasures”—the idea of taking a measure at the request and on behalf of another state. We consider the permissibility of each, both where the acting state is itself entitled to resort to countermeasures and where it is not. We also draw attention to certain legal and policy considerations relating to, and to plausible avenues for, the development of international law.