There has been much discussion, in the public press and elsewhere, of the refusal of the President to give notice, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, of the termination of so much of the treaties with various foreign governments as restricts the right of the United States to impose discriminating customs duties on imports in foreign vessels and discriminatory tonnage dues on foreign vessels entering the United States. So far as this discussion is concerned with the proposed policy of assisting the American merchant marine by thus discriminating against foreign shipping, it is not within the province of this comment to venture an opinion. So far, however, as criticism has been directed against this action of the President upon the ground that in thus failing or refusing to carry out this direction of Congress he has exceeded his constitutional rights, an interesting and important question of constitutional law, affecting international relations, is presented.

On October 29, 1919, the first annual meeting of the International Labor Conference opened at Washington, D. C. It convened pursuant to the invitation of the United States Government authorized by joint resolution of Congress in accordance with and under the provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty and the League of Nations. The meeting was in some respects embarrassed by the fact that the League of Nations had not yet come into existence, but it nevertheless proceeded, doubtless on the theory that, in the present disjointed times, it is not inappropriate that the creature should precede the creator.