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Inherence heuristic versus essentialism: Issues of antecedence and cognitive mechanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2014

Vincent Y. Yzerbyt  and
Stéphanie Demoulin
Vincent Y. Yzerbyt
Affiliation:
Institute for Research in Psychological Sciences, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. vincent.yzerbyt@uclouvain.bestephanie.demoulin@uclouvain.be
Stéphanie Demoulin
Affiliation:
Institute for Research in Psychological Sciences, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. vincent.yzerbyt@uclouvain.bestephanie.demoulin@uclouvain.be
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Abstract

We argue (1) that the empirical evidence offered by the authors is insufficient to sustain their claim; (2) that, beyond methodological problems, the proposed underlying cognitive mechanism is largely speculative and that a reverse, more motivational, path is equally plausible; and (3) that the distinction and antecedence of inherence intuitions with respect to essentialist beliefs remain to be demonstrated.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 5 , October 2014 , pp. 505 - 506
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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