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Generalizing a model beyond the inherence heuristic and applying it to beliefs about objective value

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2014

Graham Wood
Graham Wood*
Affiliation:
School of Humanities, University of Tasmania, Launceston, 7250 Tasmania, Australia. graham.wood@utas.edu.auhttp://www.utas.edu.au/humanities/people/philosophy-profiles/Graham-Wood
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Abstract

The inherence heuristic is characterized as part of an instantiation of a more general model that describes the interaction between undeveloped intuitions, produced by System 1 heuristics, and developed beliefs, constructed by System 2 reasoning. The general model is described and illustrated by examining another instantiation of the process that constructs belief in objective moral value.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 5 , October 2014 , pp. 504 - 505
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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