We use computer simulation to identify a process by which cooperation evolves without iteration, and evolves better in large than in small societies. It is based on an empirically supported heuristic for deciding whether to enter noniterated prisoner's dilemma games, namely, Expect others to have the same dispositions as yourself. Players are assigned a probability of cooperating that also defines their expectations about others' behavior and thus their willingness to play. The carrying capacity of the ecology is 10,000. Players multiply by 2 if their aggregate payoff in a given round (1) places them among the more successful 5,000 and (2) is more than zero. We find that the most adaptive disposition is toward the mean of the population. That is where individuals have the optimal mix of consummated plays with more cooperative players and unconsummated plays with less cooperative ones. When encounters occur by proximity, fortuitous clusters toward the cooperative tail will grow and dominate the society. Such clusters are more likely in large societies.

We moderns attack no new problem when we set out again on the quest for responsibility. We merely use new terms for old ideas. Hundreds of generations have tried to reconcile liberty and law, authority and freedom. These same problems are posed on the oldest Egyptian tablets. Recall also that requirement in an old Greek city that whosoever desired to propose a new law should come into the place of assembly with a rope about his neck. Responsibility, you see! Justinian declared that the affairs which concern all should be decided by all. Such illustrations may be found throughout the pages of history. Calvin and Arminius posed the problem in theological language, using the terms “sovereignty of God” and “free will.” Plantagenets, Tudors, and Stuarts all grappled with the implications of the responsible crown, and with the difficulties of getting taxes without debate in Parliament. Magna Carta, the Declaration of Right, ship money, the Instrument of Government of Cromwell's day, habeas corpus, the Bill of Rights—these are all tokens of a long English struggle for responsibility in government.

Much of this essay falls within the realm of speculative thought. Since it is in the nature of speculation that one's words may appear immodest and his conclusions often eccentric, I shall state my arguments at the outset without pausing to elaborate them. The arguments themselves are quite simple. Each of them will reappear later on clothed, I hope, in more attractive dress.

Two varieties of political thought contended for the allegiance of the American people at the founding of the new nation. The two seem irreconcilable in certain crucial respects.

One was notable for its expression of friendship and brotherhood, for its insistence upon individual spontaneity and uniqueness, and for its disdain for material concerns; it was intuitive and unsystematic in temper. The other displayed a preoccupation with social order, procedural rationality, and the material bases of political association and division; it was abstract and systematic in temper.

The exponents of the latter point of view, having put their opponents to rout, assumed the responsibility for organizing the government and politics of the country. They enacted their psychological, social, economic, and political theories into fundamental law, then erected insititutions designed to train generations of citizens to prefer certain goods and conduct over all others.

This paper, based on a statewide survey of 907 Florida high school seniors, reveals that self-reported marijuana use, regardless of cause, has social and political implications, though not at the high level of association suggested by the stereotype of a pot-smoking, hippie, political radical. Demographically, the user is typically an urban white male from a wealthier and better educated family. Marijuana users are differentiated from non-users in their more negative views toward the most proximate authority structures and their desire for changes in laws regulating behaviors commonly associated with youth. Marijuana use was not associated with broader social concerns or political ideology, and was only tenuously associated with political alienation. The relationship between measures of social discontent and political alienation reveals a more homogeneous pattern among users than non-users, thus supporting Goode's “subcommunity” hypothesis.

The Weimar Republic is frequently invoked in political theory as an example when the issue is the appropriate response of liberal democracies to internal, fundamental challenges. I explore that example through the lens of a 1932 court case that tested the legality of the federal government's “coup” against Prussia. In my analysis of the court's judgment and of the arguments of three political and public law theorists, Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann Heller, I argue for Heller's democratic vision of the rule of law. In my conclusion, I compare problems in Kelsen's position with problems in the recently articulated position of John Rawls in order to suggest what lessons Weimar may have for contemporary political theory.

We evaluate the six-year presidential term proposal in the context of a model of the U.S. economy characterized by a short-run but not a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment. Votes and public welfare are separately conceptualized as functions of inflation and unemployment, which are indirectly controlled by the president through manipulation of government spending.

In a series of simulation experiments, the vote-maximizing choice of policy instruments led to less we(fare loss with six- than with four-year terms under most conditions. Ironically, vote maximizing was shown to lead not only to short- and long-term welfare loss, but also to long-run political disadvantage.

In the December 1988 issue of this Review, John Chubb and Terry Moe presented data comparing public and private schools, and made an argument concerning “politics, markets, and the organization of schools.” Chubb and Moe argue that private schools outperform public schools because they are more autonomous, advantaged by market forces rather than democratic political control. Jack Tweedie takes vigorous exception to this conclusion, arguing that the evidence does not support Chubb and Moe's conclusions about the efficacy of market forces. Dennis Riley directly attacks the virtues of market control of institutional choices in educational policy making. Chubb and Moe find their critics unconvincing.

Entering the polling booth on Tuesday, November 3, 1964, the typical California voter found himself confronted with an immense sheet of finely-printed green paper, a dirty black rubber stamp, a tiny ink pad, and thirty decisions to render. A few minutes later (the legal maximum is 10) he emerged and numbly surrendered to a clerk his ballot, now slightly embellished, like the fingers of his decision hand, with black ink stains.

Most of his decisions were made on a lengthy array of propositions. In these, questions on an assortment of issues were posed, each couched in language tedious and obscure—as only minds trained in the finest law schools could devise.

This study seeks to gain some knowledge about factors which influence the vote on these propositions. It employs a somewhat unorthodox method: an analysis of the voting patterns on actual ballots. The ballots furnish attractive data because they are, after all, completely accurate records of the results of those minutes of decision-rendering in the artificial privacy of that cramped polling booth.

It would be impossible by this method to generate a comprehensive theory about proposition voting behavior—too much information about the individual voter is forever lost by the secrecy incorporated in the balloting procedure. Nevertheless a contribution can be made in several areas of relevant concern, areas currently dominated more by folklore and mythology than fact or theory.

We contribute to research on the democratic role of middle classes. Our paper distinguishes between middle classes emerging autonomously during gradual capitalist development and those fabricated rapidly as part of state-led modernization. To make the case for a conceptual distinction between these groups within one national setting, we employ author-assembled historical district data, survey, and archival materials for pre-Revolutionary Russia and its feudal estates. Our analysis reveals that the bourgeois estate of meshchane covaries with post-communist democratic competitiveness and media freedoms, our proxies of regional democratic variations. We propose two causal pathways explaining the puzzling persistence of social structure despite the Bolsheviks’ leveling ideology and post-communist autocratic consolidation: (a) processes at the juncture of familial channels of human capital transmission and the revolutionaries’ modernization drive and (b) entrepreneurial value transmission outside of state policy. Our findings help refine recent work on political regime orientations of public-sector-dependent societies subjected to authoritarian modernization.

For decades, political scientists have argued that competition is a fundamental component of a responsible party system, such that when one party dominates politics, legislative coalitions destabilize and democratic accountability suffers. In this paper, I evaluate these predictions in an important but largely unexplored legislative environment: American local government. Using an original collection of roll-call records from 151 municipal councils, I show that legislative behavior is more one-dimensional when elections are partisan and the electorate is evenly balanced between the parties. When either of these features is absent, however, elite behavior remains unstructured, with coalitions shifting over time and across issues. These differences across institutional and competitive contexts suggest that partisan elections—and the party organizations that nearly always come with them—are critical for translating electoral insecurity into organized government, raising questions about the capacity for electoral accountability in a growing set of one-party dominant governments across the country.

When forming opinions, mass publics may implicitly or explicitly value some people’s well-being more than others. Here we examine how two forms of this phenomenon—ethnocentric valuation and moral exclusion—affect attitudes toward international trade. We hypothesize that attitudes toward competition and believing that trade is a competition moderate the extent of ethnocentric valuation and moral exclusion; although all citizens value their co-nationals’ livelihoods systematically more than those of people in trading partner countries, greater ethnocentric valuation and moral exclusion occur when trade is seen as a competition and when individuals hold more positive attitudes toward competition.

Using two survey experiments conducted on representative samples of both Americans and Canadians, we examine how differential valuation of in-country and out-country job gains and losses influences trade policy preferences. We test a series of hypotheses using multiple variables tied to competitive attitudes across two countries that differ in their attitudes toward competition.

Compared with the recent substantial strides in presidential election analysis, research on congressional elections has only begun. The majority of studies have been cast within the presidential-election context, with the relationship between the presidential and congressional vote the phenomenon to be explained. The present attention to presidential contests is understandable because of the inherent interest in such races in a presidential-centered political system and because reliable survey data have been limited to nationwide samples, severely restricting analysis on a state or district basis. And yet without some comparable advances at the congressional level, we cannot assess bases of electoral support nor the numerous assumptions of behavior in Congress as linked to this support, nor attempt a theory of voting behavior that does not consider voting at the subpresidential level. Put simply, the state of research is such that we have only begun to identify and measure the key variables affecting congressional voting outcomes. It is this basic task to which recent research in the field has been directed.

Consider as the core phenomenon for explanation the sharp fluctuations over time in the partisan division of the vote for Senator and Representative. Since studies of voting behavior indicate the stability of party loyalties over time, evidence of sharp shifts in voting outcomes suggest factors other than party cues influencing the vote decision. Among the lines of inquiry opened, studies by Cummings, Press, and Hinckley, following the work of Key, have utilized aggregate election statistics to measure the substantial impact of the presidential vote on House election outcomes.

A recent note by Robert Butterworth is critical of William Riker's size principle on several important grounds. There is, however, an important omission in his analysis which this present essay aims to correct. The author goes on to tie assertions about coalition structure in n-person zero-sum games to a solution theory for such games. In the appendix to this essay the general five-person game, of which Butterworth's game is a special case, is considered in some detail. The effect, with one reasonable solution theory, is a favorable appraisal of the size principle.

We use simulations based on a multiequation model of federal budgetary outcomes to assess the Reagan administrations impact on the federal budget during fiscal years 1982–86. Reagan's aggregate budget priorities represent a significant departure from the priorities of prior postwar administrations. The bulk of this shift in priorities had occurred by fiscal 1984. Defense spending and uncontrollable domestic spending were higher, and spending on domestic controllable programs lower under Reagan than they would otherwise have been. The distinctiveness of Reagan's budgetary priorities can be attributed to his tax cuts and—far from a strategy of “starving the budget by reducing revenues”—to a failure to allow fiscal pressures to restrain spending. The model projects that without tax cuts Reagan's predecessors would have spent no less on defense than Reagan. Cutting taxes increased the deficit by about $400 billion cumulatively during fiscal years 1982–86 and reduced expenditures by roughly $30 billion.

Out-of-date ideas—if they can only manage to survive long enough—are often put to new and surprising uses. A case in point is British Toryism. This pre-capitalist, pre-individualist, pre-liberal creed, one might think, ought surely to have died out during the 19th century. Yet not only has it survived into the era of socialism, it can also claim credit for having helped build the Welfare State. And today British socialists and Tories—both collectivists in a degree—often have more in common than either have with their fellow Liberals. Old traditions of strong government, paternalism and the organic society have made easier the modern re-assertion of state power.

New policies usually produce new kinds of politics. For every major concept of public policy, Schattschneider has observed, there has been a different theory of political organization. Over a period of decades, British collectivism has created not only a new pattern of policy, but also a new structure of power, especially in the realm of political parties and interest groups. Along with a collectivist theory of policy has arisen a collectivist theory of representation. And the latter, like the former, is today supported in interesting and subtle ways by attitudes and ideas deriving from a distant past. The purpose of this article is to look at the historical background of certain of these attitudes—especially those concerning the role of interest groups in politics.

Although David Hume's stature as a philosopher has rarely been questioned, his claims as a political theorist have fared less well. Jefferson showed deep hostility towards Hume's ideas, while John Adams could find agreement with only a few points. Later opinion has been less vehement but still reserved. Thomas Huxley thought Hume's political writings suggestive, but on the whole marred by an unabashed desire for literary success. In Sir Leslie Stephen's judgment Hume was guilty of a “cynical conservatism” that was at once superficial and unhistorical.

More recent studies, such as those of Sabine and Halévy, have established more securely Hume's place in political thought but have left certain ambiguities. Sabine has coupled Hume with Burke as an opponent of eighteenth-century rationalism, while Halévy viewed him as a forerunner of the “philosophical radicalism” of Bentham, Adam Smith, James Mill, and Ricardo. To have fathered squabbling children is always something of an embarrassment, but particularly so when one is, like Hume, temperamentally averse to taking sides. It is true, nonetheless, that if a temporary distinction is made between Hume's doctrine and his influence, it is possible to maintain that his influence worked in two quite different directions. His inquires into causation, the role of reason, and the nature of moral judgments helped eventually to undermine the natural law structure of eighteenth-century liberalism, while his emphasis on utility as the test of institutions contributed an important ingredient to Benthamite liberalism.

Dwight Waldo, Stephen Bailey, and I, among others who have from time to time expressed admiration for certain litterateurs as sources of wisdom and understanding of the art and science of public administration, will undoubtedly ponder at length a statement in W. Somerset Maugham's latest collection of imponderabilia, Points of View. Maugham says:

Only the very ingenuous can suppose that a work of fiction can give us reliable information on the topics which it is important to us for the conduct of our lives to be apprised of. By the nature of his creative gifts the novelist is incompetent to deal with such matters; his not to reason why, but to feel, to imagine, and to invent. He is biased. The subjects the writer chooses, the characters he creates, and his attitude toward them are conditioned by his bias. What he writes is the expression of his personality and the manifestation of his instincts, his emotions, his intuitions, and his experience. He loads his dice, sometimes not knowing what he is up to, but sometimes knowing very well; and then he uses such skill as he has to prevent the reader from finding him out. Henry James insisted that the writer of fiction should dramatize. That is a telling, though perhaps not very lucid, way of saying that he must so arrange his facts as to capture and hold his reader's attention. This, as everyone knows, is what Henry James consistently did, but, of course, it is not the way a work of scientific or informative value is written. If readers are concerned with the pressing problems of the day, they will do well to read, as Chekhov advised them to do, not novels or short stories, but the works that specifically deal with them.

The act of voting in legislative and judicial bodies is one of the most widespread and valuable sources of information available to political analysts. When individuals make structured choices within some known institutional constraints, there is opportunity for the generation of data concerning how issues are collectively defined within an institution, the relative position of each actor with regard to every other actor, and the identification of blocs of actors which are more or less persistent from one issue to another over time. With proper techniques of analysis, we should be able not only to generalize about behavior within a given voting body but also to make general statements about the voting process.

Cumulative studies of voting can be undertaken, however, only on the basis of some paradigm of the voting process—that is, some consensus on how voting as an act of political commitment is to be viewed. Such a paradigm not only should provide a viewpoint for the study of voting but should also suggest an orientation to the more general political phenomenon of which voting is an example—that is, actors making mutually exclusive choices in response to a series of questions, issues, candidates, etc. That such an agreed-upon viewpoint—not to mention a model that gives the viewpoint a precise focus—does not exist is obvious from the uses which have been made of voting data. Despite the ubiquity of such data and the many different kinds of analyses that have been performed on them, there is no model available that logically interrelates (1) systemic characteristics of voting bodies, (2) individual characteristics of their members, and (3) relational characteristics between pairs of members in such a way as to yield operational measures of voting behavior that are comparative in nature.

Why do local governments sometimes hire lobbyists to represent them in other levels of government? I argue that such mobilization efforts depend in part on the policy congruence between localities and their elected delegates in the legislature. I provide evidence consistent with this theory by examining how municipal governments in the United States respond to partisan and ideological mismatches with their state legislators—a common representational challenge. Using almost a decade of original panel data on municipal lobbying in all 50 states, I employ difference-in-differences and a regression discontinuity design to demonstrate that cities are significantly more likely to hire lobbyists when their districts elect non-co-partisan state representatives. The results are broadly consistent with a model of intergovernmental mobilization in which local officials purchase advocacy to compensate for the preference gaps that sometimes emerge in multilevel government.