A study of the financing of the 1936 campaign is particularly interesting since it may show what, if any, effect the “New Deal” program has had upon political alignments. Eventually, any radical shift in the support of a political party must be reflected in the sources from which it draws its campaign funds.

In 1928, both major parties depended largely upon bankers and manufacturers for their contributions, although the Republicans received a larger proportion of their fund from manufacturers than did their rivals. In 1932, although the proportion of the Democratic fund coming from manufacturers dropped appreciably, Roosevelt's promises of a New Deal had no apparent effect upon the support of the bankers, who contributed as heavily as in 1928.

This article brings together work on liberal political theory and black nationalism in an attempt to both strengthen the case for black nationalism and enrich and extend liberal theory. I begin by arguing that for much of U.S. history, the classical black nationalist case for an independent state finds substantial support in recent liberal theories of secession. In the post–civil rights era, black nationalists in the Black Power movement argued for more limited forms of black autonomy, a position known as “community nationalism.” Community black nationalism makes claims similar to minority nationalist claims for limited self-determination, yet liberal multiculturalists like Will Kymlicka defend the latter while withholding support for black nationalism. I argue that black nationalism raises fundamental issues of justice and that liberal multicultural theory can be extended to support black nationalist claims.

In this essay, I rely primarily on unpublished documents from the Rockefeller Foundation Archives as well as the annual reports of the Ford Foundation and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) to show that rather than being in a torpor, political theory in the 1950s was a large and eclectic field, marked by contest and rapid change. I focus on the Rockefeller Foundation's policy making for its program in Legal and Political Philosophy (LAPP), the largest grant program for political theory in the 1950s, both to see how the Foundation justified the creation of the program and how it defined its scope. I argue that when faced with the task of settling on a working definition of “political theory” for the purpose of awarding grants, the Foundation's officers and the academics who assisted them opted, after prolonged debate, for an eclectic definition of political theory. I read the emergence of this eclectic definition of political theory, however, not as evidence of pacific pluralism but as an attempt to contain some of the new challenges to the field by incorporating them into it, albeit in a subordinate position.

Having made some general observations on the aspirations and obstacles of fascist ideology in democratic countries, we shall now attempt to weigh the actual possibilities of a further spread of autocratic rule in the principal states of Europe. Herein we cannot abstain from a certain amount of prophecy, with all the hazards of statements not entirely based on undisputable fact; but we shall try to keep the forecast within reasonable bounds and to fortify it by reference to actual experience in the different countries under survey. Instead of travelling rather haphazardly over Europe, we should prefer a systematic grouping of the different countries which have not yet adopted autocracy. However, we shall find it rather difficult to discover a reasonable line of division; and accordingly we shall deal with each state separately and determine in the course of our journey whether some synoptical conclusions are permissible.

Over the last decade the scholarship on judicial politics has increasingly emphasized the strategic aspects of decision making in the United States Supreme Court. This scholarship, however, has struggled with two significant limitations—the restriction to unidimensional policy spaces and the assumption of binary comparisons of alternatives. These two assumptions have the advantage of implying stable, predictable outcomes, but lack a sound theoretical foundation and assume away potentially important aspects of strategic behavior on the Court. In this article, we identify institutional features of the Court that, under certain conditions, allow us to relax these two assumptions without sacrificing stable, predictable policy outcomes. In particular, we formalize the “part-by-part” opinion voting used by the justices, a feature that, together with separable preferences over policy issues, implies stable policy outcomes around the issue-by-issue median of the justices.

How are politicians informed and who do politicians seek information from? The role of information has been at the center for research on legislative organizations but there is a lack of systematic empirical work on the information that Congress seeks to acquire and consider. To examine the information flow between Congress and external groups, we construct the most comprehensive dataset to date on 74,082 congressional committee hearings and 755,540 witnesses spanning 1960–2018. We show descriptive patterns of how witness composition varies across time and committee and how different types of witnesses provide varying levels of analytical information. We develop theoretical expectations for why committees may invite different types of witnesses based on committee intent, interbranch relations, and congressional capacity. Our empirical evidence shows how committees’ partisan considerations can affect how much committees turn to outsiders for information and from whom they seek information.

The sexual division of labor and the social and economic value of women's work in the home has been a problem that scholars have struggled with at least since the advent of the “second wave” women's movement, but it has never entered into the primary discourses of political science. This paper argues that John Stuart Mill's Political Economy provides innovative and useful arguments that address this thorny problem. Productive labor is essential to Mill's conception of property, and property was vital to women's independence in Mill's view. Yet since Mill thought most women would choose the “career” of wife and mother rather than working for wages, then granting that work productive status would provide a radical and inventive foundation for women's equality. Mill, however, is ambiguous about the productive status of domestic labor, and is thereby representative of a crucial failure in political economic thought, as well as in egalitarian liberal thought on gender. But because Mill at the same time develops a conception of production that goes well beyond the narrow limits offered by other prominent political economists, he offers contemporary political scientists and theorists a way to rethink the relationship of reproductive to productive labor, the requirements for gender equality, and the accepted categories of political economy.

A recent article in this Review has drawn attention to the inadequacies in our knowledge of how great social movements arise. On the Negro protest movement there are many hypotheses but few attempts to relate them to differences in individual behavior. Considerable confusion also exists in the variety of explanatory terms involved. James A. Geschwinder lists five hypotheses that focus variously on economic conditions and the psychological meaning given them. They are the Vulgar Marxist hypothesis—that Negro dissatisfaction results from a progressive deterioration in the social and economic position of the race; the Rising Expectations hypothesis—that Negro expectations are rising more rapidly than their fulfillment; the Sophisticated Marxist hypothesis or the Relative Deprivation hypothesis—that Negro perceptions of white life have led to dissatisfaction with their own rate of improvement; the Rise and Drop hypothesis—that improvement in conditions followed by a sharp drop is responsible; and the Status Inconsistency hypothesis—that a group possessing status attributes ranked differently on various status hierarchies of a society will be dissatisfied and prone to rebellion.

This paper will suggest that theory based on variations in the structure of intergroup relations can go some way toward integrating the different kinds of explanation that have been advanced. A more general aspiration is to draw attention to one set of terms that might be useful in the long overdue development of a genuinely comparative study of social movements such as the Negro movement. The broad hypothesis arising from—but by no means fully tested by—an examination of several individual and contextual variables is that proximity to the dominant white culture increases the likelihood of protest involvement. The analysis will give a priority to structural considerations, but will also suggest something about intervening psychological variables.

The model of comparative state policy focusing on economic development and interparty competition was reformulated by Edward Carmines to include the mediating impact of state legislatures. This study challenges his initial conclusions, poses an alternative hypothesis, and finds that interparty competition has a consistently stronger impact on “progressive” state policies among states with organizationally weak, ineffective legislative institutions, than among those with organizationally strong, capable legislatures. The findings also reveal that legislative decision-making capability is distinct from the concept of legislative professionalism.

Krishna and Morgan propose “amendments” to two of Gilligan and Krehbiel’s theoretical studies of legislative signaling. The new results for homogeneous committees do not significantly change the empirical expectations of prior works, but the results for heterogeneous committees contradict earlier claims. This note gives primary attention to heterogeneous committees and compares and contrasts the new and old equilibria and their empirical implications. The notion of signaling is somewhat nebulous in all such games but seems distinctly less plausible in the key Krishna-Morgan proposition than in previous legislative signaling games. Furthermore, the empirical literature on choice of rules—specifically, the finding of a positive relationship between committee heterogeneity and restrictive rules—is inconsistent with the Krishna-Morgan analysis but consistent with Gilligan-Krehbiel analyses, even though the former is informationally efficient and the latter are not.

The problem of politics and culture emerged in European thought from Kierkegaard to Freud the encounter with modernity. In this paper I examine a major instance of that encounter in Weber's “science of culture” and his analysis of the cultural significance of capitalism. In Weber's work the most important and politically relevant responses to modern, subjectivist culture lie in attempts from within the ethical, aesthetic, erotic, and intellectualist life orders or value spheres to escape from the “iron cage” constructed by Western rationalism. I investigate the relative autonomy and paradoxical nature of these different attempts, and conclude with an explanation of Weber's choices with respect to the sphere of knowledge, or “science.”

With the field of political geography defined on the lines indicated in the preceding instalment of this article, its content may be outlined in terms of the study of a single state area. Naturally, such studies of different states may lead to the comparative study of state areas, just as regional studies may lead to a comparative science of regions. The outline which follows represents perhaps a minimum, including only those topics which I think are unquestionably to be included.

• I. Descriptive analysis of the state

  • A. Description or analysis of the state as a whole

    1. 1. Size

    2. 2. Form and shape

    3. 3. Location in relation to other state areas

    4. 4. Boundaries

  • B. Analysis of the internal structure of the area

    1. 1. Natural landscape areas, or provinces

    2. 2. Cultural landscape areas, or provinces

    3. 3. Areal distribution of significant population groups

    4. 4. Location of the administrative center (capital)

    5. 5. Geographic relations of the different areas thus analyzed, to each other and to the capital

Nineteenth-century evolutionary historical schemas formulated in Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, or status to contract terms, which underpin theories of modernization and development in the contemporary social sciences, are now called into serious question. Recent archaeological discoveries show ancient society to have been preeminently contractual; and anthropological studies of family, clan, and tribe reveal them to be more than primordial relics in modernizing systems. A careful reading of the ancient writers—particularly Aristotle, who was read as lending support to the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft distinction—yields a very different picture, as Marx in fact appreciated. Family, clan, tribe, patron-client, friendship, and other affinal sets were constitutive of the ancient society of the polis, and have shown extraordinary durability in the modern political society of the Mediterranean basin. In the small-scale, urban, entrepreneurial, and commercial society of the Mediterranean polis, ancient and modern, which was characterized by a high degree of face-to-face interaction, people learned participation in the plethora of little-incorporated societies—familial, religious, cultic, and recreational.

Enacting stringent climate policy has proven politically challenging, not least because of concentrated losses in fossil fuel-producing communities. “Just transition” strategies have been proposed to mitigate this distributional challenge. Yet, little is known about how such strategies affect voting behavior. Using a mixed-methods approach, we exploit a local climate policy in Spain—a “Just Transition Agreement” (JTA) to phase out coalmining, support affected workers, and invest in affected municipalities—which was negotiated by the incumbent Socialist Party (PSOE) government with affected unions and businesses shortly before a national election. A difference-in-differences study shows that PSOE’s vote share in coalmining municipalities increased at the 2019 election relative to similar municipalities, implying that the JTA was electorally successful. Further statistical tests and elite interviews suggest that this electoral boost was driven by unions’ support of the JTA. Our findings have implications for how parties can craft popular climate policy.

There is a notable gap in the academic literature on racism within European Union institutions. This article scrutinizes racism and normative whiteness in one of these institutions—namely, the European Parliament. The article asks how European whiteness, as a norm, is related to and sustains racism in the European Parliament and how this affects efforts to tackle racism and formulate internal antiracist practices within the institution. The research material consists of interviews, parliamentary ethnography, and official document data, and the empirical analysis is divided into three levels: individual, political group, and parliamentary. An important contribution is to demonstrate the techniques of reproducing whiteness as an institutional norm and racialized power relations in the European Parliament. This avoids linking racism to only the actions and attitudes of individuals and enables the article to address how racism is reproduced through the Parliament as an institution.

How can we close persistent gender gaps in political participation? We develop a theory highlighting the role of male household members as “gatekeepers” of women’s participation in patriarchal settings and argue that the answer involves targeting these men. We conduct a field experiment in Pakistan and find that targeting women with a nonpartisan get-out-the-vote campaign has no effect on their turnout in a national election. However, women’s turnout increases substantially when male household members are canvassed to support women’s participation. Households where both men and women are canvassed see the largest increases in women’s turnout and additional increases in political discussion and men’s practical support to help women vote. Using a costly behavioral measure, we also demonstrate lasting effects on men’s supportive behavior in these households two months after the election. Our results address the importance, and tangible benefits, of engaging men to ease constraints that hinder equal participation.

Affluent Americans have disproportionate influence over policymaking and often use their power to advance conservative economic policies that increase inequality. I show that this behavior is partially driven by affluent Americans’ desire for social status. First, I use a new survey scale to show that affluent Americans’ desire for social status strongly predicts their level of economic conservatism. Second, I test my theory experimentally in the context of social media. On sites like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, affluent Americans compete for social status by sharing curated versions of their lives that highlight their upper-class lifestyle. When I randomly assign affluent Americans to experience this status competition, it causes them to become more economically conservative. The results help us understand the social and psychological origins of economic conservatism among affluent Americans, and provide the first evidence that social media encourages political behaviors that are conducive to inequality.

This article develops an account of demand-making and provides a novel framework for evaluating the demands and strategies of social movements. It explores three features of demands, arguing that they disclose social conditions, create constituencies, and set the horizons of the world that social movements seek to build. It does so by considering two feminist demands: the demand for wages for housework and for the socialization of housework. By revisiting revolutionary feminism in the 1970s, it contrasts two strategic perspectives articulated in debates about housework: what Selma James called the “perspective of winning” and what I call the “perspective of investment,” a strategy for change that sees short-term reforms as investments in long-term transformations. In light of this, I endorse the demand to socialize housework as apt for the contemporary care economy and show how my account of demand-making contributes to the political theory of social movements by clarifying movement demands for “non-reformist reforms,” such as defund the police.

We ask whether party competition improves economic and social well-being, drawing on evidence from the 50 American states for the period 1880–2010. Today, strident party competition and partisan polarization are blamed for many of the ills of national and state politics. But a much deeper political science tradition points to the virtues of competitive party politics. In this historical analysis, we find that states with competitive party systems spend more than other states—and specifically spend more on education, health, and transportation, areas identified as investments in human capital and infrastructure. We find that this spending leads to longer life expectancy, lower infant mortality, better educational outcomes, and higher incomes. Thus we conclude that party competition is not just healthy for a political system but for the life prospects of a state’s residents.