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Quantum probability, choice in large worlds, and the statistical structure of reality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2013

Don Ross  and
James Ladyman
Don Ross
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa. don.ross@uct.ac.zahttp://uct.academia.edu/DonRoss
James Ladyman
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol BS81TB, United Kingdom. james.ladyman@bristol.ac.ukhttp://bristol.ac.uk/philosophy/department/staff/JL/jl.html
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Abstract

Classical probability models of incentive response are inadequate in “large worlds,” where the dimensions of relative risk and the dimensions of similarity in outcome comparisons typically differ. Quantum probability models for choice in large worlds may be motivated pragmatically – there is no third theory – or metaphysically: statistical processing in the brain adapts to the true scale-relative structure of the universe.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 305 - 306
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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